Mergers And The Market For Corporate Control

This volume provides an essential overview of one of the most important developments in economics, finance and law of the past generation: the growing realization of how the market for corporate control functions and why its operation is of crucial importance. Presenting seventeen seminal contributions, the book illustrates the importance of corporate control changes - mergers, acquisitions and other takeovers - in helping to align the interests of corporate shareholders and their managers. The mechanics of various takeover techniques (poison pills, greenmail and other gambits) are also explored alongside empirical research concerning the functioning of the market for corporate control.

This book presents recent literature on corporate mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, restructuring, and corporate governance as well as discussions of valuation, cost of capital, and strategic financial planning. This book discusses how M&As fit into a company's long-term strategy and how restructuring can unlock values in a company. It presents strategies designed to increase a firm's value: i.e., joint ventures, ESOPs, LBOs, share repurchases, and international strategies. The book also provides guides on selecting M&As to strengthen a company or increase its value. The second edition of Takeovers, Restructuring and Corporate Governance has been revised to include the latest empirical data and literature. It also now includes 38 important recent case studies: i.e., QVC-Paramount; Boeing-McDonnell Douglas; Ciba-Geigy-Sandoz, Disney-Cap Cities-ABC, and Time Warner-Turner.

This book provides an insightful view of major issues in the economics of corporate governance (CG) and mergers. It presents a systematic update on the developments in the two fields during the last decade, as well as highlighting the neglected topics in CG research, such as the role of boards, CG and public interest and the relation of CG to mergers. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this book: the first is that corporate governance systems that better align shareholders and managers interests lead to better corporate performance; second, there is an important relationship between CG structures and the quality of firm decision-making, one of the most important being the decision to merge or take over another firm. Focusing on some of the often-neglected aspects of corporate governance such as non-profit organizations and public interest, as well as mergers and acquisitions from a CG perspective, this book will be a valuable resource for both academics and postgraduate students of finance, business and economics.

This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.

In this book Neil Fligstein takes issue with prevailing theories of the corporation and proposes a radically new view that has important implications for American competitiveness.

This book analyzes the modern trend in the Japanese M and A market. It reveals from different perspectives the process of convergence to a new monitoring model of the corporation: "the market for corporate control". The book contains a systematic survey of all relevant economic and legal information in this field. Analysis of 17 recent cases of hostile takeover is presented.