Meta Theory Of Law

This book is devoted to the theory of legal theory, also referred to as the "meta-theory of law". The aim of this emerging discipline is to determine the objectives, aims and methods of legal theory, and to establish the conditions of possibility as well as the validity criteria for theoretical discourse on law. The contributions in this book provide an overview of these aspects through different perspectives and approaches. The very purpose of legal theory has been disputed and the subject area is currently subject to increasing cross-fertilization between different, and sometimes diverging, traditions. Meta-theory of Law assesses these emerging trends by questioning two basic objects of legal theory, the "nature" and the "science" of law.

This book is devoted to the theory of legal theory, also referred to as the "meta-theory of law". The aim of this emerging discipline is to determine the objectives, aims and methods of legal theory, and to establish the conditions of possibility as well as the validity criteria for theoretical discourse on law. The contributions in this book provide an overview of these aspects through different perspectives and approaches. The very purpose of legal theory has been disputed and the subject area is currently subject to increasing cross-fertilization between different, and sometimes diverging, traditions. Meta-theory of Law assesses these emerging trends by questioning two basic objects of legal theory, the "nature" and the "science" of law.

What is the nature of the social sciences? What kinds of knowledge can they—and should they—hope to create? Are objective viewpoints possible and can universal laws be discovered? Questions like these have been asked with increasing urgency in recent years, as some philosophers and researchers have perceived a "crisis" in the social sciences. Metatheory in Social Science offers many provocative arguments and analyses of basic conceptual frameworks for the study of human behavior. These are offered primarily by practicing researchers and are related to problems in disciplines as diverse as sociology, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, and philosophy of science. While various points of view are expressed in these nineteen essays, they have in common several themes, including the comparison of social and natural science, the role of knowledge in meeting the demands of society and its pressing problems, and the nature and role of subjectivity in science. Some authors hold that subjectivity cannot be studied scientifically; others argue that it can and must be if progress in knowledge is to be made. The essays demonstrate the philosophical pluralism they discuss and give a wide range of alternative positions on the future of the social and behavioral sciences in a postpositivist intellectual world.

Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin argue for a revolution in our cosmological ideas. Ideal for non-scientists, physicists and cosmologists.

This book addresses theoretical problems concerning legal evidence. The concept of evidence is expected to fulfill a number of distinct roles in science and philosophy, but also in legal theory and law, some of which are complementary, while others are conflicting. In their profession, lawyers have to deal with evidence and proof. Yet the legal concept of evidence is constantly changing, and the debate concerning the distinction between a legal concept of evidence, the ordinary concept of evidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science, and by extension to our academic thinking on law. In short, legal theorists’ interest in evidence may include such diverse objects as a bloody knife, sensory data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. The book surveys selected theoretical roles that the concept of evidence plays and explores their relations and interconnections. The content is divided into three parts, investigating: (1) evidence in epistemology and the philosophy of science, which focuses on evidence methodologies and the problem of proof in legal scholarship; (2) evidence in legal theory and legal philosophy, where particular attention is paid to the interplay between evidence, legal reasoning and the binding force of such reasoning; and (3) evidence in law, where theoretical problems pertaining to witnesses, expert opinions, explanations of the accused, statistical evidence and neuroscientific evidence are examined.

Crossing the usual boundaries of abstract legal theory, this book considers actual charter systems - legal systems with explicitly posited moral-political rights, such as those of Canada and the United States - as well as cases in constitutional adjudication. It shows the worth of careful reflection on methodological and meta-theoretical issues for a comprehensive account of a present-day legal system which is fast becoming the norm. The author explicitly connects the ongoing Methodology Debate within legal philosophy to constitutional adjudication and Canadian law. By drawing out the implications of the Methodology Debate and the challenge of giving a proper account of constitutional adjudication in a general theory of law, the study examines how a descriptive, morally and politically neutral legal theory can deal with epistemic uncertainty - uncertainty about the actual status of moral-political legal provisions and their jurisprudential function - in a thoroughgoing manner. It also demonstrates the merits of a minimalist version of Legal Positivism with regard to the practical importance of charters in charter systems and societies.

John T. Roberts presents and defends a radically new theory of laws of nature, the Measurability Account. Though consistent with a Humean ontology, Roberts's theory differs sharply from the most influential Humean theory of laws, David Lewis's Best-System Analysis. Unlike other Humean theories, the Measurability Account affirms that there is an important sense in which the laws govern the universe, rather than simply describing it economically. Yet unlike non-Humean theories, it requires only minimal metaphysical commitments. In this way, it combines the advantages of Humean and non-Humean approaches to laws, while avoiding the pitfalls of each. At the heart of the Measurability Account are two new ideas: that lawhood is not a property of facts but rather a role that a proposition can play within a scientific theory, and that what is essential to laws is that they guarantee the reliability of methods of measuring natural quantities. On the basis of these ideas, Roberts argues that we can offer an informative and compelling explanation of why laws have the peculiar counterfactual resilience that sets them apart from accidental uniformities.

This collection of essays is the outcome of a workshop with Scott Shapiro on The Planning Theory of Law that took place in December 2009 at Bocconi University. It brings together a group of scholars who wrote their contributions to the workshop on a preliminary draft of Shapiro’s Legality. Then, after the workshop, they wrote their final essays on the published version of the book. The contributions clearly highlight the difference of the continental and civil law perspective from the common law background of Shapiro but at the same time the volume tries to bridge the gap between the two. The essays provide a critical reading of the planning theory of law, highlighting its merits on the one hand and objecting to some parts of it on the other hand. Each contribution discusses in detail a chapter of Shapiro’s book and together they cover the whole of Shapiro’s theory. So the book presents a balanced and insightful discussion of the arguments of Legality.