Metaphysics And Ontology Without Myths

Metaphysics and ontology feature among the traditional and fundamental concerns of philosophers. Gaining a picture of the world and the kind of objects that exist out there is for most philosophers (past and present) a preliminary aim upon which other theoretical activities depend. In fact, it seems that sound conclusions on topics relevant to ethics, aesthetics, psychology, and common and scientific knowledge can be achieved only after one has been given a picture of that sort. What is worth stressing, though, is that from time to time the tribunal of history has managed to put its finger on some flawed conclusions. To take a time-worn example, who would now accept Plato’s claim that the spatiotemporal world is just an imperfect copy of a world of abstract objects conceived of as perfect unchanging models of concrete things? The picture Plato gave us is nothing but a myth – an account which is too far away from what common sense and science could accept, too detached from the usual ways of conducting a rational discussion. Therefore, pictures of this kind appear to be supported by nothing but dogmas, i.e. uncompromising principles taken as true without any previous critical analysis. And Plato has no shortage of company. Issues of this kind revolving around metaphysics and ontology are tackled in the essays in this volume, which approach a secular debate in fresh and original ways, providing the necessary tools for clearing the field of unpalatable metaphysical and ontological items.

This original and exciting study offers a completely new perspective on the philosophy of mathematics. Most philosophers of mathematics try to show either that the sort of knowledge mathematicians have is similar to the sort of knowledge specialists in the empirical sciences have or that the kind of knowledge mathematicians have, although apparently about objects such as numbers, sets, and so on, isn't really about those sorts of things at all. Jody Azzouni argues that mathematical knowledge is a special kind of knowledge that must be gathered in its own unique way. He analyzes the linguistic pitfalls and misperceptions philosophers in this field are often prone to, and explores the misapplications of epistemic principles from the empirical sciences to the exact sciences. What emerges is a picture of mathematics sensitive both to mathematical practice and to the ontological and epistemological issues that concern philosophers. The book will be of special interest to philosophers of science, mathematics, logic, and language. It should also interest mathematicians themselves.

Scientific literature on particular themes in ontology is extremely abundant, but it is often very hard for freshmen or sophomores to find a red thread between the various proposals. This text is an opinionated introduction, a preliminary text to research in ontology from the so called standard approach to ontological commitment, that is from the particular point of view that connects ontological questions to quantificational questions. It offers a survey of this viewpoint in ontology together with their possible applications through a broad array of examples and open problems and, at the same time, essential references to the classics of philosophy, so as to allow non-specialists to understand the terms and analysis procedures characterizing the discipline. Its result is a wide-ranging overview of the issued tackled by ontology, with a particular focus on the most relevant problems of contemporary debate (categorial taxonomies, nonexistent objects, case studies of ontological debates in specific fields of knowledge).

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1914 edition. Excerpt: ...(6vaia, ens in se subsistens), but which is also a support or subject of accidents (JyiroKeifievov, substans, substare) Nor, indeed, need the child's reason be very highly developed in order to realize that if experience furnishes it with "beings that do not exist in themselves," there must also be beings which do exist in themselves: that if " accidents" exist at all it would be unintelligible and self-contradictory to deny the existence of "substances ." Hence, in the order of our experience the first, implicit notion of substance is that of " something existing in itself" (pvaia); the first explicit notion of it, however, is that by which it is apprehended as "a subject or support of accidents" (rrroKeijjievov, sub-stare, substantial; then by reflection we go back to the explicit notion of it as " something existing in itself." In the real or ontological order the perfection of "existing in itself" is manifestly more fundamental than that of "supporting accidents." It is in accordance with a natural law of language that we name things after the properties whereby they reveal themselves to us, rather than by names implying what is more fundamental and essential in them. "To exist in itself" is an absolute perfection, essential to substance; "to support accidents " is only a relative perfection; nor can we know a priori but a substance might perhaps exist without any accidents: we only know that accidents 1 Cf. Mercier, op. at., % 142 (p. 272). 1 Cf. Kleutghn, op. cit., Dissert, vi., ch. iii., ii, 592. cannot exist without some substance, or subject, or power which will sustain them in existence. Can substance be apprehended by the...

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What is an object? How do we look at them? Why do they matter? This collection presents a lively, timely discussion of natural and artifactual objects, considering the relationship between them from a range of philosophical perspectives, including the philosophy of biology, the metaphysics of space and the philosophy of perception. Beginning from the starting point that natural objects are bona fide, endowed with some natural border between themselves and everything else, while artifactual objects depend on the observation of tacit conventions and may include the ordinary objects of everyday life, this volume explores, contextualises and interrogates objects. Contributors discuss a variety of objects including physical, scientific and mental ones, as well as things that appear to question the limits of object-hood, including holes, Quinean 'posits' and language. The very first collection to address this growing topic within analytic philosophy, Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics represents a highly original work, showcasing some of the most important and influential philosophers working in Europe today.

Living-With Wisdom explores the way in which ancient Greek models of philosophy as an attempt to live ‘the good life’ can and should be realised through the practice of permaculture. Following the thought of Plato and Aristotle, the author places the achievement of wisdom and fulfilment at the centre of the good life, identifying these with the achievement of a complex admixture of virtues, which are dependent on an appreciation of goodness itself. The book then examines the manner in which permaculture – or the practice of sustainable farming or ethical gardening – can provide us with the best opportunity to acquire this ‘moral knowledge’ through the close relationships we can have with other living beings and things. A study of the nature of wisdom and a means of ‘living-with philosophy’, Living-With Wisdom: Permaculture and Symbiotic Ethics reveals that it is by appreciating and sharing in the lives of other organisms that we engage with many dilemmas of life and death and have the opportunity to exercise the virtues. As such, it will appeal to scholars of philosophy, social theory and anthrozoology with interests in virtue ethics, environmental ethics, animal ethics and human-animal relations.

This book is an attempt to interpret man's religious existence, an inter pretation for which some of the groundwork was laid by the author's book PHENOMENOLOGY AND ATHEISM (Duquesne University Press, 2nd impression, 1965). That work explored the "denial" of God by the leading atheists and came to terms with the most typical forms assumed by their "denials". Nevertheless, I am not an adherent of atheism. The reason why it is possible to agree with many "atheists" without becoming one of them is that man can misunderstand his own religiousness or lapse into an inauthentic form of being a believer. What many "atheists" unmask is one or the other form of pseudo-religiousness which should be unmasked. On the other hand, I have also constantly refused to identify religiousness with such inauthentic forms and to define it in terms of those forms - just as I refuse to identify the appendix with appendicitis, the heart with an infarct, the psyche as a disturbance, and marriage as a fight. The book offered here has been written since the rise of the radical "God is dead" theology. This "theology" without God has often been presented as the only form of theological thought still suitable for "modern man". As the reader will notice, I reject the brash facility with which some "modern men" measure the relevance of "anything" by its "modernity".