Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam 1954 1963 The Battle Of Ap Bac

The performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at the Battle of Ap Bac, January 2, 1963, established a narrative that the South Vietnamese were unwilling to fight or lacked aggressiveness. At the time of the Battle of Ap Bac, the South Vietnamese had been receiving direct military aid from the US and under the tutelage of American advisors for over eight years. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the senior US Army advisor present and remarked after the battle, “It was a miserable damn performance, just like it always is. These people won’t listen. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way.” In the context of those comments, ARVN did not show an appreciable increase in combat effectiveness with years of direct American support. The larger narrative surrounding the battle indicates that the performance of ARVN was a harbinger for future challenges and setbacks in South Vietnam. This battle and subsequent evaluation of the ARVN attribute the cause for combat ineffectiveness was the South Vietnamese lacking leadership and not possessing the necessary fighting spirit. Is the evaluation that the outcome of the Battle of Ap Bac hinged on the ARVN’s lack of aggressiveness still valid when put in the broader cultural, social, and political context that existed at its birth?

The performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) at the Battle of Ap Bac, January 2, 1963, established a narrative that the South Vietnamese were unwilling to fight or lacked aggressiveness. At the time of the Battle of Ap Bac, the South Vietnamese had been receiving direct military aid from the US and under the tutelage of American advisors for over eight years. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the senior U.S. Army advisor present and remarked after the battle, "It was a miserable damn performance, just like it always is. These people won't listen. They make the same mistake over and over again in the same way.” In the context of those comments, ARVN did not show an appreciable increase in combat effectiveness with years of direct American support. The larger narrative surrounding the battle indicates that the performance of ARVN was a harbinger for future challenges and setbacks in South Vietnam. This battle and subsequent evaluation of the ARVN attribute the cause for combat ineffectiveness was the South Vietnamese lacking leadership and not possessing the necessary fighting spirit. Is the evaluation that the outcome of the Battle of Ap Bac hinged on the lack of competent and aggressive ARVN officers still valid when put in the broader cultural, social, and political context that existed at its birth?

Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.

This unique publication covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history-the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 70.0 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed. The author is a Marine Reservist who was a member of the History and Museums Division from September 1972 until August 1974. Promoted to major soon after his return to inactive duty, he is now working for the Kentucky State Government. A native of Kentucky, he holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Morehead State College (1965) and a Master of Arts degree in American History from the University of Kentucky (1972). Commissioned in 1965, Major Whitlow served as an infantry platoon commander with the 6th Marines, an aerial observer with the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam, and later as a platoon commander at Officer Candidate School, Quantico. For services in the Republic of Vietnam during 1967 and 1968 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and 26 awards of the Air Medal. Contents: PART I * THE WATERSHED * Chapter 1 * Background to Military Assistance * The Geographic Setting * The People * Vietnam's Recent History * Post-Geneva South Vietnam * The American Response * Chapter 2 * The Formative Years * Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam * Origins of U.S. Marine Assistance * Political Stabilization and Its Effects * Reorganization and Progress * Summing Up Developments * Chapter 3 * Vietnamese Marines and the Communist Insurgency * Origins and Early Stages of Insurgency * Insurgency and the Vietnamese Marine Corps * Ancillary Effects on Marine Pacific Commands * American Decisions at the Close of 1961 * Chapter 4 * An Expanding War, 1962 * The War's New Context * Creation of MACV and Marine Advisory Division * The Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1962 * Some Conclusions * PART II * MARINE HELICOPTERS GO TO WAR * Chapter 5 * SHUFLY at Soc Trang * The Decision * Deployment to Soc Trang * Mekong Delta Combat Support Operations * Preparations and Redeployment * Accomplishments * Chapter 6 * SHUFLY Moves North * Arrival at Da Nang * I Corps Tactical Zone * Military Situation, September 1962 * Initial Helicopter Operations * Marine People-to-People Program * SHUFLY Operations in I Corps * Chapter 7 * The Laotian Crisis, 1962 * Genesis of the Problem * The American Response * The Marine Corps Role * Marine Participation: A Summary * PART III * THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963 * Chapter 8 * The Marine Advisory Effort * The Political Climate * The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations * Accomplishments * Chapter 9 * SHUFLY Operations * Development of the Compound Continues * Combat Support Operations * The Situation in Vietnam * PART IV * AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964 * Chapter 10 * Marines Meet the Challenge * New American Decisions * A Restructured Military Assistance Command * Changes in Marine Leadership * Redesignation and Reorganization * The Vietnamese Marine Brigade * Additional Marine Activities * Chapter 11 * Spring and Summer Fighting * The Monsoons * The Weather Breaks * Sure Wind 202 * Operations Elsewhere in I Corps * Changing the Watch * Chapter 12 * Fall and Winter Operations * Dry Weather Fighting * Monsoon and Flood Relief Operations * Changes and Improvements * Action as the Year Ends * Chapter 13 * Prelude to Escalation * NOTES * APPENDICES. * A. USMC and VNMC Senior Officers, 1954-1964 * B. Awards and Decorations, RVN, Through 1964 * C. Glossary of Acronyms * D. Chronology * E. List of Reviewers

This is the first of a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history—the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

With the withdrawal of French forces from South Vietnam in 1955, the U.S. took an ever-widening role in defending the country against invasion by North Vietnam. By 1965, the U.S. had "Americanized" the war, relegating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to a supporting role. While the U.S. won many tactical victories, it had difficulty controlling the territory it fought for. As the war grew increasingly unpopular with the American public, the North Vietnamese launched two large-scale invasions in 1968 and 1972--both tactical defeats but strategic victories for the North that precipitated the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization," the drawdown of American forces that left the ARVN to fight alone. This book examines the maturation of the ARVN, and the major battles it fought from 1963 to its demise in 1975. Despite its flaws, the ARVN was a well-organized and disciplined force with an independent spirit and contributed enormously to the war effort. Had the U.S. "Vietnamized" the war earlier, it might have been won in 1967-1968.

This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.