Ministry Of Defence

Readiness is the term used to describe the means by which the Ministry of Defence holds its military forces at varying levels of preparedness to respond to emerging operations. An effective system for assessing and reporting military readiness is a key part of modern armed forces capability, in order to manage risks and address any deficiencies and plan for the future. This has become increasingly important in recent years given the unpredictable nature of the current security environment. This NAO report finds that the MoD has a good system for reporting the readiness of its armed forces, although there is scope for further improvement, both to better define and measure its Public Service Agreement target for readiness, and to manage the main areas of risk, such as logistic support.

This report deals with the performance of the Ministry of Defence against the objectives and priorities set for the financial year 1999/2000. It is as far as possible a comprehensive account of defence-related performance and activity. A summary of performance against the Public Service Agreement precedes chapters on: military capability; security policy; people; logistics and procurement; resources and management; standards. There are a number of appendices which include the Defence Mission, the structure of the Ministry of Defence and the responsibilities of Defence Ministers.

Explores the crucial aspect of civil-military relations encompassed in the dynamic between policy making, command, and administration by focusing on the centre for defence decisions in Canada, the National Defence Headquarters. Basic concepts concerning civilian control of military forces, military command, and defence administration are first explained, followed by a review of the law and its relation to the Dept. of National Defence. The following two chapters describe the responsibilities and formal relationships of various decision makers (the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Deputy Minister); the legal aspects of command; the operational duties of the Chief of Defence Staff; the defence decision making structure; and the Defence Headquarters management system. The final two chapters review problems with the defence system, including overall structures, ethics, strategy and command, and administration, along with recommendations for reform of the defence structure.

In 2000, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) began to develop plans to replace existing diverse systems with a single information infrastructure to enable better communication, to promote more efficient ways of working, and to obtain better value for money. In March 2005, the Department let a contract with ATLAS, a consortium with EDS as the prime contractor, for the installation and management of a new infrastructure over 10 years. The Defence Information Infrastructure Programme (DII) will eventually incorporate 150,000 terminals for 300,000 users at over 2,000 defence sites, including on ships and deployed operations. The parts of the Programme which the Department has on contract are estimated to cost £4.9 billion. As with other major IT programmes, DII is intrinsically complex and challenging. In this case, the Programme's size and demanding requirements for security and deployment to theatres of military operations are particularly exacting. It is also challenging to manage in terms of the complex interconnection with other business change programmes and the level of churn in the Department's business, and has had to be introduced into a diverse, and in places poor quality, estate. The Programme reports that it has already achieved or enabled benefits to date of £916 million. But the Programme's implementation difficulties have led to key elements of it running 18 months late. This delay has led to postponement of the achievement of some benefits, particularly the savings associated with switching off legacy systems and the longer term benefits from improved ways of working. The National Audit Office makes recommendations on preparation, implementation, service management and costs.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is unaware of the location of radios worth £184 million, and is unable to provide evidence of the existence and condition of assets worth £6.3 billion. This shortfall in accounting is reflected in the decision by the National Audit Office to qualify the MoD accounts for the fourth successive year. The Committee thinks this year's qualification should have been foreseen, given that it was a clear requirement on all Government departments to adopt the relevant reporting standards from 2009-10. It is unsatisfactory that the MoD expects their stock control problems to continue for another two to four years. The report notes the period of intense change that the MoD is going through, and recommends that any cuts to staffing levels must be appropriate for future business need and managed with care. The Committee will study the outcomes of the report of the Defence Reform Unit (ISBN 9780108510663) to ensure that the MoD retains the right skills. This will need to be reflected in decisions on redundancies through voluntary exit and otherwise so that the Department is not left without the right skills and experience required for effective performance. The Committee wishes to be assured that decisions on the scrapping of assets before the end of their useful life have been made on the basis of a sound cost-benefit analysis, taking into account the savings to be achieved and the effect of the loss of capability.

This report analyses the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (published as HC 697, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102946369). The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated since the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts. At the end of 2007, the MoD did not expect to meet the target relating to generating forces and expects "only partly" to meet targets relating to recruitment and retention, and defence equipment procurement. The failure to meet the target for generating forces is a consequence of the continuing high levels of deployment of the Armed Forces. The Committee is concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002. Achieving manning balance in all three Service continues to be a challenge. Shortages remain within many specialist trades in all three Armed Services, but especially in the Army Medical Service. The report notes the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the Royal Air Force - another indicator of the pressure on the Armed Forces from the continuing high level of operations - and another target missed by all three services is for ethnic minority recruitment. The MoD continues to experience substantial forecast cost increases on equipment programmes, and the report notes delays in delivering equipment programmes to the planned in-service dates. The MoD faces difficult choices in the face of expected cuts in the defence programme and the management of a streamlining exercise to reduce civilian posts in the headquarters.