Modern Legal Scholarship

"The purpose of this book is to get you started and guide you through the full scholarly writing process, from drafting to publishing. This book breaks down that process into understandable and manageable tasks to help you get started and complete the project. Individuals learn best when they understand the context and purpose of a project. To provide as much context as possible for the tasks ahead, and so that you understand both how and why to complete each task, this book walks you through the process of producing a range of quality scholarship both efficiently and effectively"--

Equity in Early Modern Legal Scholarship offers a comprehensive account of the development of equity by legal writers in the early modern period, unearthing a time of lively debate about its nature and function.

"The purpose of this book is to get you started and guide you through the full scholarly writing process, from drafting to publishing. This book breaks down that process into understandable and manageable tasks to help you get started and complete the project. Individuals learn best when they understand the context and purpose of a project. To provide as much context as possible for the tasks ahead, and so that you understand both how and why to complete each task, this book walks you through the process of producing a range of quality scholarship both efficiently and effectively"--

This book is about the use of legal scholarship by judges. It discusses the possibility that legal scholarship may function as a genuine source of law in modern municipal legal systems. The book advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The major conceptual claims are found in Chapters 2 and 3, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The relevant notion of content-independence is derived (with qualifications) from H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudence. Indeed, the book’s analysis of the concept of a source of law relies at various points on Hartian insights about law and legal reasoning. Chapter 4 argues that legal scholarship – or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that might be described as standard or doctrinal – can be, and indeed is, used as a source of law in modern legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate judicial recourse to legal scholarship with judicial activism. This association is discussed and criticized in Chapters 5 and 6. It is argued that, in spite of a relatively common opinion to the contrary, legal scholarship can be used to mitigate discretion. In fact, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it really does not. The concluding chapter addresses potential objections not explicitly discussed in earlier chapters.​

Providing a comprehensive account of the often-misunderstood area of legal doctrinal scholarship, this incisive book offers a novel framing for conceptual legal theory and the functions of conceptual theorising in legal studies. It explores the ways in which a doctrinally oriented legal theory may provide methodological support to legal scholars, arguing that making adequate sense of the rational reconstruction of law is pivotal in delivering such active support.

The contributions of Understanding the Sources of Early Modern and Modern Commercial Law show an excellent assemblage of sources which historians of commercial law use. Besides normative sources, others are often needed to complement them.

Although American scholars sometimes consider European legal scholarship as old-fashioned and inward-looking and Europeans often perceive American legal scholarship as amateur social science, both traditions share a joint challenge. If legal scholarship becomes too much separated from practice, legal scholars will ultimately make themselves superfluous. If legal scholars, on the other hand, cannot explain to other disciplines what is academic about their research, which methodologies are typical, and what separates proper research from mediocre or poor research, they will probably end up in a similar situation. Therefore we need a debate on what unites legal academics on both sides of the Atlantic. Should legal scholarship aspire to the status of a science and gradually adopt more and more of the methods, (quality) standards, and practices of other (social) sciences? What sort of methods do we need to study law in its social context and how should legal scholarship deal with the challenges posed by globalization?

This book uses the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn to provide a new vision of the development of European comparative law that will challenge and inspire scholars in the field. With the 'empathic' use of some ideas from Kuhn's theories on the history of science – paradigm, paradigm-shift, puzzle-solving research and incommensurability – the book rethinks the modern history of European comparative law from the late 19th century to the modern day. It argues that three major paradigms determine modern comparative law: - historical and comparative jurisprudence, - droit comparé, and - post-World War II comparative law. It concludes that contemporary methodological trends are not signs of a paradigm-shift toward a postmodern and culturalist understanding of comparative law, but that the new approach spreads the idea of methodological plurality.