Modern Legal Theory Judicial Impartiality

This book argues that at the core of legal philosophys principal debates there is essentially one issue judicial impartiality. Keeping this issue to the forefront, Raban's approach sheds much light on many difficult and seemingly perplexing jurisprudential debates. Modern Legal Theory and Judicial Impartiality offers a fresh and penetrating examination of two of the most celebrated modern legal theorists: HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. The book explains the relations between these two scholars and other theorists and schools of thought (including Max Weber, Lon Fuller, and the law and economics movement), offering both novices and experts an innovative and lucid look at modern legal theory. The book is written in an engaging and conversational style, tackling highly sophisticated issues in a concise and accessible manner. Undergraduates in jurisprudence and legal theory, as well as more advanced readers, will find it clear and challenging.

This book argues that at the core of legal philosophys principal debates there is essentially one issue judicial impartiality. Keeping this issue to the forefront, Raban's approach sheds much light on many difficult and seemingly perplexing jurisprudential debates. Modern Legal Theory and Judicial Impartiality offers a fresh and penetrating examination of two of the most celebrated modern legal theorists: HLA Hart and Ronald Dworkin. The book explains the relations between these two scholars and other theorists and schools of thought (including Max Weber, Lon Fuller, and the law and economics movement), offering both novices and experts an innovative and lucid look at modern legal theory. The book is written in an engaging and conversational style, tackling highly sophisticated issues in a concise and accessible manner. Undergraduates in jurisprudence and legal theory, as well as more advanced readers, will find it clear and challenging.

The U.S. Constitution contains a series of rights and liberties operating as restrictions on the powers of government, and courts have the final authority to determine what these often nebulous restrictions require. But judges are deeply divided over the correct methodology to follow in making these determinations: different judges employ different judicial philosophies--and may consequently reach different constitutional results. Understanding these methodological disagreements is therefore crucial for anyone wishing to attain a full understanding of our constitutional law, or to appraise the legitimacy of our institutional arrangements--especially that of judicial review. In The Silent Prologue, Ofer Raban provides an engaging examination of the interpretive theories judges use to reach their verdicts. Using key case histories as illustration, Raban illuminates the rationales and assumptions behind competing judicial philosophies that have far-reaching implications for the rights of American citizens. Distributed for George Mason University Press

Moving beyond the subjectivity-objectivity debate, Edlin presents a case for intersubjectivity

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines "international law" to include not only "custom" and "convention" between States but also "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" within their municipal legal systems. In 1953, Bin Cheng wrote his seminal book on general principles, identifying core legal principles common to various domestic legal systems across the globe. This monograph summarizes and analyzes the general principles of law and norms of international due process, with a particular focus on developments since Cheng's writing. The aim is to collect and distill these principles and norms in a single volume as a practical resource for international law jurists, advocates, and scholars. The information contained in this book holds considerable importance given the growth of inter-state intercourse resulting in the increased use of general principles over the past 60 years. General principles can serve as rules of decision, whether in interpreting a treaty or contract, determining causation, or ascertaining unjust enrichment. They also include a core set of procedural requirements that should be followed in any adjudicative system, such as the right to impartiality and the prohibition on fraud. Although the general principles are, by definition, basic and even rudimentary, they hold vital importance for the rule of law in international relations. They are meant not to define a rule of law, but rather the rule of law.

We live in an age where one person's judicial "activist" legislating from the bench is another's impartial arbiter fairly interpreting the law. After the Supreme Court ended the 2000 Presidential election with its decision in Bush v. Gore, many critics claimed that the justices had simply voted their political preferences. But Justice Clarence Thomas, among many others, disagreed and insisted that the Court had acted according to legal principle, stating: "I plead with you, that, whatever you do, don't try to apply the rules of the political world to this institution; they do not apply." The legitimacy of our courts rests on their capacity to give broadly acceptable answers to controversial questions. Yet Americans are divided in their beliefs about whether our courts operate on unbiased legal principle or political interest. Comparing law to the practice of common courtesy, Keith Bybee explains how our courts not only survive under these suspicions of hypocrisy, but actually depend on them. Law, like courtesy, furnishes a means of getting along. It frames disputes in collectively acceptable ways, and it is a habitual practice, drummed into the minds of citizens by popular culture and formal institutions. The rule of law, thus, is neither particularly fair nor free of paradoxical tensions, but it endures. Although pervasive public skepticism raises fears of judicial crisis and institutional collapse, such skepticism is also an expression of how our legal system ordinarily functions.

The creation of a culture of Judicial Independence is of a central significance both in national domestic legal systems, as well as for the international courts and tribunals. The main aim of this volume is to analyze the development of a culture of Judicial Independence in comparative perspectives, to offer an examination of the conceptual foundations of the principle of judicial independence and to discuss in detail the practical challenges facing judiciaries in different jurisdictions. The proposed volume is based on the papers presented at the five conferences held in the framework of The International Project on Judicial independence. The editors of this volume and the contributors to it are leading scholars and distinguished experts on judicial independence and judiciaries.

Judicial systems are under increasing pressure: from rising litigation costs and decreased accessibility, from escalating accountability and performance evaluation expectations, from shifting burdens of case management and alternative dispute resolution roles, and from emerging technologies. For courts to survive and flourish in a rapidly changing society, it is vital to have a clear understanding of their contemporary role – and a willingness to defend it. This book presents a clear vision of what it is that courts do, how they do it, and how we can make sure that they perform that role well. It argues that courts remain a critical, relevant and supremely well-adjusted institution in the 21st century. The approach of this book is to weave together a range of discourses on surrounding judicial issues into a systemic and coherent whole. It begins by articulating the dual roles at the core of the judicial function: third-party merit-based dispute resolution and social (normative) governance. By expanding upon these discrete yet inter-related aspects, it develops a language and conceptual framework to understand the judicial role more fully. The subsequent chapters demonstrate the explanatory power of this function, examining the judicial decision-making method, reframing principles of judicial independence and impartiality, and re-conceiving systems of accountability and responsibility. The book argues that this function-driven conception provides a useful re-imagining of some familiar issues as part of a coherent framework of foundational, yet interwoven, principles. This approach not only adds clarity to the analysis of those concepts and the concrete mechanisms by which they are manifest, but helps make the case of why courts remain such vital social institutions. Ultimately, the book is an entreaty not to take courts for granted, nor to readily abandon the benefits they bring to society. Instead, by understanding the importance and legitimacy of the judicial role, and its multifaceted social benefits, this books challenge us to refresh our courts in a manner that best advances this underlying function.