Modern Statutory Interpretation

Modern Statutory Interpretation is an original, clear, coherent and research-based account of contemporary Australian statutory interpretation. It provides a comprehensive coverage of statutory interpretation law, legislative drafting, the parliamentary process, the modern history of interpretation, sources of doubt, and interpretation techniques.

This book is designed to teach statutory interpretation skills. It uses a combination of traditional cases along with problems to accomplish that objective. Broadly organized around the process of interpretation, it focuses first on the plain meaning of the text and then addresses the question of whether and, if so, when courts will examine sources other than the text. The book addresses the various approaches and theories to interpretation and examines how those approaches have been applied to particular interpretative problems, such as implied rights, administrative interpretations, and the interpretation of "uniform statutes." Within each chapter, subjects are introduced with concise summaries of the core concepts. After the introduction, a well-edited case explores the uncertainties and boundaries of those core concepts. The notes and questions following each principal case are designed to help focus the students' thoughts and understanding of the case before they come to class. Finally, problems are included to ensure that the students use the statutory interpretation skills they have just learned. Each problem lends itself to at least two arguments (often more) and allows for further inquiry into the concepts in the chapter. The second edition has been revised and updated to include more problems and a few new cases. Additionally, the legislative and administrative chapters have been substantially revised. An electronic Teacher's Manual is available. To request the file, please email crutan (at) cap-press (dot) com.

"The modern principle is the official approach to statutory interpretation in Canada and is the foundation for the structure of this text. The modern principle focuses on the language of a statutory provision in light of its purpose, intent and context, and Hutchison devotes separate chapters to each of these aspects of statutory interpretation. The Fundamentals of Statutory Interpretation also critiques the various facets of the modern principle with a view to help identify more convincing interpretations of legislative intent. In addition, it tackles complicated issues concerning both the temporal application of statutes, such as retroactivity and retrospectivity, and when legislation may interfere with "vested rights.""--Publisher's website.

This book offers readers concise and user-friendly tools to help articulate the most powerful arguments to identify the legislative intent found in the statute. It provides: examples and illustrations from across Canada's federal and provincial jurisdictions; detailed analysis of the key judicial decisions and a table of cases that practitioners in particular will find extremely valuable, as well as a reproduction of both the Interpretation Act (Canada) and Interpretation Act (Quebec).

Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judgecentered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic. Eskridge also considers how different normative theories of jurisprudence--liberal, legal process, and antiliberal--inform debates about statutory interpretation. He explores what theory of statutory interpretation--if any--is required by the rule of law or by democratic theory. Finally, he provides an analytical and jurisprudential history of important debates on statutory interpretation.

In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

This book is designed to teach statutory interpretation skills. It uses a combination of traditional cases along with problems to accomplish that objective. Broadly organized around the process of interpretation, it focuses first on the plain meaning of the text and then addresses the question of whether and, if so, when courts will examine sources other than the text. The book addresses the various approaches and theories to interpretation and examines how those approaches have been applied to particular interpretative problems, such as implied rights, administrative interpretations, and the interpretation of ''uniform statutes.'' Within each chapter, subjects are introduced with concise summaries of the core concepts. After the introduction, a well-edited case explores the uncertainties and boundaries of those core concepts. The notes and questions following each principal case are designed to help focus the students' thoughts and understanding of the case before they come to class. Finally, problems are included to ensure that the students use the statutory interpretation skills they have just learned. Each problem lends itself to at least two arguments (often more) and allows for further inquiry into the concepts in the chapter. The second edition has been revised and updated to include more problems and a few new cases. Additionally, the legislative and administrative chapters have been substantially revised.