Monetary And Fiscal Coordination In Small Open Economies

This paper is concerned with the design of institutional arrangements for low inflation in small open economies. In the real world of information asymmetries, uncertain expectations and changeable preferences, it is not enough to create an autonomous and publicly accountable central bank. In addition, the central bank and the treasury must work together on the design, implementation, monitoring and, when necessary, the revision of macroeconomic policy, and on providing the public with information on ongoing economic developments and interpretation of the macroeconomic strategy.

Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.

This paper examines the relative effectiveness of the use of indirect and direct monetary policy instruments in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, by estimating a restricted Vector Autoregressive model with Exogenous Variables (VARX). The study assumes that the central bank conducts monetary policy using a Taylor-type rule and it evaluates the effects of a reserve requirement policy. The results show that although a positive shock to the policy interest rate has a direct effect on commercial banks' interest rates, there is a weak transmission to the real variables. Furthermore, an increase in the required reserve ratio is successful in reducing private sector credit and excess reserves, while at the same time alleviating pressures on the exchange rate. The findings therefore indicate that central banks in small open economies should consider using reserve requirements as a complement to interest rate policy, to achieve their macroeconomic objectives.

This paper investigates the effects of unconventional monetary policy in a small open economy. Using recently proposed shadow interest rates to capture unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB) we estimate a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive model for Canada - a useful case where foreign shocks can be proxied by U.S. variables alone. We find that, during the ZLB period, Canadian unconventional monetary policy increased output (measured by industrial production) by 0.013 percent per month on average while US unconventional monetary policy raised Canadian output by 0.127 percent per month on average. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of domestic unconventional monetary policy and the strong positive spillover effects that foreign unconventional monetary policies can have in a small open economy.

We develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run. We show how such monetary-fiscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate specific features of emerging market economies. The model takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with the rest of the world and features, in particular, financial frictions It is calibrated using Chile and US data. Alongside the optimal Ramsey policy benchmark, we model the three pillars as simple monetary and fiscal rules including and both domestic and CPI inflation targeting interest rate rules alongside a 'Structural Surplus Fiscal Rule' as followed recently in Chile. A comparison with a fixed exchange rate regime is made. We find that domestic inflation targeting is superior to partially or implicitly (through a CPI inflation target) or fully attempting to stabilizing the exchange rate. Financial frictions require fiscal policy to play a bigger role and lead to an increase in the costs associated with simple rules as opposed to the fully optimal policy.

This paper studies the fiscal multiplier using a small-open-economy DSGE model enriched with financial frictions. It shows that the multiplier is large when frictions are present in domestic and international financial markets. The reason is that in the model government bonds are more liquid than private financial assets and that entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints. A bond-financed fiscal expansion eases these constraints and stimulates investment and hence growth. This mechanism, however, breaks down under the assumption of perfect international capital mobility, suggesting that conventional models which ignore the presence of frictions in international capital markets tend to underestimate the fiscal multiplier.

In pursuing a steady-state reserve target, policymakers in small open economies can resort to devaluation or to temporary increases in public saving. This paper contrasts the dynamic implications of these alternative policies in a model with optimizing agents who possess perfect foresight. In general, the private sector cannot be insulated from the effects of the government’s reserve-accumulation policies. The dynamic effects of devaluation depend on the fiscal policy rule in effect. In contrast to devaluation, the “equivalent” fiscal policies imply discontinuities in private consumption and temporary tax increases may cause key macroeconomic variables to overshoot their steady-state values.

We develop a tractable open-economy new-Keynesian model with two sectors to analyze the short-term effects of aid-financed fiscal expansions. We distinguish between spending the aid, which is under the control of the fiscal authorities, and absorbing the aid-using the aid to finance a higher current account deficit-which is influenced by the central bank's reserves policy when access to international capital markets is limited. The standard treatment of the transfer problem implicitly assumes spending equals absorption. Here, in contrast, a policy mix that results in spending but not absorbing the aid generates demand pressures and results in an increase in real interest rates. It can also lead to a temporary real depreciation if demand pressures are strong enough to threaten external balance. Certain features of low income countries, such as limited participation in domestic financial markets, make a real depreciation more likely by amplifying demand pressures when aid is spent but not absorbed. The results from our model can help understand the recent experience of Uganda, which saw an increase in government spending following a surge in aid yet experienced a real depreciation and an increase in real interest rates.