Moving Beyond Supplier Controls In A Mature Technology Environment

The proliferation of all kinds of weapons is a focal point for international security. This work shows how both the language used to talk about weapons proliferation and the practices adopted to respond to it serve to define the problem in ways that promote policy responses doomed to failure.

This text takes issue with arguments that security studies is a discipline of limited use in making sense of the post-Cold War world. It argues that many of the most interesting theoretical issues in international relations can most usefully be studied through a prism labelled "security studies". The book combines chapters which provide a variety of critical perspectives on the discipline and address a diverse range of theoretical concerns, with chapters that examine such substantive issues as weapons proliferation and the changing meaning of "security" for actors in the erstwhile conflict between East and West.

The Markland Group is a Canadian non-governmental organization founded in 1987 by Douglas Scott. It is composed of lawyers, academics and other professionals with a special interest in the compliance aspects of disarmament treaties. The Canadian Council on International Law was founded in 1972 to represent Canadian international law practitioners and academics and to facilitate and promote the study of international legal problems by scholars and professionals. These two organizations joined forces in March 1995 to conduct a workshop on compliance, a topic which they felt had received insufficient attention from the international legal community. Thirty-eight experts from Canada, the United States and Great Britain were assembled for a series of meetings at the University of Toronto under the chairmanship of Walter Dorn and Christine Elwell. Five of the papers presented at the workshop have since been edited, expanded and updated for publication in this volume. The papers analyse compliance measures under various treaties, with particular attention being given to: The Biological Weapons Convention; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Safeguards); Trade and Environment Compliance Measures; and International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms and their potential impact on Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties. The Markland Group and the CCIL believe that the study of treaty compliance methodology is still in its infancy. The development of effective, reliable and acceptable compliance systems is imperative, particularly for treaties dealing with disarmament. It is hoped that this volume will provide an impetus for enhanced study of this crucial issue.

The papers compiled in this report attempt to determine under what conditions and to what extent cultural factors make a difference in the elaboration and execution of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD) policies. They seek to clarify a concept of security cultures that draws upon the diplomatic, political, strategic, and social elements that go into security policy-making. Culture, as it refers to NACD issues, consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's or society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated, and advanced by political actors and elites. The papers cover a range of states and regions: south-east Asia, China, India, Latin America, and the Middle East. Each examines a range of concrete issues and cases connected with NACD issues, and orientations towards security more generally.