My Clan Against The World U S And Coalition Forces In Somalia 1992 1994

This study examines the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.

"My Clan Against the World": US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu.

As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the United States had a military presence in Somalia from December 1992 to the end of March 1994. A principal aim of the authors was to provide an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. The authors address planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse of "lessons learned."

This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster. The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to Oct. 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations. This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention.

In this book, two national-security experts put the exploits of America’s special operation forces in historical and strategic context. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb offer an incisive overview of America’s turbulent experience with special operations. Starting with in-depth interviews with special operators, the authors illustrate the diversity of modern special operations forces and the strategic value of their unique attributes. Despite longstanding and growing public fascination with special operators, these forces and their contribution to national security are poorly understood. With this book, Tucker and Lamb dispel common misconceptions and offer a penetrating analysis of how these unique and valuable forces can be employed to even better effect in the future. The book builds toward a comprehensive assessment of the strategic utility of special operations forces, which it then considers in light of the demands of future warfare. This second edition of United States Special Operations Forces, revised throughout to account for lessons learned in the twelve years since its first publication, includes two new case studies, one on High Value Target Teams and another on Village Stability Operations, and two new appendixes charting the evolution of special operation missions and the best literature on all aspects of U.S. special operation forces.

Urban Battlefields: Lessons Learned from World War II to the Modern Era offers a detailed study of the complexities of urban operations, demonstrating through historical conflicts their key features, the various weapons and tactics employed by both sides, and the factors that contributed to success or failure. Urban operations are a relatively recent phenomenon and an increasingly prominent feature of today’s operational environment, typified by on-going fighting in Syria and Iraq. Here, Gregory Fremont-Barnes has enlisted ten experts to examine the key elements that characterize this particularly costly and difficult method of fighting by focusing on notable examples across the modern era. He covers their nineteenth-century roots, and follows with case studies ranging from major conventional formations to counterinsurgency and civil resistance. The contributors analyze the distinct features of urban warfare, which separate it from fighting in open areas, particularly the three-dimensional nature of the operating environment. These include: the restricted fields of fire and view; the substantial advantages conferred on the defender as a result of concealed positions and ubiquitous cover; the often- abundant presence of subterranean features including cellars, tunnels, and drainage and sewer systems; and the recurrent problems imposed by snipers holding up the progress of troops many times their number. Further, the authors consider how the presence of civilians may influence the rules of engagement and also may provide an advantage to the defender. Urban Battlefields illustrates why warfare in metropolises can be protracted and costly. It also illustrates why modest numbers of soldiers, militia, or insurgents with nothing more than shoulder-borne anti-tank weapons or ground-to-air missile systems, small arms, and improvised explosive devices can drastically reduce the effectiveness of much better disciplined, trained, and armed adversaries. Furthermore, it explains how those short-term advantages can be neutralized and ultimately overcome.

The Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations presents an innovative, authoritative, and accessible examination and critique of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Since the late 1940s, but particularly since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping has been a central part of the core activities of the United Nations and a major process in global security governance and the management of international relations in general. The volume will present a chronological analysis, designed to provide a comprehensive perspective that highlights the evolution of UN peacekeeping and offers a detailed picture of how the decisions of UN bureaucrats and national governments on the set-up and design of particular UN missions were, and remain, influenced by the impact of preceding operations. The volume will bring together leading scholars and senior practitioners in order to provide overviews and analyses of all 65 peacekeeping operations that have been carried out by the United Nations since 1948. As with all Oxford Handbooks, the volume will be agenda-setting in importance, providing the authoritative point of reference for all those working throughout international relations and beyond.