Napoleon In The Russian Imaginary

Napoleon today is still a figure who fascinates both his admirers and detractors because of his seminal role in European history at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, straddling the French Revolution and the enormous empire that he fashioned through military conquest. Napoleon in the Russian Imaginary focuses on the response of Russia's greatest writers—poets, novelists, critics, and historians—to the idea of "Great Man" as an agent of transformational change as it manifests itself in the person and career of Napoleon. After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815 and his subsequent exile to St. Helena, in much of Europe a re-evaluation of Napoleon's person, stature, and historical significance occurred, as thinkers and writers witnessed the gradual reestablishment of repressive regimes throughout Europe. This re-evaluation in Russia would have to wait until Napoleon's death in 1821, but when it came to pass, it continued to occupy the imagination of Russia's greatest writers for over 130 years. Although Napoleon's invasion of Russia and subsequent defeat had a profound effect on Russian culture and Russian history, for Russian writers what was most important was the universal significance of Napoleon’s desire for world conquest and the idea of unbridled ambition which he embodied. Russian writers saw this, for good or ill, as potentially determining the spiritual and moral fate of future generations. What is particularly fascinating is their attempt to confront each other about this idea in a creative dialogue, with each succeeding writer addressing himself and responding to his predecessor and predecessors.

Drawn from innumerable sources, this book provides a concise history of the reasons for, the campaigns, and the conclusion of Napoleon's ill-fated attempt to conquer Russia. Unlike other accounts, this book offers a more accessible version of events and separates fact from fiction to provide an insight into Napoleon's motives and reasons for his eventual failure.

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Published in 1860, this vivid first-hand account provides important insight into Napoleon's ignominious retreat from Russia.

The following pages are not offered to the reader as a history of the invasion of Russia by Napoleon. They are but the statement of the basis of observation on which M. Verestchagin has founded his great series of pictures illustrative of the campaign. These pictures are now to be exhibited in this country, and the painter has naturally desired to show us from what point of view he has approached the study of his subject-one of the greatest subjects in the whole range of history-especially for a Russian artist. The point of view is-inevitably in his case-that of the Realist; and this consideration gives unity to the conception of his whole career and endeavour. He has ever painted war as it is, and therefore in its horrors, as one of its effects, though not necessarily as an effect sought in and for itself. He has tried to be "true" in all his representations of the battle-field. His work may thus be said to constitute a powerful plea in support of the Tsar's Rescript to the Nations in favour of peace. My meaning will be best illustrated by a short sketch of M. Verestchagin and his work, as painter, as soldier, and as traveller.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1860 edition. Excerpt: ... to render him useful service." The Marshal said "he had determined to finish the war on that spot--to succeed or make the enemy pass over his body,"f and requested the English General " to keep up constant communication with him from every point of the field where he might be moving during the combat," and authorized him " to use his name on every emergency as bearing an order from himself." Above eighty thousand men were placed in position, with nearly seven hundred pieces of cannon, pointing their muzzles on all the sallying points of the town. The enemy could not be more than seventy thousand strong; for a large force had moved with the great convoy on the Mojaisk road, and Poniatowski with his corps had been detached to Wercia, with instructions to reconnoitre the road to Medynsk. The state of the enemy was moreover calculated to put the Russian commander at ease with regard to the result of the intended obstruction. It was now indisputable that the enemy was not proposing to entangle his adversary by a series of complicated operations, but that his sole object was " transit," without the passport he had been so long expecting. That in case of success he could not afford time to pursue his advantage, and deviate from this sole point de mire of his movement. That should the enemy even penetrate the Russian semicircle of investment, and gain the Kalouga or Medynsk line of road, the Russian divided wings would have nothing to apprehend from separation, but might immediately act as distinct corps to harass his flank Oct. 1812. KUTUSOW DETERMINES TO RETREAT. 233 causeway was constructed, and extended a good quarter of a mile. Beyond the causeway rose a high hill, which ran parallel with and commanded the whole ravine. A. division...

Excerpt from Napoleon's Invasion of Russia In a different category again are the writings of the two great theoretic strategists who took part in the campaign, J omini and Clausewitz. The former has greatly marred his Life of Napoleon by pretending that the Emperor is telling his own story: hence one hardly knows whether the excuses put forward for Napoleon's mistakes are merely dramatic, or represent the writer's real opinion. Never theless his pages give a good compendious View of the whole campaign, fuller of facts, though for that very reason less clear in outline, than that of Clausewitz. The book of the latter contains his own personal experiences he took part in the Russian retreat on Moscow, and was then sent off on other duty - mixed up with an admirable summary of the campaign, with criticisms on the general strategy of both parties. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1914 edition. Excerpt: ... preface While the great tragedy of 1812 must ever excite the interest and wonder of mankind, like all the deeds of its mighty actor, the lessons to be derived from it are its most important if not its most attractive feature. We may point to the vanity of human greatness, here shown in its decline, and the limitations imposed by adverse circumstance on genius even in its most exalted manifestation. We may indicate the futility of undertaking a great enterprise with inadequate means, without the power and perhaps even the will to carry it to a successful conclusion; and the limits that are fixed to human ambition as much by the forces of nature as by the hostility of man. Napoleon, the embodiment of intellectual force, the incarnation of mental and physical energy, contrived for a time to control the conditions he created in Europe. He rode the whirlwind by virtue of character, of personality, of intelligence, and of imagination which made up the sum of his genius. But in course of time he created forces, not only in his enemies but in himself, which ranged beyond the power of control. There arose in him an almost blasphemous self-confidence a belief in his " star " that led him to neglect the elements necessary to success, which may be illustrated by his own saying: "It is a proof of the weakness of human nature that men imagine that they can oppose me." Well might Goethe say of him: "He lives entirely in the ideal but can never consciously grasp it." The military lessons of the Russian campaign are numerous. In its general features, in the grandeur of its conception, and in some respects in its execution, as well as in its abysmal end, this gigantic invasion was splendid and awe-inspiring. Who can contemplate unmoved the sublime...