Napoleon S Last Victory And The Emergence Of Modern War

Presenting a significant new interpretation of Napoleonic warfare, Robert M. Epstein argues persuasively that the true origins of modern war can be found in the Franco-Austrian War of 1809. Epstein contends that the 1809 war -- with its massive and evenly matched armies, multiple theaters of operation, new command-and-control schemes, increased firepower, frequent stalemates, and large-scale slaughter -- had more in common with the American Civil War and subsequent conflicts that with the decisive Napoleonic campaigns that preceded it. - Jacket flap.

A leading expert examines one of Napoleon's most decisive but least analysed victories In early July 1809 Napoleon crossed the Danube with 187,000 men to confront the Austrian Archduke Charles and an army of 145,000 men. The fighting that followed dwarfed in intensity and scale any previous Napoleonic battlefield, perhaps any in history: casualties on each side were over 30,000. The Austrians fought with great determination, but eventually the Emperor won a narrow victory. Wagram was decisive in that it compelled Austria to make peace. It also heralded a new, altogether greater order of warfare, anticipating the massed manpower and weight of fire deployed much later in the battles of the American Civil War and then at Verdun and on the Somme.

Appendix: A Brief Explanation of The Principles of War.

Written by an experienced author and expert in the field, Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792-1815 provides a thorough re-examination of the crucial period in the history of France for students of history and military studies. Based on extensive research, and including twenty detailed maps, this study is unique in its focus on the wars of both the French Revolution and Napoleon. Owen Connelly expertly analyzes them both to provide a broader context for warfare. Examining the causes of the wars, and how the practices of warfare during this period were to influence mode of combat throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Connelly also establishes trends discernable in the First and Second World Wars and examines key issues including: * the impact of the population explosion on armies and war * the legacy of the ancient regime impact on revolutionary armies * the impact of the Revolution on leadership, strategy, organization and weaponry * Was Napoleon’s leadership style unique, or could another have played his role? * contributions from the governments of the early Revolution, the Terror, the Directory and the Napoleonic regime * What did twenty-three successive years of war accomplish? * Was this era a turning point in the history of warfare?

*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading Nearly 50 years after Napoleon met his Waterloo, generals across the West continued to study his tactics and engage their armies the same way armies fought during the Napoleonic Era. Despite advances in military technology and the advent of railroads for transportation, all of which made defensive warfare more effective, acclaimed military geniuses like Robert E. Lee used flank attacks and infantry charges against superior numbers in an effort to win decisive victories, and it would not be until World War I that concepts of modern warfare made the Napoleonic Era of the early 19th century outdated. For those questioning why generals continued using tactics from the Napoleonic Era even as technology changed the battlefield, the Battle of Austerlitz may provide the best answer. Napoleon is regarded as one of history's greatest generals, and Austerlitz was his greatest victory. In 1805, Britain, Austria, and Russia allied together to form the Third Coalition against the French, and the Third Coalition's forces consisted of armies from Austria and Russia, with Britain providing naval support as well as its financial powers. Napoleon had already defeated and mostly destroyed an Austrian army in October at Ulm before it could link up with the Russians, setting the stage for the Battle of Austerlitz to be the culmination of the war against the Third Coalition as a whole in early December. Despite the smashing victory at Ulm, Napoleon's French army would still be well outnumbered at Austerlitz by a joint Russo-Austrian army in a battle that would also come to be known as the Battle of Three Emperors. Napoleon's enemies would famously say he was worth 50,000 men in the field, but the simple truth is he wasn't able to dominate Europe on his own. In fact, the subordinates and soldiers underneath him participated in several of history's most famous battles and charted the course of Napoleon's rise and fall. The French army which became known as the Grande Armée existed for just 10 years, from 1805 - 1815, and the question of what it was about this army that allowed it to win so many notable victories and to survive defeats which would have destroyed lesser armies has fascinated historians and writers ever since. After all, in terms of equipment, weapons, and battlefield tactics, there was little to distinguish the Grande Armée from other European armies in the early 1800s, but in battles such as Austerlitz (1805), Jena-Auerstedt (1806) and Wagram (1809) it won stunning victories, often against numerically superior enemies. No single factor can account for these victories, which could be attributed to a combination of high morale, a truly egalitarian approach to promotion from the ranks, a radical army organization, and the inspired leadership of Napoleon, all of which combined to make the Grande Armée virtually unbeatable for the first few years of its existence. As noteworthy as those battles all were, Waterloo is the most famous battle in modern history if not all of history, and appropriately so. Gathering an army of 100,000 men, Napoleon marched into what is now Belgium, intent on driving his force between the advancing British army under the Duke of Wellington and the Prussian forces under Marshal Blucher. It was the kind of daring strategy that only Napoleon could pull off, as he had at places like Jena and Austerlitz. At Waterloo, however, it would end disastrously, as Napoleon's armies were unable to dislodge Wellington and unable to keep the Prussians from linking up with the British. The battle would end with the French suffering nearly 60% casualties, the end of Napoleon's reign, and the restructuring of the European map. Simply put, the next 200 years of European history can be traced back to the result of the battle that day in 1815.

This book is a comparative study of military operations conducted my modern states between the French Revolution and World War I. It examines the complex relationship between political purpose and strategy on the one hand, and the challenge of realizing strategic goals through military operations on the other. It argues further that following the experience of the Napoleonic Wars military strength was awarded a primary status in determining the comparative modernity of all the Great Powers; that military goals came progressively to distort a sober understanding of the national interest; that a genuinely political and diplomatic understanding of national strategy was lost; and that these developments collectively rendered the military and political catastrophe of 1914 not inevitable yet probable.

The single most important volume for anyone interested in the Civil War to own and consult. (From the foreword by James M. McPherson) The first guide to Civil War literature to appear in nearly 30 years, this book provides the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and informative survey and analysis of the vast body of Civil War literature. More than 40 essays, each by a specialist in a particular subfield of Civil War history, offer unmatched thoroughness and discerning assessments of each work's value. The essays cover every aspect of the war from strategy, tactics, and battles to logistics, intelligence, supply, and prisoner-of-war camps, from generals and admirals to the men in the ranks, from the Atlantic to the Far West, from fighting fronts to the home front. Some sections cover civilian leaders, the economy, and foreign policy, while others deal with the causes of war and aspects of Reconstruction, including the African-American experience during and after the war. Breadth of topics is matched by breadth of genres covered. Essays discuss surveys of the war, general reference works, published and unpublished papers, diaries and letters, as well as the vast body of monographic literature, including books, dissertations, and articles. Genealogical sources, historical fiction, and video and audio recordings also receive attention. Students of the American Civil War will find this work an indispensable gateway and guide to the enormous body of information on America's pivotal experience.

Since the earliest days of warfare, military operations have followed a predictable formula: after a decisive battle, an army must pursue the enemy and destroy its organization in order to achieve a victorious campaign. But by the mid-19th century, the emergence of massive armies and advanced weaponry - and the concomitant decline in the effectiveness of cavalry - had diminished the practicality of pursuit, producing campaigns that bogged down short of decisive victory. Great battles had become curiously indecisive, decisive campaigns virtually impossible.