National Parliaments After The Lisbon Treaty And The Euro Crisis

A critical assessment of the role of national parliaments in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty and the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, this book examines whether national parliaments have become resigned or resilient actors in these new socio-economic and politico-legal circumstances.

The role of national parliaments in EU matters has become an important subject in the debate over the democratic legitimacy of European Union decision-making. Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights at both the domestic and the European level is often seen as an effective measure to address the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU – the reason for affording them a prominent place in the newly introduced ‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’ of the Union (in particular Article 12 TEU). Whether this aim can be met, however, depends crucially on the degree to which, and the manner in which, national parliaments actually make use of their institutional rights. This volume therefore aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the activities of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. This includes the ‘classic’ scrutiny of EU legislation, but also parliamentary involvement in EU foreign policy, the use of new parliamentary participation rights of the Lisbon Treaty (Early Warning System), their role regarding the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis, and the, so far under-researched, role of parliamentary administrators in scrutiny processes. This book was originally published as a special issue of West European Politics.

Seminar paper from the year 2015 in the subject Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: 1,3, University of Cologne (Institut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen), course: Advanced Seminar the political System of the EU: Parliamentary representation in the multi-level system of the EU, language: English, abstract: This paper focuses on the Spanish parliament (Cortes Generales, or just Cortes) and its role in the management of the Eurozone-crisis. Which measures does the Cortes Generales possess to scrutinize instruments of crisis management? Has it been actively using those to scrutinize European crisis management or has it been a mere rule taker? To answer these questions it is essential to look at the role of national parliaments in the EU system first. In a second step we want to have a closer look at the role of the parliament in the Spanish political system to better understand the then following part that is dealing with what scrutiny measures the Cortes possess and how actively it has been using them during the Eurozone-crisis. During the last decades, the process of European integration has fundamentally changed patterns of governance in Europe and led to the establishment of a new institutional framework on the continent. The ongoing transfer of competencies from the national to the supranational level has created a multi-level governance system in which new institutions emerged and already existing ones are looking for a new role in this very complex system. Since the national parliaments represent the will of the citizens, they play a crucial role in legitimating decision-making at the EU level and therefore are under pressure to find ways of influencing EU policy. This is especially crucial since national executives to an increasing degree exercise legislative competencies at the EU level (namely in the EU Council) and as a consequence increasingly restrict national parliaments in influencing policy-making at the EU level. The beginning of the European debt crisis in 2010 reinforced this tendency, since measures to counter the Eurozone-crisis, such as the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), intergovernmental treaties outside the legal framework of the EU like the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, also known as Fiscal Compact), and especially the European Semester strongly limit the national parliament’s key prerogative: budgetary authority. Since their legislative competencies have been limited, national parliaments have elaborated different mechanisms to scrutinize decision-making at the supranational level to ensure democratic legitimacy.

The euro was supposed to create an unbreakable bond between the nations and people of Europe. But when the debt crisis struck, the flaws of the half-built currency brought the European Union close to breaking point after decades of post-war integration. Deep fault-lines have opened up between European institutions and the nation-states—and often between the rulers and the ruled—raising profound questions about Europe's democratic deficit. Belief in European institutions and national governments alike is waning, while radicals on both the left and the right are gaining power and influence. Europe's leaders have so far proved the doomsayers wrong and prevented the currency from breaking up. "If the euro fails, Europe fails," says Angela Merkel. Yet the euro, and the European project as a whole, is far from safe. If it is to survive and thrive, leaders will finally have to confront difficult decisions. How much national sovereignty are they willing to give up to create a more lasting and credible currency? How much of the debt burden and banking risk will they share? Is Britain prepared to walk away from the EU? And will other countries follow? In Unhappy Union, The Economist's Europe editor and Brussels correspondent provide an astute analysis of the crisis. They describe America's behind-the-scenes lobbying to salvage the euro, economists' bitter debates over austerity, the unseen maneuvers of the European Central Bank and the tortuous negotiations over banking union. In the final chapter, they set out the stark choices confronting Europe's leaders and citizens.

The evolution in parliaments' roles, the reasons for this and the challenges that lie in wait for future progress are all considered, with Ireland's stop-start parliamentary adaptation, the role of the Lisbon Treaty and economic crises in accelerating reform carefully analysed.

The European Parliament in the Contested Union provides a systematic assessment of the real influence of the European Parliament (EP) in policy-making. Ten years after the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which significantly empowered Europe’s only directly elected institution, the contributions collected in this volume analyse whether, and under what conditions, the EP has been able to use its new powers and shape decisions. Going beyond formal or normative descriptions of the EP’s powers, this book provides an up-to-date and timely empirical assessment of the role of the EP in the European Union, focusing on key cases such as the reforms of the EU’s economic governance and asylum policy, the Brexit negotiations and the budget. The book challenges and qualifies the conventional view that the EP has become more influential after Lisbon. It shows that the influence of the EP is conditional on the salience of the negotiated policy for the Member States. When EU legislation touches upon ‘core state powers’, as well as when national financial resources are at stake, the role of the EP – notwithstanding its formal powers – is more constrained and its influence more limited. This book provides fresh light on the impact of the EP and its role in a more contested and politicised European Union. Bringing together an international team of top scholars in the field and analysing a wealth of new evidence, The European Parliament in the Contested Union challenges conventional explanations on the role of the EP, tracking down empirically its impact on key policies and processes. It will be of great interest to scholars of the European Union, European politics and policy-making. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

This book provides an original argument that rejects the idea of national MPs having but one ‘standard’ mode of representation. It acknowledges the national electoral connection, but considers representation beyond national borders. The author empirically investigates such patterns of representation in MPs’ parliamentary speech-making behavior and their attitudes in Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK. The book analyzes representative claims in parliamentary debates on the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis, and relies on qualitative interviews with members of the European affairs and budget committees. It finds a Eurosceptic Europeanization in that national MPs from the Eurosceptic left particularly represent other EU citizens.

This handbook offers a comprehensive picture of the European activities of national parliaments in all 28 member states of the European Union. In the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, it assesses the extent to which national legislatures actually matter in European governance.