Natural Gas As An Instrument Of Russian State Power Enlarged Edition

The slow re-emergence of Russia as a world power despite its weak military force is of critical significance for the strategic interests of the United States in Europe. Since the Cold War, Russia has been perceived as a broken nation that no longer represents a threat to the North Atlantic Alliance. This monograph emphasizes that Russia overcame this major vulnerability by developing the capacity to use unilateral economic sanctions in the form of gas pricing and gas disruptions against many European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. It agrees with many scholars and politicians alike who fear that Russia will leverage its monopoly of natural gas to gain political concessions. The author suggests it is only a matter of time until Russia will use natural gas as an instrument of coercion to disrupt NATO's decisionmaking process. A key aim of this monograph is to explain why the rapid global transition from oil to natural gas will redefine the way policymakers and strategic security scholars look at the scarcity of natural gas in Europe. What is unique about this monograph is that it analyzes the oil and gas markets separately and illustrates, with examples, why in Europe natural gas is a more potent instrument of coercion than oil. Despite these revelations, only 1 month after the German Government announced its plans to abandon nuclear power by 2022, in July 2011 German Chancellor Angela Merkel disclosed that Germany will need to import more Russian natural gas to make up for the loss of over 10 gigawatts of generation capacity. Almost simultaneously, Germany's largest energy utilities group, RWE, and the Russian state-controlled gas giv vi ant, Gazprom, have agreed to form a strategic partnership. The author argues that situations like these create a delicate state of affairs that will ultimately undermine the de facto power of NATO in the contemporary security environment, particularly vis-�vis Russia, unless the dependency on Russian natural gas is promptly addressed.

"Since the Cold War, Russia has been perceived as a broken nation that no longer represents a threat to the North Atlantic Alliance. This book emphasizes that Russia overcame this major vulnerability by developing the capacity to use unilateral economic sanctions in the form of gas pricing and gas disruptions against many European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. It agrees with many scholars and politics alike who fear that Russia will leverage its monopoly of natural gas to gain political concessions. The author suggests it is only a matter of time until Russia will use natural gas as an instrument of coercion to disrupt NATO's decision making process." -Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute A former Intelligence Officer, Ion A. Iftimie is an energy security expert with over one decade of successfully advising senior military, business, and government leaders on Eurasian natural gas industry and related national security issues. This is the second, revised edition.

Gazprom is the world's single largest producer of natural gas, long acknowledged as a state-within-a-state. In 2005 it reached a turning point in its history when the Russian government reasserted its majority stakeholder position, whilst also continuing it's own push to gain control over an increasing share of Russia's energy complex overall. This timely report provides answers to questions such as: what do these movements mean for the future of the Russian energy sector? What will be the impact of state control over Gazprom on domestic and foreign shareholders? And what do these changes portend for the future of natural gas exploitation, production, distribution and the ultimate export of Russian gas to downstream consumers? And what will these changes mean to world? This series of reports establishes for the first time the confluence of Russian foreign policy with the acquisition of foreign energy assets by Russian entities. Nine specific country profiles focus on the oil, gas, electricity and nuclear power industries. Each report written by an author of international standing, explains how Russian foreign energy downstream mergers and acquisitions are transpiring to consolidate the new Russian empire.

The Russian gas industry provides 50% of Russian domestic energy supplies, a substantial proportion of CIS gas supplies, and around 20% of European gas demand. Declines in production at existing fields mean that Gazprom will face increasingly difficult decisions about moving to higher cost fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The alternative will be increasing imports from Central Asian countries and allowing other Russian gas producers to increase their role in the industry. Russian exports to Europe will gradually increase and deliveries of Russian LNG will commence to Asia and the both coasts of North America. Pipeline gas deliveries to East Asian countries may have a longer time horizon. Export projects aimed at new markets will depend crucially on the maintenance of (oil and) gas prices at the levels of 2003-05. European exports will also depend on the pace of EU market liberalisation and Gazprom's ability to agree mutually acceptable terms for transit, principally with Ukraine and Belarus. Reform, liberalisation and restructuring of the Russian gas industry have been more substantial than has generally been recognised. Most important has been price reform which, in 2005, allowed Russian industrial customers to become profitable to serve at regulated prices. Price increases may significantly reduce future increases in domestic gas demand. The increasing need for production from companies other than Gazprom will ensure that liberalised access to networks expands considerably over the next decade. In the 2000s, Gazprom reclaimed its CIS gas business from intermediaries, while maintaining its de facto monopoly of exports to Europe and establishing a similar degree of authority over future exports to Asia. The merger of Gazprom and Rosneft will provide the potential to become a force in the domestic and international oil markets, particularly given the authority that the president has conferred on the company in terms of Russian energy policy.

Europe and Russia are pushing against each other in a contest of economic doctrines and political ambitions, seemingly erasing the vision of cooperation that emerged from the end of the Cold War. Thane Gustafson argues that natural gas serves as a bridge over troubled geopolitical waters, uniting the region through common economic interests.

The essays gathered here represent a panel at SSI's annual Russia conference in 2011. They focus on the analysis of Russian foreign policy both on its material side or actual conduct as well as on the cognitive bases of Russian thinking about international affairs and Russian national security. They span much of the gamut of that foreign policy and also show its strong linkages to the Russian historical tradition and to the imperatives of Russian domestic development.