Negotiating Peace In El Salvador

Set against the backdrop of the collapsing Cold War world, this monograph draws on entirely new documentary evidence to chronicle almost two years worth of UN-led peace talks to end the civil war in El Salvador. Presented in 'moment-to-moment' fashion, hitherto private notes and interviews with the chief UN, American and Salvadoran negotiators demonstrate that the key to enduring peace was to restructure relations between the country's powerful entrepreneurs and the armed forces.

This book explains how facilitative mediators, those without material leverage, contribute to progress in peace negotiations. While existing theories of mediation have offered suggestions about what a mediator should get parties to do to reach an agreement, the puzzle that has remained is: how does a mediator get parties to do what is prescribed? The book argues that a communication perspective is key to understanding facilitative mediation and that framing is the main mechanism by which facilitative mediation functions. Based on an empirical analysis of the United Nations mediation in El Salvador between 1990 and 1992, the work breaks new ground by uncovering three underlying mechanisms that explain how a mediator can get their framing adopted by the negotiating parties, thereby advancing the negotiations. The book offers a novel theory of facilitative mediation as framing and an innovative methodological approach that focuses on negotiation impasses to study the process of how negotiations progress. Practitioners will also appreciate the framework for thinking about when and how framing and reframing can be used to increase mediation’s effectiveness as a tool for ending armed conflict. This book will be of much interest to students of peace and conflict studies, negotiation, Latin American politics, and International Relations, as well as practitioners.

The resolution of the civil war in El Salvador coincided with the end of the Cold War. After two years of negotiations and a decade-long effort to implement the peace accords, this work examines how peace was made and whether it has endured.

Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin American countries, have developed similar counterinsurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between the insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran insurgent forces agreed to demobilize its army and to become a legal political party, while the government agreed to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, after forty years of guerilla warfare and after failed peace talks during the last decade, is still trying to set conditions to gain peace through negotiations. The thesis, while contrasting both general contexts, emphasizes their differences to explain the success of the peace process in El Salvador and the failure in Colombia. After comparing the political actors involved - the military and the guerrillas, studying the intensity of the conflict, and analyzing the outcomes of the different peace processes, we arrived to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Similarly, no government should try to copy the Salvadoran recipe as the remedy for their own social and political problems. Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided because it could lead to fallacies that could generate dangerous interpretations by the key actors in the process.

Since the first edition of this book appeared in 1982, El Salvador has experienced the most radical social change in its history. Ten years of civil war, in which a tenacious and creative revolutionary movement battled a larger, better-equipped, US-supported army to a standstill, have ended with 20 months of negotiations and a peace accord that promises to change the course of Salvadorean society and politics. This book traces the history of El Salvador, focusing on the oligarchy and the armed forces, that shaped the Salvadorean army and political system. Concentrating on the period since 1960, the author sheds new light on the US role in the increasing militarization of the country and the origins of the oligarchy-army rupture in 1979. Separate chapters deal with the Catholic church and the revolutionary organizations, which challenged the status quo after 1968. In the new edition, Dr Montgomery continues the story from 1982 to the present, offering a detailed account of the evolution of the war. She examines why Duarte's two inaugural promises, peace and economic prosperity could not be fulfilled and analyzes the electoral victory of the oligarchy in 1989. The final chapters closely follow the peace negotiations, ending with an assessment of the peace accords, and evaluate the future prospects for El Salvador and for the 1994 elections.

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