Nepal And The Geo Strategic Rivalry Between China And India

The importance of the Himalayan state of Nepal has been obscured by the international campaign to free Tibet and the vicissitudes of the Sino-Indian rivalry. This book presents the history of Nepal’s domestic politics and foreign relations from ancient to modern times. Analysing newly declassified reports from the United States and Britain, published memoirs, oral recollections and interviews, the book presents the historical interactions between Nepal, China, Tibet and India. It discusses how the ageing and inevitable death of the 14th Dalai Lama, the radicalization of Tibetan diaspora and the ascendancy of the international campaign to free Tibet are of increasing importance to Nepal. With its position between China and India, the book notes how the focus could shift to Nepal, with it being home to some 20,000 Tibetan refugees and its chronic political turmoil, deepened by the Asian giants’ rivalry. Using a chronological approach, the past and present of the rivalry between China and India are studied, and attempts to chart the future are made. The book contributes to a new understanding of the intricate relationship of Nepal with these neighbouring countries, and is of interest to students and scholars of South Asian studies, politics and international relations.

Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Earth Science / Geography - Geopolitics, University of Dhaka (Dhaka University), course: IR-407(GEOPOLITICS), language: English, abstract: Nepal is a one of the landlocked countries in the world. It has no access to the sea and it needs to deal with its neighboring countries for many issues. Geopolitically Nepal has drawn much more attention for its natural beauty of the Himalayas and landlocked reality that make it to compromise with its neighbors for its own economic and strategic interests. Determinants and the capability to reverse those to geo-strategy influence one's foreign policy. Having the Himalayas, river belts and strategic boundary and road links, Nepal has some positive and influential determinants. They can formulate effective foreign policy by using the realities properly as it is strategically, politically and economically important in this region especially to China and India. Stability and effective control of this land is geopolitically influential for two great power neighbors. Here we look on the factors that determine Nepal foreign policy and managing its foreign relations with its neighboring countries and in the international arena.

This book explores buffer states' agency beyond being highly interactive spaces for the competing strategic and security interests of larger powers. Analyzing 21 political events, the author offers a new conceptual framework for the buffer state, which emphasizes strategic utility and agency. Applying this to the case study of Nepal as a buffer state between India and China, he offers a systematic analysis of Sino-Indian interests in the wider region, and Nepal’s interactions with and reactions to them, and argues that the buffer state in contemporary international relations is characterized by intense competitive overtures from its contending neighboring states. However, the buffer state is not just a spectator but an active participant that consistently assesses and reassesses its geopolitical position in between much larger competing powers. This reading offers a new understanding of the buffer state as a highly dynamic political space wherein the levels of influence and strategies of bigger powers can be examined. Aimed at a multidisciplinary audience, this book will be of particular interest to scholars, practitioners and students of international relations, security studies, strategic studies, and Asian Studies.

Nepal has a non-neutral history. As an imperial and expansionist power in the Himalayas from the days of its unification in 1769 AD to the Anglo-Nepal war of 1815, Nepal never remained neutral. Also, during the period of Colonialism in South Asia, and particularly after losing the war with the British in 1816, Nepal never exercised the policy of neutrality. Rather, Nepal was raiding Tibet; assisting British India in Sepoy Mutiny; and stood by Britain in the two world wars. Besides, Nepal militarily backed independent India in 1948 over Hyderabad question. But why Nepal suddenly had to take a refuge in neutrality after the political change of 1950? Was it because of Nepal’s internal politics, or an attempt to cope with new arrangements in regional security? Nepal’s fascination with neutrality was so swifter and inadvertent that Kathmandu, hitherto, has never initiated any policy debates over the all-weather choice. Power elites in Nepal still misperceive neutrality as non-alignment. The aim of the book, however, is not only limited to distinguishing neutrality with non-alignment in the Nepali context but weighs Nepal’s claim to neutrality through the Indian and Chinese perceptions to underline the presence of ambiguity and uncertainty in Nepal’s claim to neutrality. Illustrating Nepal’s attempt to neutrality as a mere survival strategy, this study is less hopeful about Nepal’s foreign policy institutions abandoning their Cold War worldview by embracing the strategy of sustenance in today’s interdependent and globalized world. Because, as the book suggests, power elites in Kathmandu are customarily lured by the ephemeral yet sporadic geopolitical ambitions, either through discourses or deeds.

Backfire in Nepal explores how China has become the ultimate beneficiary of India's democracy-promotion agenda in Nepal. New Delhi had made a bold bet in 2005, but one that contained two mutually fortifying flaws: the abolition of the monarchy and the empowerment of the former Maoist rebels. The world's only Hindu monarch and kingdom were bound to India in a special relationship that neither country needed to define or assert. True, Indians had been put off by successive Nepalese monarchs playing New Delhi off against Beijing. In retrospect, a little more compassion for Nepal's compulsions might have put things into sharper relief. Nepalese Maoists, being communists first, were trained to denounce Indian 'expansionism' before American 'imperialism'. Experience may have impelled the senior leadership to make practical compromises. It was a leap of faith for New Delhi to trust the leadership to rein in their cadres' radicalism. More broadly, since India had also enlisted Western democracies, it needed to address their often-contradictory concerns throughout Nepal's turbulent transition.

At publication date, a free ebook version of this title will be available through Luminos, University of California Press's Open Access publishing program. Visit www.luminosoa.org to learn more. Islamic Shangri-La transports readers to the heart of the Himalayas as it traces the rise of the Tibetan Muslim community from the 17th century to the present. Radically altering popular interpretations that have portrayed Tibet as isolated and monolithically Buddhist, David Atwill's vibrant account demonstrates how truly cosmopolitan Tibetan society was by highlighting the hybrid influences and internal diversity of Tibet. In its exploration of the Tibetan Muslim experience, this book presents an unparalleled perspective of Tibet's standing during the rise of post-World War II Asia.

This book examines and compares the diverging security approaches of the UK, China and India in peacebuilding settings, with a specific focus on the case of Nepal. Rising powers such as China and India dissent from traditional templates of peacebuilding and apply their own methods to respond to security issues. This book fills a gap in the literature by examining how emerging actors (China and India) engage with security and development and how their approaches differ from those of a traditional actor (the UK). In the light of democratic peace and regional security complex theories, the book interprets interview data to compare and contrast the engagement of these three actors with post-war Nepal, and the implications for security sector governance and peacebuilding. It contends that the UK helped to peacefully manage transition but that the institutional changes were merely ceremonial. China and India, by contrast, were more effective in advancing mutual security agendas through elite-level interactions. However, the ‘hardware’ of security, for example material and infrastructure support, gained more consideration than the ‘software’ of security, such as meritocratic governance and institution building. This book will be of much interest to students of peacebuilding, development studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations in general.