New Perspectives On Platonic Dialectic

For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute this claim, but there is little agreement as to what Platonic dialectic is. According to a now prevailing view it is a method for inquiry the conception of which changed so radically for Plato that it "had a strong tendency ... to mean ‘the ideal method’, whatever that may be" (Richard Robinson). Most studies of Platonic dialectic accordingly focus on only one aspect of this method that allegedly characterizes one specific period in Plato’s development. This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato’s philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato’s ideal of method. New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic.

The period from Plato's birth to Aristotle's death (427–322 BC) is one of the most influential and formative in the history of Western philosophy. The developments of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and science in this period have been investigated, controversies have arisen and many new theories have been produced. But this is the first book to give detailed scholarly attention to the development of dialectic during this decisive period. It includes chapters on topics such as: dialectic as interpersonal debate between a questioner and a respondent; dialectic and the dialogue form; dialectical methodology; the dialectical context of certain forms of arguments; the role of the respondent in guaranteeing good argument; dialectic and presentation of knowledge; the interrelations between written dialogues and spoken dialectic; and definition, induction and refutation from Plato to Aristotle. The book contributes to the history of philosophy and also to the contemporary debate about what philosophy is.

This series provides a forum for monographs and collected volumes aiming at a philosophical discussion of the texts, topics, and arguments of ancient philosophers. The authors demonstrate that philosophical historiography not only paraphrases the claims of ancient authors, but can also reconstruct the arguments for those claims and consider ongoing discussions in modern philosophy, thus enriching the philosophical debate of our time.

With the birth of the feminist movement classicists, philosophers, educational experts, and psychologists, all challenged by the question of whether or not Plato was a feminist, began to examine Plato's dialogues in search of his conception of woman. The possibility arose of a new focus affecting the view of texts written more than two thousand years in the past. And yet, in spite of the recent surge of interest on woman in Plato, no comprehensive work identifying his position on the subject has yet appeared. This book considers not only the totality of Plato's texts on woman and the feminine, but also their place within both his philosophy and the historical context in which it developed. But this book is not merely a textual study situating the subject of woman philosophically and historically; it also uncovers the implications hidden in the texts and the relationships that follow from them. It draws an image of the Platonic woman as rich and full as the textual and historical information allows, offering new and sometimes unexpected results beyond the topic of woman, illuminating aspects of Plato's work that are of relevance to Platonic studies in general.

Recently, scholars have looked more closely at the philosophical importance of the imaginative and literary aspects of Plato's writing, and have begun to appreciate the methods of ancient philosophers and commentators who studied Plato. This study brings together leading philosophical and literary scholars to investigate these new-old approaches.

In its examination of two of Plato's key works, Soul, World, and Idea: An Interpretation of Plato's Republic and Phaedo reveals the key role that images and our capacity for image-making play in the relationship among soul, world, and Idea. This bookbegins and ends with a reading of the Republic. Daniel Sherman turns midway to the Phaedo to further analyze the nature of the soul and its relation to the nature of the Ideas, then returns to apply the conclusions to the rest of the Republic. Sherman's focus is on the ontological and epistemological argument, including attention to the dramatic detail. He argues that the ontology of the Ideas in the Republic and the Phaedo is inseparable from the ontology of human being, that is, from the structure and life of the soul. On this interpretation, the Ideas are seen as indeed objective but as in a sense also a product of a permanent dialectical relationship. The Ideas, though something more than concepts, do not have any real independent existence outside of this human dialectical triad of world, soul and Idea. The stability of the Ideas need not be grounded in a static otherworldliness, and the condition of meaning is not temporally prior to human existence in general. The result is a new interpretation concerning the realm of the Ideas, the immortality of the soul, and the lived in world of their interaction in the production of interpretive images. Sherman argues that the platonic soul is immortaland the Ideas eternal wholly and solely in human (dialogical) activity--the rest is muthologia--and that the world of our experience is a product of an ongoing act of interpretation or dianoetic dialegesthai. This reinterpretation of the platonic Ideas will be especially interesting to students and scholars of classics, ancient philosophy, and continental philosophy.

Was Plato a Platonist? While ancient disciples of Plato would have answered this question in the affirmative, modern scholars have generally denied that Plato’s own philosophy was in substantial agreement with that of the Platonists of succeeding centuries. In From Plato to Platonism, Lloyd P. Gerson argues that the ancients are correct in their assessment. He arrives at this conclusion in an especially ingenious manner, challenging fundamental assumptions about how Plato’s teachings have come to be understood. Through deft readings of the philosophical principles found in Plato's dialogues and in the Platonic tradition beginning with Aristotle, he shows that Platonism, broadly conceived, is the polar opposite of naturalism and that the history of philosophy from Plato until the seventeenth century was the history of various efforts to find the most consistent and complete version of "anti-naturalism." Gerson contends that the philosophical position of Plato—Plato’s own Platonism, so to speak—was produced out of a matrix he calls "Ur-Platonism." According to Gerson, Ur-Platonism is the conjunction of five "antis" that in total arrive at anti-naturalism: anti-nominalism, anti-mechanism, anti-materialism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. Plato’s Platonism is an attempt to construct the most consistent and defensible positive system uniting the five "antis." It is also the system that all later Platonists throughout Antiquity attributed to Plato when countering attacks from critics including Peripatetics, Stoics, and Sceptics. In conclusion, Gerson shows that Late Antique philosophers such as Proclus were right in regarding Plotinus as "the great exegete of the Platonic revelation."

A 2023 Choice Reviews Outstanding Academic Title Socrates famously claimed that he knew nothing, and that wisdom consisted in awareness of one’s ignorance. In Ignorance, Irony and Knowledge in Plato, Kevin Crotty makes the case for the centrality and fruitfulness of Socratic ignorance throughout Plato’s philosophical career. Knowing that you don’t know is more than a maxim of intellectual humility; Plato shows how it lies at the basis of all the virtues, and inspires dialogue, the best and most characteristic activity of the philosophical life. Far from being simply a lack or deficit, ignorance is a necessary constituent of genuine knowledge. Crotty explores the intricate ironies involved in the paradoxical relationship of ignorance and knowledge. He argues, further, that Plato never abandoned the historical Socrates to pursue his own philosophical agenda. Rather, his philosophical career can be largely understood as a progressive deepening of his appreciation of Socratic ignorance. Crotty presents Plato as a forerunner of the scholarly interest in ignorance that has gathered force in a wide variety of disciplines over the last 20 years.