New Zealand Financial Sector Assessment Program

The regulatory and oversight framework for Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) in New Zealand is undergoing a major reform. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) and the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) currently lack sufficient legal powers to identify and address risks building up in FMIs, partly because the regime is voluntary and the authorities do not have the appropriate toolkit to pursue their oversight objectives. This may give rise to negative externalities as the interests of members and shareholders of FMIs are not necessarily aligned with public interest objectives. Recognizing the shortcomings of the current regime, the authorities are proposing to develop a new regime. These reforms have been consulted on with industry during recent years.

This paper presents an assessment of the stability of the financial system in New Zealand. Imbalances in the housing market, banks’ concentrated exposures to the dairy sector, and their high reliance on wholesale offshore funding are the key macro-financial vulnerabilities. The banking sector has significant exposure to real estate and agriculture, is relatively dependent on foreign funding, and is dominated by four Australian subsidiaries. A sharp decline in the real estate market, a reversal of the recent recovery in dairy prices, deterioration in global economic conditions, and tightening in financial markets would adversely impact the system. Despite these vulnerabilities, the banking system is resilient to severe shocks. Strengthening the macroprudential framework is important.

This Technical Note presents an assessment of Regulation, Supervision and Systemic Risk Monitoring in New Zealand. The overall regulatory framework for asset management is well developed, but would benefit from some enhancements to prevent the buildup of risks. The provision of custody services does not require a license in New Zealand, and custodians therefore fall outside the direct supervision of the Financial Markets Authority (FMA). They are neither subject to prudential requirements nor to ongoing supervision by any other authority. Given that custodians perform key functions regarding safeguarding investors’ assets, the government should require that these entities be licensed and subject to ongoing supervision by the FMA.

This Technical Note assesses the level of implementation of the Contingency Planning and Crisis Management Framework in New Zealand. Work has already begun to identify necessary resources, such as rosters of potential statutory managers and personnel from government agencies and the private sector who could be mobilized to deal with a crisis. This work needs to be further developed. In parallel, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand should continue to document the procedure for appointment of a statutory manager, open bank resolution, and other resolution options. The Treasury should complete “shelf” agreements, which may be required for a Crown guarantee or other support in a crisis.

This Technical Note assesses the macroprudential institutional framework and policies in New Zealand. New Zealand has a strong institutional framework for macroprudential policy. This framework is based on a clear mandate for financial stability operationally clarified by a memorandum of understanding. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the single prudential regulator with responsibility and authority for supervision of financial institutions and macroprudential policies. A clear mandate for financial stability, independent decision making, transparent communication, and external accountability form the basis of the strong framework that was put in place. Institutional arrangements could be strengthened further by making the procedures to adjust the macroprudential framework more transparent.

This paper presents an assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) in New Zealand. The supervisory approach of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) reflects the characteristics of the local banking industry and the authorities’ goal to limit moral hazard by relying on market discipline and not offering deposit insurance. Banks offer traditional products in a highly concentrated market. Since the most recent Financial Sector Assessment Program, the RBNZ has increased attention to strengthening regulatory discipline. The current approach to supervision is limited by the heavy weight the RBNZ places on market discipline compared with regulatory discipline. Better compliance with the BCP and enhanced effectiveness of the RBNZ three-pillar approach are recommended.

This Technical Note discusses the results of stress testing of the banking sector and systemic risk analysis for New Zealand. The banking sector, which dominates the financial system, has significant exposure to real estate. A sharp decline in the real estate market, a prolonged period of low dairy prices, deterioration in global economic conditions, and a tightening in financial markets would adversely impact the system. Despite these risks, the banking system is resilient to severe shocks. Results of stress tests and sensitivity analysis indicate that the solvency and liquidity of the banking system can withstand adverse and severe shocks.

This paper evaluates the Observance of Standards and Codes on the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation for New Zealand. New Zealand equity markets are comparatively small with market capitalization of about 44 percent of GDP. Reflecting a preference for property investment, ownership of New Zealand-listed equities remains mostly in the hands of offshore investors and domestic institutional investors, with only about one-fourth held directly by households. Securities market intermediaries include sharebrokers, futures dealers, investment advisers, and managers of collective investment schemes, including contributory mortgage brokers.