Nixon Ford And The Abandonment Of South Vietnam

South Vietnam fell because of events occurring thousands of miles away from the battlefields—in China, the Soviet Union, Latin America, the Middle East, and Washington’s corridors of power, along protest lines, and around America’s dinner tables. These other wars being fought by American presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford profoundly impacted what happened in Vietnam. This work examines those other conflicts and the political, social, and economic factors involved with them that distracted and crippled the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and led to the eventual abandonment of the U.S.-supported South Vietnamese regime. Nixon entered office with the goal of bringing the world together, but saw that goal ruined by the 1973 war in the Middle East, preoccupations with China and the Soviet Union, a weak economy, Watergate, and his disgraceful exit from the White House. Ford’s presidency was tainted almost from the beginning because of the pardon he granted to Nixon, but the American public, tired of war and concerned about the economy, was ready to hear that the war had come to an end. An argument is presented that the war could have been won if the “other wars” had been fought by presidents willing to honor the American commitment to its allies in South Vietnam.

Drawing upon both archival research and his own military experiences in Vietnam, Willbanks focuses on military operations from 1969 through 1975. He begins by analyzing the events that led to a change in U.S. strategy in 1969 and the subsequent initiation of Vietnamization. He then critiques the implementation of that policy and the combat performance of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN), which finally collapsed in 1975.

"In writing No More Vietnams, Richard Nixon-with the unique perspective of the man who served us America's commander-in-chief during the war's most difficult stage-has set out to dispel the myths of Vietnam, to show why we failed in Vietnam, and to contribute to the development of policies that will help avoid such failures in the future. In doing so, President Nixon analyzes the role that four presidents, the military, the Congress, the media, and the antiwar movement played in the Vietnam debacle." -- Front jacket flap

In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period. Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

“He is just about the only American leader who ever did anything right in Vietnam.…Nixon makes a strong case.” —Chicago Tribune In his bestselling No More Vietnams, Richard Nixon analyzes America’s military involvement in Southeast Asia—including his own role as commander-in-chief from 1969 to 1974—and presciently calls for a new American approach to conflicts in the Third World.

An expose of Kissinger's secret negotiations to end the Vietnam War argues that the final agreement to end the war betrayed America's former South Vietnamese allies and left thousands of American soldiers dead in vain.

NO PEACE NO HONOR takes readers inside the negotiations that lead to the agreement Nixon famously called 'peace with honour' and reveals that the entire process was a sham. Through exhaustive, meticulous research, Larry Berman provides conclusive evidence that Kissenger crafted a deal he and Nixon expected and actually wanted North Vietnam to violate because it would allow them to continue the bombing with no threat of a congressional cut-off. Their secret plans to extend the war, he argues, were aborted only with the onset of the Watergate debacle. Tracing the step-by-step deception of both the South Vietnamese and the American public from initiatives that began as early as 1969, through the disgraceful peace agreement that cost the country it's honour, this extraordinary book is a benchmark in the literature of Vietnam.

Now, for the first time, Kissinger gives us in a single volume an in-depth, inside view of the Vietnam War, personally collected, annotated, revised, and updated from his bestselling memoirs and his book Diplomacy. Many other authors have written about what they thought happened—or thought should have happened—in Vietnam, but it was Henry Kissinger who was there at the epicenter, involved in every decision from the long, frustrating negotiations with the North Vietnamese delegation to America's eventual extrication from the war. Here, Kissinger writes with firm, precise knowledge, supported by meticulous documentation that includes his own memoranda to and replies from President Nixon. He tells about the tragedy of Cambodia, the collateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the disagreements within the Nixon and Ford administrations, the details of all negotiations in which he was involved, the domestic unrest and protest in the States, and the day-to-day military to diplomatic realities of the war as it reached the White House. As compelling and exciting as Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, Ending the Vietnam War also reveals insights about the bigger-than-life personalities—Johnson, Nixon, de Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh, Brezhnev—who were caught up in a war that forever changed international relations. This is history on a grand scale, and a book of overwhelming importance to the public record.