Non G 10 Countries And The Basle Capital Rules

The 1988 Basle Capital Accord has introduced the norm of a risk-based capital ratio of 8 percent. It was negotiated among the G-10 countries to strengthen their international banks’ capital base while simultaneously levelling the playing field for competition. Since 1988, a large number of non-G-10 countries, although not members of the “Basle Club,” have introduced similar risk-based capital ratios, hoping to achieve similar effects in terms of enhanced safety and competition in their banking markets. This paper explains why the endeavor failed in most cases and discusses what the required conditions would be for effective implementation of the Basle rules beyond the G-10 countries.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 - the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on banking supervision.

The paper seeks to identify strategies of commercial banks in response to higher capital requirements of Basel III reform and its phase-in. It focuses on a sample of nine EU emerging market countries and picks up 5 largest banks in each country assessing their response. The paper finds that all banking sectors raised CAR ratios mainly through retained earnings. In countries where the banking sector struggled with profitability, banks have resorted to issuance of new equity or shrunk the size of their balance sheets to meet the higher capital-adequacy requirements. Worries echoed at the early stage of Basel III compilation, namely that commercial banks would shrink their balance sheet by reducing their lending to meet stricter capital requirements, did materialize only in banks struggling with profitability.

Despite recently announced delays, Basel II - the new standard for bank capital - is due to be completed this year for implementation in the 13 Basel Committee member countries by the end of 2006. Should the other 170 plus member countries of the World Bank also adopt Basel II? Basel II was not written with developing countries in mind, but that does not necessarily mean that there is nothing in it for developing countries or that it can be ignored. Basels I and II represent a wide Sea of Standards. This paper suggests five alternative island-standards and five navigational tools to help countries choose their preferred island within the sea. It is suggested that for some developing countries the standardized approach will yield little in terms of linking regulatory capital to risk, but that countries may need many years of work to adopt the more advanced internal rating-based approach. The paper then proposes a centralized rating-based approach as a transition measure. The paper also makes proposals regarding a set of largely unresolved cross-border issues.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

The turmoil in financial markets that resulted from the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States indicates the need to dramatically transform regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Would these institutions have been sounder if the 2004 Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II accord)—negotiated between 1999 and 2004—had already been fully implemented? Basel II represents a dramatic change in capital regulation of large banks in the countries represented on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Its internal ratings–based approaches to capital regulation will allow large banks to use their own credit risk models to set minimum capital requirements. The Basel Committee itself implicitly acknowledged in spring 2008 that the revised framework would not have been adequate to contain the risks exposed by the subprime crisis and needed strengthening. This crisis has highlighted two more basic questions about Basel II: One, is the method of capital regulation incorporated in the revised framework fundamentally misguided? Two, even if the basic Basel II approach has promise as a paradigm for domestic regulation, is the effort at extensive international harmonization of capital rules and supervisory practice useful and appropriate? This book provides the answers. It evaluates Basel II as a bank regulatory paradigm and as an international arrangement, considers some possible alternatives, and recommends significant changes in the arrangement.

Developing economies can strengthen their financial systems by implementing the main elements of global regulatory reform. But to build an effective prudential framework, they may need to adapt international standards taking into account the sophistication and size of their financial institutions, the relevance of different financial operations in their market, the granularity of information available and the capacity of their supervisors. Under a proportionate application of the Basel standards, smaller institutions with less complex business models would be subject to a simpler regulatory framework that enhances the resilience of the financial sector without generating disproportionate compliance costs. This paper provides guidance on how non-Basel Committee member countries could incorporate banks’ capital and liquidity standards into their framework. It builds on the experience gained by the authors in the course of their work in providing technical assistance on—and assessing compliance with—international standards in banking supervision.