North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nato Enlargement Costs

This work evaluates the pros and cons of NATO enlargement. It explains why NATO offered membership to three of its Cold War adversaries and makes recommendations about which countries, if any, should be offered membership in the future.

Past NATO enlargement helped create a Europe whole, free, and at peace, but future enlargement, should it occur, faces a hostile and militarily revitalized Russia. This report examines the military requirements and resulting budget costs of extending NATO’s Article 5 commitment to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are actively seeking NATO membership, and Sweden and Finland, about which there has been analysis and speculation about membership. Costs to the United States range from $11 billion per year to defend Ukraine to half a billion dollars or less to defend Sweden. The project recommends that NATO incorporate force requirements and cost considerations into its future decisionmaking.

NATO must pursue a sound defense program as it enlarges-not to prepare for a threat, but to meet its peacetime preparedness standard. DOD's cost estimate of $27-35 billion for all NATO enlargement measures through 2009 causes sticker shock to some, but it is moderate: only about 1% of NATO's total defense spending. This estimate is not low-sided or prone to major inflation. It is similar to the RAND estimate, and lower than the CBO estimate because CBO embraced a higher threat and theory of requirements. The United States will not be carrying unfair burdens. Its expense may be no more than $2 billion through 2009. The cost of stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not rise appreciably.

The central aims of the book is to present, in the form of a collection of papers, a variety of views on NATO from member states “formerly known as new”, and to assess in this context the prospects for NATO enlargement. Therefore, the book consists of two parts. The main objective of the first part is to present how NATO is now perceived in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Papers collected here offer an opportunity to reflect on the impact of the enlargements starting from 1999 on NATO functioning and evolution, roles, tasks and capabilities. The issue of how accession has transformed accessioning states will also be discussed. Last but not least, the perspective of “new” members on NATO’s future will be presented. The authors of the articles in this part mainly come from those countries that joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War. The second part is devoted strictly to the topic of enlargement. In this part we asked experts from NATO members (both “old” and “new”), potential candidates and other NATO partners (including Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Sweden, Finland etc.) how they view the future of NATO cooperation with external partners in Europe and the prospects for enlargement of the Alliance.

In 1999 three East-Central European states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) gained membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Professor Barany argues that, once it began, the Alliance should continue the enlargement process. Nevertheless he maintains that only states that satisfy NATO's membership criteria should be allowed to join. Through an extensive analysis of four countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who, at the time of the book's original publication in 2003 were NATO aspirants, Barany demonstrates that they were in several important respects unprepared for membership and that there was no pressing reason for NATO's haste. Barany argues that while NATO should be clear that its doors remain open to qualified candidates, the Alliance should hold off further expansion until prospective members will become assets rather than liabilities.