North Korea S Military Diplomatic Campaigns 1966 2008

This book examines North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy over a long time period from the early 1960s, setting its dangerous brinkmanship in the wider context of North Korea’s military and diplomatic campaigns to achieve its political goals. It argues that the last four decades of military adventurism demonstrates Pyongyang’s consistent, calculated use of military tools to advance strategic objectives vis à vis its adversaries. It shows how recent behavior of the North Korean government is entirely consistent with its behavior over this longer period: the North Korean government’s conduct (rather than being haphazard or reactive) is rational – in the Clausewitzian sense of being ready to use force as an extension of diplomacy by other means. The book goes on to demonstrate that North Korea’s "calculated adventurism" has come full circle: what we are seeing now is a modified repetition of earlier events – such as the Pueblo incident of 1968 and the nuclear and missile diplomacy of the 1990s. Using extensive interviews in the United States and South Korea, including those with defected North Korean government officials, alongside newly declassified first-hand material from U.S., South Korean, and former Communist-bloc archives, the book argues that whilst North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns have intensified, its policy objectives have become more conservative and are aimed at regime survival, normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic aid.

This book examines North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy over a long time period from the early 1960s, setting its dangerous brinkmanship in the wider context of North Korea’s military and diplomatic campaigns to achieve its political goals. It argues that the last four decades of military adventurism demonstrates Pyongyang’s consistent, calculated use of military tools to advance strategic objectives vis à vis its adversaries. It shows how recent behavior of the North Korean government is entirely consistent with its behavior over this longer period: the North Korean government’s conduct (rather than being haphazard or reactive) is rational – in the Clausewitzian sense of being ready to use force as an extension of diplomacy by other means. The book goes on to demonstrate that North Korea’s "calculated adventurism" has come full circle: what we are seeing now is a modified repetition of earlier events – such as the Pueblo incident of 1968 and the nuclear and missile diplomacy of the 1990s. Using extensive interviews in the United States and South Korea, including those with defected North Korean government officials, alongside newly declassified first-hand material from U.S., South Korean, and former Communist-bloc archives, the book argues that whilst North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns have intensified, its policy objectives have become more conservative and are aimed at regime survival, normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic aid.

This book chronicles the political-military development of the Korean Peninsula since 1945, with particular attention to North Koreas pursuit of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons, and how it has shaped Northeast Asian security and non-proliferation policy and influenced the strategic choices of the United States and all regional powers. I focus on North Koreas leaders, institutions, political history, and the systems longer-term prospects. How has an isolated, highly idiosyncratic, small state repeatedly stymied or circumvented the policy preferences of much more powerful states, culminating with its withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (the only state ever to do so) and the testing of nuclear weapons in open defiance of adversaries and allies alike? What does this portend for the regions future? Unlike most of the literature that focuses on US non proliferation policy, this is a book about decision making in North Korea and the states survival in the face of daunting odds. It draws on extensive interviews with individuals in China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the EU who have had ample experience in and with North Korea, additional interviews with former US policy makers, and the results from two visits to the North. The author makes extensive use of archival materials from the Cold War International History Project, enabling a far fuller rendering of North Korean history than appears in most of the literature on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.

How has North Korea developed and managed its military readiness to achieve its strategic ends? Hinata-Yamaguchi analyzes North Korea’s defense planning by looking at how political, economic, and societal factors affect the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) readiness and strategies. He answers four key questions: How have the internal and external factors shaped North Korea’s security strategy? How do the political, economic, societal, and environmental factors impact North Korea’s defense planning? What are North Korea’s defense planning dilemmas and how do they impact the KPA’s readiness? What are the key implications for regional security and the strategies against North Korea? This analysis, drawing on various Korean, English, Japanese, and Chinese sources on North Korea and military affairs, will be of great value to strategists and policy analysts as well as scholars of East Asian security issues.

New conventional wisdom posits that the public in democracies is inattentive but not really ignorant nor easily swayed, and indeed quite consistent and thoughtful when it comes to national security and foreign policy issues. This volume builds on such a claim to study the attributes and impacts of public opinion on foreign and national security policy in six democracies: Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, Ukraine, Finland and West Germany. These countries face acute and sustained national security challenges posed by stronger authoritarian regimes close by, namely China, North Korea, the Arab nations, Russia and the Soviet Union. Given potential existential threats to their democracies, the public is typically tuned in, and in sorting out their policy stands, is mindful that the fundamental values of identity, sovereignty and prosperity may be jeopardized. Public opinion can indeed constrain statecraft here in these democracies ensnared in asymmetric dyads. Many have studied public opinion and national security in democracies, but few have studied national security strategy of weak powers confronting great powers. This volume is the first attempt to examine this topic. The approach here is a comparative rather than country-specific study combining qualitative and quantitative research methods to enrich our understanding of the complexity and intrigues of the interplay between public opinion and national security under the condition of regime asymmetry. The wealth of data and careful examination of various issues from different theoretical approaches makes this volume an essential guide for courses and research in comparative foreign policy, international relations and democratic processes.