Nuclear Nonproliferation Security Of Russia S Nuclear Material Improving Further Enhancements Needed

Safeguarding nuclear material that can be used in nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States and Russia. Terrorists and countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is estimated that Russia inherited 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in forms highly attractive to theft. This amount of material is enough to produce almost 40,000 nuclear bombs. The breakdown of Soviet-era control systems, coupled with social and economic deterioration within Russia, has increased the threat of this material's theft or diversion.

GAO-01-312 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed

In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.

Safeguarding nuclear warheads & materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary nat. security concern of the U.S. Since 1993, the DoE & DoD have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material & warheads in Russia & other countries. In 1995, DoE established the Materials Protection, Control, & Accounting program to implement these efforts. The author examined the: (1) progress DoE has made in improving security at nuclear-material sites in Russia & other countries; (2) progress DoE & DoD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites; & (3) efforts DoE & DoD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. Illustrations.

The management challenge in orchestrating a multitude of DOE headquarters, laboratory, and contractor personnel at about 50 sites in Russia is daunting. Steps are needed to maximize the return on U.S. expenditures, to reduce redundancy while ensuring adequate oversight, and to provide additional work incentives that will attract highly qualified specialists from the United States and Russia to participate in the protection, control, and accountability of direct-use material (MPC&A) program. This report contains many recommendations to address these and related issues.