Nuclear Risk Reduction In South Asia

The essys in this collection explore and analyze how to reduce the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. Contributors work to introduce the theory and methodology of nuclear risk reduction, to provide specific measures that might work best in the region, and to consider the consequences of missile defense options for stability in Asia. Much work is needed to recduce nuclear dangers between India and Pakistan. While the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons may prevent a full-blown conventional or nuclear war, the presence of these weapons in the region may also encourage the use of violence at lower levels expecting escalation to be contained by a mutual desire to avoid the nuclear threshold. One only needs to look at the Kashmir conflict for confirmation of this paradox, with serious crises coming more frequently with more severity since the nuclear tests of 1998. Sustained efforts along the line suggested by the contributors of this volume are a crucial step toward reducing nuclear risk on the Subcontinent.

This Book Examines The Prospects Of `Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Restraint Regime In South Asia` Which Would Minimize The Risks Of Accidental, Unauthorized, Or Inadvertent Use Of Indian And/Or Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. It Recommends Effective Barriers Against The Danger Of Loose Nukes And Facility-Related Problems. Furthermore, The Book Explains The Nuclear Perils In The South Asian Strategic Environment, Along With Possible Solutions For Viable Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Nuclear Restraint Regime In South Asia.

The Prospect Of A Nuclear War In South Asia Has Drawn Global Attention And Concern. This Book Studies Nuclear Risks In The Indo-Pakistani And Sino-Indian Contexts And Suggests A Wide Range Of Measures By Which India, Pakistan And China Could Reduce Nuclear Dangers In South Asia. The Only Full-Length Study And A Timely Epilogue Of Latest Nuclear Dialogues Between India And Pakistan. Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures In South Asia Will Be A Standard Reference Not Only For Political Scientists And Strategic Analysts, But Also For Policy Makers, Diplomats, Journalists, Defence Personnel And The Informed General Reader.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

India and Pakistan have developed and flight tested seventeen new nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since testing nuclear devices in 1998 - an average of more than one per year. Military doctrines have also evolved to emphasize more rapid mobilization to engage in limited conventional warfare. Diplomacy to reduce nuclear risks has lagged far behind nuclear weapon-related advances and doctrinal change. Since 1998, Pakistan and India have negotiated four notable military-related Confidence-Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures. No new measures have been agreed upon since 2007. There is no basis for deterrence stability on the Subcontinent when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction are moribund while nuclear capabilities grow and military doctrines evolve. The most desirable off-ramp to increased nuclear dangers is to secure normal relations with a nuclear-armed neighbor. This collection of essays - the product of bi-monthly discussions at the Stimson Center - provides analysis and ideas for deterrence stability and escalation control on the Subcontinent. This pursuit awaits leadership in India and Pakistan that is strong enough to persist in the face of violent acts designed to disrupt progress.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.