On The Limits Of Constitutional Adjudication

Juliano Z. Benvindo investigates the current movement of constitutional courts towards political activism, especially by focusing on the increasing use of the balancing method as a “rational” justification for this process. From the critical perception of the serious risks of this movement to democracy, the book takes as examples two constitutional realities, Germany and Brazil, in order to discuss the rationality, correctness, and legitimacy of constitutional decisions within this context. Through a dialogue between Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and Jürgen Habermas’s proceduralism, the author confronts Robert Alexy’s defense of the balancing method as well as those two constitutional realities. This confrontation leads to the introduction of the concept of limited rationality applied to constitutional democracy and constitutional adjudication, which affirms the double bind of history and justice as a condition for a practice of decision-making committed to the principle of separation of powers.

Juliano Z. Benvindo investigates the current movement of constitutional courts towards political activism, especially by focusing on the increasing use of the balancing method as a “rational” justification for this process. From the critical perception of the serious risks of this movement to democracy, the book takes as examples two constitutional realities, Germany and Brazil, in order to discuss the rationality, correctness, and legitimacy of constitutional decisions within this context. Through a dialogue between Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and Jürgen Habermas’s proceduralism, the author confronts Robert Alexy’s defense of the balancing method as well as those two constitutional realities. This confrontation leads to the introduction of the concept of limited rationality applied to constitutional democracy and constitutional adjudication, which affirms the double bind of history and justice as a condition for a practice of decision-making committed to the principle of separation of powers.

Moon argues that recognition of the social dynamic of communication is critical to understanding the potential value and harm of language and to addressing questions about the scope and limits on one's rights to freedom of expression.

What does it mean to interpret the constitution? Does constitutional interpretation involve moral reasoning, or is legal reasoning something different? What does it mean to say that a limit on a right is justified? How does judicial review fit into a democratic constitutional order? Are attempts to limit its scope incoherent? How should a jurist with misgivings about the legitimacy of judicial review approach the task of judicial review? Is there a principled basis for judicial deference? Do constitutional rights depend on the protection of a written constitution, or is there a common law constitution that is enforceable by the courts? How are constitutional rights and unwritten constitutional principles to be reconciled? In this book, these and other questions are debated by some of the world's leading constitutional theorists and legal philosophers. Their essays are essential reading for anyone concerned with constitutional rights and legal theory.

In the past few years, constitutional courts have been presented with new challenges. The world financial crisis, the new wave of terrorism, mass migration and other country-specific problems have had wide-ranging effects on the old and embedded constitutional standards and judicial constructions. This book examines how, if at all, these unprecedented social, economic and political problems have affected constitutional review in Europe. As the courts’ response must conform with EU law and in some cases international law, analysis extends to the related jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. The collection adopts a common analytical structure to examine how the relevant challenges have been addressed in ten country specific case studies. Alongside these, constitutional experts frame the research within the theoretical understanding of the constitutional difficulties of the day in Europe. Finally, a comparative chapter examines the effects of multilevel constitutionalism and identifies general European trends. This book will be essential reading for academics and researchers working in the areas of constitutional law, comparative law and jurisprudence.

Limiting Rights is an in-depth exploration of who is, and who should be, responsible for determining whether legislation that conflicts with the entrenched rights of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should nevertheless be upheld as a reasonable limit on protected rights. Janet Hiebert addresses a topic that threatens to undermine claims that what courts do can be distinguished from the discretionary decisions of policy makers and raises concerns about whether judicial review of the Charter is consistent with democratic principles.

In Judgment Calls, Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry present a fresh perspective on judicial review, taking aim at those who see only two types of approaches to judicial decisions: one based on constitutional law and one based on raw politics. Building on their previous book Beyond All Reason, which was a New York Times Notable Book of the Year, this volume is a similarly incisive challenge to some of the dominant tenets in mainstream legal studies and is sure to inspire debate. The authors aim to reconcile the democratic rule of law with the recognition that judges have discretion. The book takes on the problem of how the Supreme Court can operate in a principled way even in hard, politically charged cases where the legal materials fail to point unambiguously to a single outcome. Throughout, they describe the inherent constraints that keep judges from merely imposing their will, suggest standards for evaluating judicial performance, and make substantial suggestions for improvement. They close with a careful examination of the Supreme Court's controversial cases on the most pressing sociopolitical issues of recent times: the War on Terrorism, abortion, and affirmative action. Timely, trenchant, and carefully argued, Judgment Calls is a welcome addition to the literature on the intersection of constitutional interpretation and American politics.

This book provides unique insights into the practice of democratic constitutionalism in one of the world’s most legally and politically significant regions. It combines contributions from leading Latin American and global scholars to provide ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ insights about the lessons to be drawn from the distinctive constitutional experiences of countries in Latin America. In doing so, it also draws on a rich array of legal and interdisciplinary perspectives. Ultimately, it shows both the promise of democratic constitutions as a vehicle for social, economic and political change, and the variation in the actual constitutional experiences of different countries on the ground – or the limits to constitutions as a locus for broader social change.