On The Nominal Nature Of Propositional Arguments

Die grammatische Kategorie eingebetteter Sätze zählt seit über 50 Jahren zu den zentralen Themen der theoretischen Syntax. Dabei dreht sich die Diskussion speziell um die Frage, ob manche oder vielleicht alle eingebetteten Sätze als Nominalphrasen zu behandeln sind, sei es, weil sie einen (stummen) nominalen Kopf haben (D oder N), oder sei es, weil der Satzeinleiter selbst als nominal zu betrachten ist. Die Beiträge des Sonderhefts nehmen diese Fragestellung erneut auf und explorieren sie unter verschiedenen, syntaktischen wie semantischen Aspekten im Lichte neuerer theoretischer Ansätze. Das Spektrum an Sprachen, die genauer untersucht oder argumentativ für die Zwecke der Analyse herangezogen werden, umfasst neben Deutsch – einschließlich dialektaler Varietäten wie Bairisch und Alemannisch – Englisch, Niederländisch (einschließlich der Brabanter Varietät), Alt- und Neugriechisch, Jula (Niger-Kongo), Schwedisch, Baskisch sowie eine Reihe anderer genetisch und typologisch unterschiedlicher Sprachen. Inhalt: – Katrin Axel-Tober, Lutz Gunkel, Jutta M. Hartmann & Anke Holler: Introduction Part I: Complementation as relativization – Carlos de Cuba: Relatively nouny? – Gisela Zifonun: Sind Komplementsätze nominal? Positionen der Grammatikschreibung Part II: Complement clauses and nominal structure – Richard Faure: (H)óti-clauses from DP to NPhood. The life of a Greek nouny clause – Kalle Müller: On noun-related complementizer clauses – Alassane Kiemtoré: A syntactic account of clausal complementation in Jula Part III: Semantic aspects – Vesela Simeonova: Definitely factive – Jürgen Pafel: (Argument) clauses and definite descriptions – Patrick Brandt: The real semantic value is propositional: German particle verbs and state change Part IV: Aspects based on dependent verb-second – Andreas Blümel & Nobu Goto: Reconsidering the syntax of correlates and propositional arguments – Frank Sode: On the conditional nature of V2-clauses in desire reports of German

This study aims at developing a unified perspective on nonfiniteness, encompassing its morphological, syntactic and semantic aspects. It puts the emphasis on clause types distinct from standard infinitives (gerund clauses, Celtic verbo-nominal structures, Portuguese inflected infinitives, Latin dominant participle constructions) and takes advantage of the most recent developments in syntactic theory. The notions of defectiveness and completeness, the inheritance hypothesis, the labeling requirement, the syntactic definition of lexical categories, once combined together, appear to make accessible tighter and more elegant analyses than previous accounts.

Since entering the stage, Davidsonian event arguments have taken on a central role in linguistic theorizing. Recent years have seen a continuous extension of possible applications for them, not only in semantics but also in syntax. At the same time questions concerning the ontological status of events have received renewed attention. This collection of articles provides new evidence for the virtually ubiquitous presence of event arguments in linguistic structure and sheds new light on their nature. The volume is organized into four sections: Events - states - causation; Event nominals; Events in composition; Measuring events.

This book investigates in detail the grammar of polysynthetic languages--those with very complex verbal morphology. Baker argues that polysynthesis is more than an accidental collection of morphological processes; rather, it is a systematic way of representing predicate-argument relationships that is parallel to but distinct from the system used in languages like English. Having repercussions for many areas of syntax and related aspects of morphology and semantics, this argument results in a comprehensive picture of the grammar of polysynthetic languages. Baker draws on examples from Mohawk and certain languages of the American Southwest, Mesoamerica, Australia, and Siberia.

For the most part, the papers collected in this volume stern from presentations given at a conference held in Tucson over the weekend of May 31 through June 2, 1985. We wish to record our gratitude to the participants in that conference, as well as to the National Science Foundation (Grant No. BNS-8418916) and the University of Arizona SBS Research Institute for their financial support. The advice we received from Susan Steele on organizational matters proved invaluable and had many felicitous consequences for the success of the con ference. We also would like to thank the staff of the Departments of Linguistics of the University of Arizona and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for their help, as weIl as a number of individuals, including Lin Hall, Kathy Todd, and Jiazhen Hu, Sandra Fulmer, Maria Sandoval, Natsuko Tsujimura, Stuart Davis, Mark Lewis, Robin Schafer, Shi Zhang, Olivia Oehrle-Steele, and Paul Saka. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to Martin Scrivener, our editor, for his patience and his encouragement. Vll INTRODUCTION The term 'categorial grammar' was introduced by Bar-Rillel (1964, page 99) as a handy way of grouping together some of his own earlier work (1953) and the work of the Polish logicians and philosophers Lesniewski (1929) and Ajdukiewicz (1935), in contrast to approaches to linguistic analysis based on phrase structure grammars.

The volume explores the semantics of nominalizations from different theoretical points of view: formal and lexical semantics, cognitive-functional grammar, lexical-functional grammar, discourse representation theory. Data from a variety of languages are taken into account, including Hungarian, Italian, French, German and English. The papers discuss the semantics of distinct readings of nominalizations and meaning differences observed between competing affixes.

An argument that the major metaphysical theories of facts give us no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world. In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenable—neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form “the fact that such and such.” There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in “the fact that” statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language.