On The Use Of Monetary And Macroprudential Policies For Small Open Economies

We explore optimal monetary and macroprudential policy rules for a small open economy. Delegating 'lean against the wind' squarely to macroprudential policy provides a more robust policy mix to shock uncertainty—(i) if macroprudential measures exist, there are no significant welfare gains from monetary policy reacting to credit growth under a financial shock; and (ii) monetary responses to financial markets could generate bigger welfare losses than macroprudential responses under different shocks. The source of outstanding liabilities also plays a role in the choice of policy instrument— macroprudential policies are particularly effective for emerging markets where foreign borrowing is sizeable.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

Using a recent IMF survey and expanding on previous studies, we document the use of macroprudential policies for 119 countries over the 2000-13 period, covering many instruments. Emerging economies use macroprudential policies most frequently, especially foreign exchange related ones, while advanced countries use borrower-based policies more. Usage is generally associated with lower growth in credit, notably in household credit. Effects are less in financially more developed and open economies, however, and usage comes with greater cross-border borrowing, suggesting some avoidance. And while macroprudential policies can help manage financial cycles, they work less well in busts.

This paper examines the relative effectiveness of the use of indirect and direct monetary policy instruments in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, by estimating a restricted Vector Autoregressive model with Exogenous Variables (VARX). The study assumes that the central bank conducts monetary policy using a Taylor-type rule and it evaluates the effects of a reserve requirement policy. The results show that although a positive shock to the policy interest rate has a direct effect on commercial banks' interest rates, there is a weak transmission to the real variables. Furthermore, an increase in the required reserve ratio is successful in reducing private sector credit and excess reserves, while at the same time alleviating pressures on the exchange rate. The findings therefore indicate that central banks in small open economies should consider using reserve requirements as a complement to interest rate policy, to achieve their macroeconomic objectives.

We analyze the effects of macroprudential policies through the lens of an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model tailored to developing markets. In particular, we explicitly introduce informality in the labor and goods markets within a small open economy embedding financial frictions, nominal and real rigidities, labor search and matching, and an explicit banking sector. We use the estimated version of the model to run welfare analysis under optimized monetary and macroprudential rules. Results show that although informality reduces the efficiency of macroprudential policies following a convex fashion, combining the latter with an inflation targeting objective could be beneficial.

An integrated analysis of how financial frictions can be accounted for in macroeconomic models built to study monetary policy and macroprudential regulation. Since the global financial crisis, there has been a renewed effort to emphasize financial frictions in designing closed- and open-economy macroeconomic models for monetary and macroprudential policy analysis. Drawing on the extensive literature of the past decade as well as his own contributions, in this book Pierre-Richard Age&́nor provides a unified set of theoretical and quantitative macroeconomic models with financial frictions to explore issues that have emerged in the wake of the crisis. These include the need to understand better how the financial system amplifies and propagates shocks originating elsewhere in the economy; how it can itself be a source of aggregate fluctuations; the extent to which central banks should account for financial stability considerations in the conduct of monetary policy; whether national central banks and regulators should coordinate their policies to promote macroeconomic and financial stability; and how much countercyclical macroprudential policies should be coordinated at the international level to mitigate financial spillovers across countries.

The crisis has underscored the costs of systemic instability at both the national and the global levels and highlighted the need for dedicated macroprudential policies to achieve financial stability. Building on recent advances, this paper provides a framework to inform the IMF’s country-specific advice on macroprudential policy. It recognizes that developing macroprudential policy is a work in progress, and addresses key issues to help ensure its effectiveness.

We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, shallow FX markets, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions for the “traditional prescription”—relying on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—to be sufficient, even if externalities persist. The conditions are satisfied for world interest rate shocks if FX markets are deep. By contrast, we show that to manage non-fundamental inflow surges and taper tantrums related to local currency debt, capital inflow taxes and FX intervention should be used instead of the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility. In the realistic case where countries face both shallow FX markets and external borrowing constraints, we establish that some kinds of FX mismatch regulations may reduce the external debt limit friction but worsen FX market depth. Finally, we show that capital controls and domestic macroprudential measures cease to be perfect substitutes if there is a risk that the domestic borrowing constraint binds as a result of the transmission of the global financial cycle.