On The Utility Of War In The Nuclear Age

"This book covers a lot of ground -- from the stirrings of the 'new physics' early in the century to events of June 1988, notably the last meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev's special conference of the Soviet Communist party some days later. In between came crises, confrontations, negotiations and even a few arguments, I have tried to relate much of that and to describe the historic effect of nuclear weapons on relations between adversaries, as well as the singular effects of these weapons on relations between allies"--Page xi.

Given the disappointing history of arms control negotiations and agreements, disconcerting trends in the balance of power, and emerging technologies that challenge conventional assumptions about deterrence, new ways to promote security through negotiations must be identified and utilized if arms control is ever to play an integral role in enhancing deterrence and reducing instabilities. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) may offer one way out of the contemporary arms control morass. Instead of focusing on limiting the number and types of weaponry, CBMs are designed to control how, when, where, and why military activities occur. By clarifying military intentions and regulating the operations of military forces in times of both crisis and calm, CBMs can help diminish the opportunities for war arising from surprise attack or from miscalculation, accident, or failure of communication. This volume assembles leading CBM experts from government and academia to assess the utility of CBMs in a wide variety of areas. It is intended to serve as a basic primer on the subject, as well as to contribute to the ongoing national debate over the role of arms control in strengthening national security by analyzing new and fruitful avenues toward that over-riding objective.

This book, first published in 1965, examines the doctrine for fighting a conventional war against a nuclear power. Troops must be deployed as if they were fighting a nuclear war: dispersed over a greatly extended battlefield, conducting mobile operations, with no fixed front line, or static defence system, or defence zone. A new strategy of forward defence is needed, whereby significant numbers of troops are dispatched into the enemy’s rear, and this book lays out such a strategy, and thereby sets a proposal for the future safety of Western Europe.

Using a number of recent conflicts such as Cuba, Korea, and Indochina, Halperin develops a theory of how and why nations use limited means to settle disputes when they possess infinitely greater means of destruction.

Professor Knorr examines bends in the values which nations derive in their international relationships from the possession and use of both nuclear and non-nuclear military forces, and suggests that territorial conquest and the furtherance of economic benefits by military means have generally diminished in appeal. He inquires into the costs and disadvantages of military power-the greatly reduced security obtainable even by the major nuclear powers and the noticeable diminution in the legitimacy of international violence in its several forms. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to "think about the unthinkable." The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age. In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises. Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

A “second nuclear age” has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy—that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain—the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor—the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.