Ownership Structure Corporate Governance And Corporate Performance

The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.

The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.

June 1997 Does the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in China affect their performance? Yes. Institutional shareholders seem to have a positive impact on corporate governance and performance; state ownership seems to lead to inefficiency; and an overly dispersed ownership structure can create problems in the Chinese setting. Xu and Wang investigate whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of publicly listed firms in China and if so, in what way. With public listed stocks, one can quantify the ownership mix and concentration, which makes it possible to study this issue. The authors use the recent literature on the role of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance as a theoretical base. A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed ownership structure, with three predominant groups of shareholders- state, legal persons (institutions), and individuals- holding about 30 percent of the stock. (Employees and foreign investors together hold less than 10 percent.) Ownership is heavily concentrated: the five largest shareholders accounted for 58 percent of outstanding shares in 1995, compared with 57.8 percent in the Czech Republic, 42 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in Japan. Their empirical analysis shows that the mix and concentration of stock ownership do indeed significantly affect a company's performance: * There is a positive, significant correlation between concentration of ownership and profitability. * The effect of concentrated ownership is greater with companies dominated by institutions than with those dominated by the state. * The firms' profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of legal person (institutional) shares; it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and with tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals. * Labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares increases. This paper- product of the Office of the Director, Economic Development Institute- part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand and disseminate various models of corporate governance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm's Performance (RPO 681-08).

Governance-Led Corporate Performance explores the corporate governance system for developing economies, and provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ownership structure, board composition, director multiplicity and CEO duality in relation to corporate performance.

The book illustrates that the impact of ownership on firm value depends not only on the concentration of ownership but also on the identity of blockholders. Large shareholders can use their power to influence corporate performance. However, owners are no homogenous group and have different motivations and abilities.

Establishing a corporate governance strategy that promotes the efficient use of organisational resources is instrumental in the economic growth of a country, as well as the successful management of firms. This book reviews existing literature and identifies board structural features as key variables of an effective corporate governance system, establishing a multi-theoretical model that links Board structural characteristics with firm performance. It then, using a comprehensive empirical study of 265 companies listed on the Karachi Stock exchange, tests this conceptual model. This research serves as a significant milestone, reflecting the socio-economic setting of emerging economies, and highlighting the need for the corporate sector in emerging markets to move away from a 'tick-box' culture. It argues that the sector needs to implement corporate governance as a tool to mitigate business risks; appoint and empower non-executive directors to achieve an effective monitoring of management; and establish their own ethical and governance principles, applicable to the Board of Directors. Based on an extensive data base, collected painstakingly over five years, this book offers new insights and conceptual framework for further research in this area. Given the breadth and width of the research, it is a useful source of future reference for students, researchers and policy makers.