Palestinian Refugees And The Regional Security Implications Of The Peace Process

This thesis focuses on the status of Palestinian refugees following final peace negotiations. The major conclusions of the thesis are that basic Palestinian refugee rights are not likely to be honored given the immense imbalance of power between Israel and the PLO; that the Palestinian refugee community will likely become a permanently marginalized outcast group in the Middle East; and that the probable result of this condition will be an increase in Palestinian political violence and terrorism against Israeli, American, and allied Arab interests. This is likely to be achieved through mobilization of former refugees by Islamic fundamentalist groups, capitalizing on the failure of the nationalist peace effort. These conclusions are reached through a close examination of the specific Palestinian refugee question and applying a general model of ethnonationalist collective action to the Palestinian question. The major policy conclusion for the United States is that to protect its own interests in the Middle East and reduce violence, the United States must treat seriously the rights of Palestinian refugees during regional peace negotiations. American and Israeli interests on this key issue are clearly divergent; they should be recognized as such and treated accordingly.

The U.S. Institute of Peace¿s (USIP) Project on Arab-Israeli Futures is a research effort designed to anticipate and assess obstacles and opportunities facing the peace process in the years ahead. Stepping back from the day-to-day ebb and flow of events on the ground, this project examines deeper, over-the-horizon trends that could foreclose future options or offer new openings for peace. The effort brings together American, Israeli, and Arab researchers. This 2006 report, analyzes survey data gathered from dozens of polls conducted over the past decade and identifies long-term trends in Palestinian public opinion and related policy implications. Table and graphs.

The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, a concept more recently broadened to cover all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has been before the international community for decades. In this book, two experts from the region explore why the matter remains unresolved, and outline a comprehensive yet achievable roadmap to a Middle East free of WMD. Weapons of mass destruction pose an existential threat to global peace and security. But nowhere is it more urgent to stem their spread than in the Middle East, a region fraught with mistrust and instability. Accounting for these geopolitical realities, including the ongoing talks to curb Iran’s nuclear program, the authors present a practical and innovative strategy to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destructions (WMD). They outline a phased approach toward disarmament in the region, prescribing confidence-building measures and verification tools to create trust among the region’s governments. Their vision also sees the realization of a WMD-free zone within a broader regional agenda for security and cooperation to advance socioeconomic and political progress. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, politics and security studies in the Middle East.

This volume is a collection of the best essays of Professor Benjamin Miller on the subjects of international and regional security. The book analyses the interrelationships between international politics and regional and national security, with a special focus on the sources of international conflict and collaboration and the causes of war and peace. More specifically, it explains the sources of intended and unintended great-power conflict and collaboration. The book also accounts for the sources of regional war and peace by developing the concept of the state-to-nation balance. Thus the volume is able to explain the variations in the outcomes of great power interventions and the differences in the level and type of war and peace in different eras and various parts of the world. For example, the book’s model can account for recent outcomes such as the effects of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq, the post-2011 Arab Spring and the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. The book also provides a model for explaining the changes in American grand strategy with a special focus on accounting for the causes of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Finally, the book addresses the debate on the future of war and peace in the 21st century. This book will be essential reading for students of international security, regional security, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy and IR.

The Palestinian refugee issue remains a central component of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This book explores the demographic and developmental challenges which the return of refugees to a future Palestinian state would generate.

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.

Provides an overview of the key dimensions of the Palestinian refugee problem.