Paradoxes In Scientific Inference

Paradoxes are poems of science and philosophy that collectively allow us to address broad multidisciplinary issues within a microcosm. A true paradox is a source of creativity and a concise expression that delivers a profound idea and provokes a wild and endless imagination. The study of paradoxes leads to ultimate clarity and, at the same time, in

Science has revolutionized our lives and continues to show inexorable progress today. It may seem obvious that this must be because its theories are steadily getting better and approaching the truth about the world. After all, what could science be progressing toward, if not the truth? But scholarship in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science offers little support for such a sanguine view. Those opposed to specific conclusions of the scientific community-nonbelievers in vaccinations, climate change, and evolution, for example-have been able to use a superficial understanding of the nature of science to sow doubt about the scientific consensus in those areas, leaving the general public confused as to whom to trust, with damaging effects for the health of individuals and the planet. The Great Paradox of Science argues that to better counter such anti-science efforts requires us to understand the nature of scientific knowledge at a much deeper level and dispel many myths and misconceptions. It is the use of scientific logic, the characteristics of which are elaborated on in the book, that enables the scientific community to arrive at reliable consensus judgments in which the public can retain a high degree of confidence. This scientific logic is applicable not just in science but can be used in all areas of life. Scientists, policymakers, and members of the general public will not only better understand why science works: They will also acquire the tools they need to make sound, rational decisions in all areas of their lives.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974.

This work breaks new ground by carefully distinguishing the concepts of belief, confirmation, and evidence and then integrating them into a better understanding of personal and scientific epistemologies. It outlines a probabilistic framework in which subjective features of personal knowledge and objective features of public knowledge have their true place. It also discusses the bearings of some statistical theorems on both formal and traditional epistemologies while showing how some of the existing paradoxes in both can be resolved with the help of this framework.This book has two central aims: First, to make precise a distinction between the concepts of confirmation and evidence and to argue that failure to recognize this distinction is the source of certain otherwise intractable epistemological problems. The second goal is to demonstrate to philosophers the fundamental importance of statistical and probabilistic methods, at stake in the uncertain conditions in which for the most part we lead our lives, not simply to inferential practice in science, where they are now standard, but to epistemic inference in other contexts as well. Although the argument is rigorous, it is also accessible. No technical knowledge beyond the rudiments of probability theory, arithmetic, and algebra is presupposed, otherwise unfamiliar terms are always defined and a number of concrete examples are given. At the same time, fresh analyses are offered with a discussion of statistical and epistemic reasoning by philosophers. This book will also be of interest to scientists and statisticians looking for a larger view of their own inferential techniques.The book concludes with a technical appendix which introduces an evidential approach to multi-model inference as an alternative to Bayesian model averaging.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974.

Logic and scientific inference; Probability; Sampling; Errors; Physical magnitudes; Mensuration; Newtonian dynamics; Light and relativity; Miscellaneous questions; Statistical mechanics and quantum theory.