Phenomenology And The Crisis Of Philosophy

Philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy and the crisis of European man.

Philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy and the crisis of European man.

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl's last great work, is important both for its content and for the influence it has had on other philosophers. In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a philosophy of history. As he says in Part I, "The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies--or nonphilosophies, which retain the word but not the task--and the actual and still vital philosophies. But the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for their true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of a genuine humanity."

The Crisis of the European Sciences is Husserl's last and most influential book, written in Nazi Germany where he was discriminated against as a Jew. It incisively identifies the urgent moral and existential crises of the age and defends the relevance of philosophy at a time of both scientific progress and political barbarism. It is also a response to Heidegger, offering Husserl's own approach to the problems of human finitude, history and culture. The Crisis introduces Husserl's influential notion of the 'life-world' – the pre-given, familiar environment that includes both 'nature' and 'culture' – and offers the best introduction to his phenomenology as both method and philosophy. Dermot Moran's rich and accessible introduction to the Crisis explains its intellectual and political context, its philosophical motivations and the themes that characterize it. His book will be invaluable for students and scholars of Husserl's work and of phenomenology in general.

This book offers a systematic interpretation of the relation between natural science and metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology. It shows that Husserl’s account of scientific knowledge is a radical alternative to established methods and frameworks in contemporary philosophy of science. The author’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy offers a critical reconstruction of the historical context from which his phenomenological approach developed, as well as new interpretations of key Husserlian concepts such as metaphysics, idealization, life-world, objectivism, crisis of the sciences, and historicity. The development of Husserl’s philosophical project is marked by the tension between natural science and transcendental phenomenology. While natural science provides a paradigmatic case of the way in which transcendental phenomenology, ontology, empirical science, and metaphysics can be articulated, it has also been the object of philosophical misunderstandings that have determined the current cultural and philosophical crisis. This book demonstrates the ways in which Husserl shows that our conceptions of philosophy and of nature are inseparable. Philosophy’s Nature will appeal to scholars and advanced students who are interested in Husserl and the relations between phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics.

This book presents a sympathetic yet critical treatment of the major philosophical attempts to define a viable project for philosophy in the face of historical changes. McCarthy, then, proposes a comprehensive, critical, and methodological strategy of epistemic integration that fully respects the progressive and pluralistic character of contemporary science and common sense. The programs of Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Sellers, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty are carefully presented and an assessment is made of their merits and limitations. This assessment results in a defense of Lonergan's integrative strategy -- a nuanced philosophical strategy around which a gathering center could be built. McCarthy presents Lonergan's work as containing the firm outline and partial execution of a philosophical project continuous with philosophy's historic purposes and equal to the exigences of the present. The book examines a broad range of seminal topics and, after extended dialectical treatment of them, develops a coherent account of their interdependence. These topics include psychologism, intentionality, the limits of naturalism, semantical and epistemic realism, historical belonging, epistemic invariance, foundational analysis, the limitation of logic and of the linguistic turn, generalized empirical method, the interdependence of mind and language, the interplay of nature and history, and the critical appropriation of tradition.

The guiding dictum of phenomenology is "to the things themselves. " This saying conveys a sense that the "things," the "phenomena" with which we are confronted and into which we seek some insight are not as immediately accessible as may be imagined. Phenomena, however, are often hidden not by their distance from us, but by their very proximity, by the fact that they are taken for granted as being self-evident and understood by all. Even the most common, everyday phenomena and the words used to describe them often reveal, upon closer inspection, a degree of complexity which had previously been unsuspected. Upon interrogation, that which had been taken to be self-evident and widely understood shows itself otherwise; assumed self-evidence frequently masks unintelligibility and common understanding can be a sign of a lack of understanding. One phenomenon which is extremely proximate in our times is the phenomenon of "crisis. " To be sure, one can hardly avoid the word these it abound in periodicals and newspapers, but also, in days. Not only does the learned journals of medicine, political science, economics, art, and law, barely does an edition appear without the discussion of a crisis of one sort or another within these respective fields. One is tempted to remark, along with Umberto Eco, that "crisis sells well. "l One is also inclined to be suspicious of the collective malaise of academics.