Plato S Use Of Fallacy

There are many fallacious arguments in the dialogues of Plato. The author argues that Plato was fully conscious of the fallacious character of at least an important number of these arguments and that he sometimes made deliberate use of fallacy as an indirect means of setting forth certain of his fundamental philosophical views. Plato introduces them, the author maintains, for the purpose of working out their implications. Plato is thus able to expose them for what they are, to clear away possible lines of attack upon his own position, and even to show that when the proper correction is applied his own views receive support.

There are many fallacious arguments in the dialogues of Plato. The author argues that Plato was fully conscious of the fallacious character of at least an important number of these arguments and that he sometimes made deliberate use of fallacy as an indirect means of setting forth certain of his fundamental philosophical views. Plato introduces them, the author maintains, for the purpose of working out their implications. Plato is thus able to expose them for what they are, to clear away possible lines of attack upon his own position, and even to show that when the proper correction is applied his own views receive support.

Excerpt from Plato's Use of Fallacy: A Study of the Euthydemus and Some Other Dialogues There is no doubt that there are many fallacious arguments in Plato's dialogues. This book is an attempt to try out the hypo thesis that Plato was fully conscious of the fallacious character of at least an important number of these arguments, and that he sometimes made deliberate use of fallacy as an indirect means of setting forth certain of his fundamental philosophical views. Of course there may well be arguments in the dialogues which Plato regarded as sound but which are in fact fallacious. It is not my purpose to deny this nor to examine passages where Plato may have committed unintentional logical errors. My purpose is rather to insist that in the case of certain specific fallacious arguments Plato was fully aware of the fallacy and used it for a purpose. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

There are many fallacious arguments in the dialogues of Plato. The author argues that Plato was fully conscious of the fallacious character of at least an important number of these arguments and that he sometimes made deliberate use of fallacy as an indirect means of setting forth certain of his fundamental philosophical views. Plato introduces them, the author maintains, for the purpose of working out their implications. Plato is thus able to expose them for what they are, to clear away possible lines of attack upon his own position, and even to show that when the proper correction is applied his own views receive support.

Presenting the first book-length study in English of Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations, this work takes a fresh look at this seminal text on false reasoning. Through a careful and critical analysis of Aristotle's examples of sophistical reasoning, Scott G. Schreiber explores Aristotle's rationale for his taxonomy of twelve fallacy types. Contrary to certain modern attempts to reduce all fallacious reasoning to either errors of logical form or linguistic imprecision, Aristotle insists that, as important as form and language are, certain types of false reasoning derive their persuasiveness from mistaken beliefs about the nature of language and the nature of the world.

At the crisis of his Republic, Plato asks us to imagine what could possibly motivate a philosopher to return to the Cave voluntarily for the benefit of others and at the expense of her own personal happiness. This book shows how Plato has prepared us, his students, to recognize that the sun-like Idea of the Good is an infinitely greater object of serious philosophical concern than what is merely good for me, and thus why neither Plato nor his Socrates are eudaemonists, as Aristotle unquestionably was. With the transcendent Idea of Beauty having been made manifest through Socrates and Diotima, the dialogues between Symposium and Republic—Lysis, Euthydemus, Laches, Charmides, Gorgias, Theages, Meno, and Cleitophon— prepare the reader to make the final leap into Platonism, a soul-stirring idealism that presupposes the student’s inborn awareness that there is nothing just, noble, or beautiful about maximizing one’s own good. While perfectly capable of making the majority of his readers believe that he endorses the harmless claim that it is advantageous to be just and thus that we will always fare well by doing well, Plato trains his best students to recognize the deliberate fallacies and shortcuts that underwrite these claims, and thus to look beyond their own happiness by the time they reach the Allegory of the Cave, the culmination of a carefully prepared Ascent to the Good.