Policing Process Of Home Office Leaks Inquiry

Government response to HC 157 (ISBN 9780215529718)

On 27 November 2008 a senior Member of Parliament and Opposition spokesman, Mr Damian Green, was arrested by police and his home and offices searched in connection with an investigation into the leak and publication of a number of government documents. Press reports indicated that Mr Green was believed to have received government documents from a Home Office official, Mr Christopher Galley, who had been arrested eight days earlier and who had subsequently admitted to having leaked some documents. This series of events, and particularly the fact that Mr Green's office at the House of Commons was searched without the police producing a warrant, caused considerable disquiet. The Committee's remit was to review the internal processes of the House administration for granting permission for such action (as police searches of Members' offices and seizure of their papers), and to make recommendations for the future. As a starting point, the reasons why the police were requested to investigate the suspected disclosure of government information and how many disclosures, the type of information that had been leaked, in particular, whether any of it was relevant to national security or was otherwise classified, and the efforts that had been made to discover the source of the leaks before the police were called in. Also the Committee wished to disentangle the roles of the Home Office and the Cabinet Office in the investigation process. The Committee concluded the Home Office appears to have followed best practice for investigating leaks, as set out in the Cabinet Office's Memorandum to the Committees' sister Committee. But there are concerns that growing frustration in both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office may have led officials to give an exaggerated impression of the damage done by the leaks that could reasonably be presumed to have emanated from the Home Office. The Committee thought it was unhelpful to give the police the impression that the Home Office leaker(s) had already caused considerable damage to national security. The Cabinet Office's guidance to departments says that it is appropriate to involve the police in leak investigations when they involve "a serious and damaging impact on the functioning of a Department and suspicion of leaking sensitive information". However, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a leak of sensitive information could lead to a damaging impact on the functioning of a Department without falling within the categories laid down in statute. The Cabinet Office's guidance therefore seems to leave open the possibility of involving the police in an investigation without any suspicion let alone evidence that a criminal offence under the Act has taken place. The Committee recommend that the Cabinet Office revise its guidance to preclude this possibility.

Incorporating HC 1040-i, ii and ii, session 2008-09. About the police search on 27 November 2009 of the Parliamentary offices of Damian Green MP, who had been leaked some restricted papers by a Home Office official

The Committee calls for better and more accessible procedures for civil servants to raise concerns about the conduct of government. A route should to be established whereby evidence that a minister had misled Parliament or the public could be reported to Parliament following a complaint by a civil servant. Leaks damage trust within government and trust in government. The Committee concludes that leak investigations are often hamstrung by the fact that many leaks are politically motivated, including leaks from ministers and special advisers. The most effective way to prevent leaks by civil servants is to have accessible, effective and visible ways for individuals to raise concerns about the conduct of government, either internally or through an external oversight body, the Civil Service Commissioners. The report makes the following key recommendations: the Civil Service Commissioners should have the power to report to Parliament evidence indicating that the government was misleading Parliament or the public or the fact that the Civil Service has refused to act on a justified complaint; the Commissioners should also conduct independent investigation of breaches of confidentiality by special advisers; the leaking of information should only be a criminal matter where there is a breach of the Official Secrets Act or there is evidence of serious criminal misconduct; the Cabinet Office, Heads of Departments and the Civil Service Commissioners should do more to ensure that potential whistleblowers know how to raise concerns and have the confidence to come forward with them.

Focusing on a time of profound social and political change, this book offers a detailed and engaging history of policing, covering the key themes of social stability, professionalisation and police reform, as well as the major events between 1974 and 2008 such as the Miners' Strike of 1984.

Enacted in 2000 and in operation in the UK since 2005, the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act has revealed information which has generated calls for constitutional reform. A massive 'information jurisprudence' has developed through the decisions of the Information Commissioner, the Information Tribunal and the courts. Governments' responses to the war on terror have involved increased resort to claims of national security and accompanying secrecy, but these developments have to exist alongside demands for FOI and transparency. FOI has to balance access to and protection of personal information, and major amendments have been made to the Data Protection Act in order to balance the competing demands of transparency and privacy. This detailed discussion of FOI laws and personal data laws examines the historical development of secrecy, national security and government, and their modern context.

Calls for the merger of many different counter-terrorism committees into a single, formalised National Security Committee, chaired by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister and assisted by a National Security Advisor.

The policing of the G20 Protests in April 2009 was a remarkably successful operation; more than 35,000 protesters demonstrated in the centre of London with a police presence of several thousand, yet there was a minimum of disruption. Aside from a few high-profile incidents, the policing of the G20 Protests passed without drama. However, these incidents and the tactics that led to them caused considerable adverse comment and have the potential to damage the public's faith in the police. The use of containment (detaining people in a confined area for a sustained period of time), and distraction tactics (the controlled use of force against those who appear hostile) while legitimate according to the police rule-book, shocked the public. Whether they should continue to be used must form the basis of a wide-ranging discussion on the future policing of public protests. Police communications with the media and the protesters must also improve. This would require the police, media and protesters to engage better with one another both before and during the protest. There are no circumstances in which it is acceptable for officers not to wear identification numbers and urgent action must be taken to ensure that officers have the resources to display identification at all times; those officers found to be consciously removing their identification numbers must face the strongest possible disciplinary measures. While the vast majority of officers on duty performed very well, the Committee is concerned that untrained and inexperienced officers were placed in such a highly combustible atmosphere. It cannot condone the use of untrained, inexperienced officers on the front-line of a public protest and feel that an element of luck must be attributed to the success of the operation.