Political Decisions And Agency Performance

All over the world, many people who live in urban areas find themselves in an arduous social situation. In the third world, people in overcrowded metropolitan areas have a problem in maintaining even the slightest standards of living. But also richer parts of the world, the United States, Europe and the far-East, show growing social inequalities in their cities. And social problems are not confined to the large metropolitan areas: impoverishment, long-term unemployment, social isolation, and the dependency on welfare programs pops up in medium-sized cities and even in smaller communities. At the same time, these cities are confronted with a growing bureaucratic conglomerate which is increasingly inapt to fight social degeneration. The catastrophe seems to be total: how to deal at once with declining social conditions and bureaucratic inadequacy? Two American authors, Osborne and Plastrik (1997), claim to have found the answer: just banish bureaucracy. The liberating accomplishments of the free market will elevate ordinary citizens and force lazy, incompetent bureaucrats to do their work properly. If they succeed, they survive. Otherwise, these agencies will vanish. They illustrate their arguments with the American city of 'Uphill Battle' which stopped its decline by reinventing government. Strict performance measures, allotting financial controls and incentives to the citizens, and improving accountability have saved the city. We should, however, be very careful in taking such measures so far that they banish bureaucracy. It is far from obvious that simply banishing bureaucracy indeed will help people in poor social situations.

Based on five years of extensive research by the Government Performance Project, this volume offers a comprehensive analysis of how government managers and elected officials use management and management systems to improve performance. Drawing on data from across the nation, it examines the performance of state, county, and city governments between 1997 and 2002 within the framework of basic management systems: financial information, human resources, capital and infrastructure, and results evaluation. Key issues addressed: • How governments strategically select elements of management to emphasize the role of leadership • How those governments that aim to improve performance differ from those that do not • What “effective management” looks like Through this careful, in-depth investigation, the contributors conclude that the most effective governments are not those with the most resources, but those that use the resources available to them most carefully and strategically. In Pursuit of Performance is an invaluable tool for government leaders and the scholars who study them.

Now considered a classic amongst political experts, "American Public Policy" is an excellent overview of the fundamental processes and content of American public policy. Peters gives a clear exposition of the public policy environment from agenda setting to evaluation, identifying the governmental structures and procedures through which policy is designed and implemented. With characteristic flair for lucid and lively discussion, Peters examines the problems, goals, and important issues in substantive policy areas, including health care, social security and welfare, education, energy, environment, defense and law enforcement.A new chapter on social policy covering important contemporary topics such as abortion, school prayer, and gay rights enhances the currency of this accomplished review of public policy.

The complexity of governments today makes the accountability desired by citizens difficult to achieve. Written to address performance policies within state and national governments, Government Performance and Results: An Evaluation of GPRA’s First Decade summarizes lessons learned from a 10-year research project that evaluated performance reports produced by federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). The results of this project can help answer a wide variety of questions in political economy and public administration, such as: What factors make performance reports relevant and informative? Has the quality of information disclosed to the public improved? Why do some agencies produce better reports than others? Has GPRA led to greater availability and use of performance information by federal managers? Has GPRA led to greater use of performance information in budget decisions? What steps would make federal management and budget decisions more performance oriented? The book documents the current state of the art in federal performance reporting, measures the extent of improvement, compares federal performance reports with those produced by state governments and other nations, and suggests how GPRA has affected management of federal agencies and resource allocation by policymakers. It also identifies obstacles that must be overcome if GPRA is to deliver on the promise of performance budgeting. The authors chronicle the improvements observed in federal performance reporting through the lens of the Mercatus Center’s annual Performance Report Scorecard. As budget shortfalls and new debt burdens increase interest in public management and budgeting techniques that allow governments to do more with less, this is an appropriate time to take stock of what GPRA has accomplished and what remains to be done. By comparing best performance reporting practices in the US federal government with those in states and other countries, this book speeds the diffusion of useful knowledge at a critical time.

The complexity of governments today makes the accountability desired by citizens difficult to achieve. Written to address performance policies within state and national governments, Government Performance and Results: An Evaluation of GPRA's First Decade summarizes lessons learned from a 10-year research project that evaluated performance reports produced by federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). The results of this project can help answer a wide variety of questions in political economy and public administration, such as: What factors make performance reports relevant and informative? Has the quality of information disclosed to the public improved? Why do some agencies produce better reports than others? Has GPRA led to greater availability and use of performance information by federal managers? Has GPRA led to greater use of performance information in budget decisions? What steps would make federal management and budget decisions more performance oriented? The book documents the current state of the art in federal performance reporting, measures the extent of improvement, compares federal performance reports with those produced by state governments and other nations, and suggests how GPRA has affected management of federal agencies and resource allocation by policymakers. It also identifies obstacles that must be overcome if GPRA is to deliver on the promise of performance budgeting. The authors chronicle the improvements observed in federal performance reporting through the lens of the Mercatus Center's annual Performance Report Scorecard. As budget shortfalls and new debt burdens increase interest in public management and budgeting techniques that allow governments to do more with less, this is an appropriate time to take stock of what GPRA has accomplished and what remains to be done. By comparing best performance reporting practices in the US federal government with those in states and other countries, this book speeds the diffusion of useful knowledge at a critical time.

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 has laid a foundation of results-oriented agency planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Performance planning and measurement have slowly, yet increasingly, become a part of agencies' cultures. For planning and performance measurement to be effective, federal managers need to use performance information to identify performance problems and look for solutions, develop approaches that improve results, and make other important management decisions. According to GAO's periodic surveys, federal managers reported having more performance measures in 2003 than in 1997. However, the data also showed that managers' reported use of performance information for program management activities has remained essentially unchanged from 1997 levels. GAO was asked to identify (1) how federal agencies can use performance information to make management decisions and (2) practices that can enhance or facilitate the use of performance information to make management decisions. Technical comments from the case agencies were incorporated where appropriate.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many questioned whether the large number of political appointees in the Federal Emergency Management Agency contributed to the agency's poor handling of the catastrophe, ultimately costing hundreds of lives and causing immeasurable pain and suffering. The Politics of Presidential Appointments examines in depth how and why presidents use political appointees and how their choices impact government performance--for better or worse. One way presidents can influence the permanent bureaucracy is by filling key posts with people who are sympathetic to their policy goals. But if the president's appointees lack competence and an agency fails in its mission--as with Katrina--the president is accused of employing his friends and allies to the detriment of the public. Through case studies and cutting-edge analysis, David Lewis takes a fascinating look at presidential appointments dating back to the 1960s to learn which jobs went to appointees, which agencies were more likely to have appointees, how the use of appointees varied by administration, and how it affected agency performance. He argues that presidents politicize even when it hurts performance--and often with support from Congress--because they need agencies to be responsive to presidential direction. He shows how agency missions and personnel--and whether they line up with the president's vision--determine which agencies presidents target with appointees, and he sheds new light on the important role patronage plays in appointment decisions.

An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.