Political Economy Politics And Policy Analysis

Most of economics takes politics for granted. Through some (often implausible) assumptions, it seeks to explain away political structures by characterizing them as stable and predictable or as inconsequential in understanding what goes on in an economy. Such attempts are misguided, and this book shows how governments and political institutions are composed of people who respond to incentives and whose behavior and choices can be studied through the lens of economics. This book aims to bridge the gap between economics and politics, and in doing so hopes to instill in the reader a deeper appreciation for social scientific thinking. Opening with a refresher on microeconomics and an introduction to the toolkit of political economy, it ensures that the necessary building blocks are in place before building up from the level of the individual and the firm to show how a political–economic equilibrium can be achieved. The text explores how to separate primitives—the external parts of a model that we cannot affect—from outcomes—the internal parts of a model that we can. Moreover, it demonstrates that economic and political issues alike can be studied within the same general framework of analysis. Political Economy and Policy Analysis offers readers the chance to gain a more sophisticated understanding of political processes, economic processes, and the interplay among them. Adopting an applied microeconomics approach, it will be ideal for upper-level undergraduate or postgraduate courses on political economy, public choice, or policy analysis. A complementary workbook with exercises and solutions that accompanies Political Economy and Policy Analysis is available for download under the eResources tab at: https://www.routledge.com/Political-Economy-and-Policy-Analysis/Merlo/p/book/9781138591783.

This text gives students a framework for analyzing public policy choices. The unique "political economy" approach focuses on the institutions and market processes that contribute to the solving of public problems.

The ideal introductory textbook to the politics of the policymaking process This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking—political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas—externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems—that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies. This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students Models unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence Exercises at the end of every chapter Self-contained appendices cover necessary game theory Extensive discussion of cases and applications

Over its lifetime, 'political economy' has had different meanings. This handbook views political economy as a synthesis of the various strands of social science, treating it as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behaviour and institutions.

5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries

There is a long-standing difference amongst public economists between those who think that collective choice must be formally acknowledged, and those who derive their policy recommendations from a social planning framework in which politics plays no role. The purpose of this book is to contribute to a meaningful dialogue between these two groups, in the belief that the future of both political economy and of normative public finance lies somewhere between the two approaches. Some of the specific questions addressed in the book include: does public finance need political economy? Should collective choice play a role in the standard of reference used in normative public finance? What is a 'failure' in a non-market or policy process? And what have we learned about the theory and practice of public finance from three decades of empirical research on public choice? The book also provides a practitioner's view of the political economy of redistribution.

A selection of essays examining economic policy and politics in the United States.