Political Transitions In Dominant Party Systems

This is a path-breaking study by leading scholars of comparative politics examining the internal transformations of dominant parties in both authoritarian and democratic settings. The principle question examined in this book is what happens to dominant political parties when they lose or face the very real prospect of losing? Using country-specific case studies, top-rank analysts in the field focus on the lessons that dominant parties might learn from losing and the adaptations they consequently make in order to survive, to remain competitive or to ultimately re-gain power. Providing historical based, comparative research on issues of theoretical importance, Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems will be invaluable reading for students and scholars of comparative politics, international politics and political parties.

Why have dominant parties persisted in power for decades in countries spread across the globe? Why did most eventually lose? Why Dominant Parties Lose develops a theory of single-party dominance, its durability, and its breakdown into fully competitive democracy. Greene shows that dominant parties turn public resources into patronage goods to bias electoral competition in their favor and virtually win elections before election day without resorting to electoral fraud or bone-crushing repression. Opposition parties fail because their resource disadvantages force them to form as niche parties with appeals that are out of step with the average voter. When the political economy of dominance erodes, the partisan playing field becomes fairer and opposition parties can expand into catchall competitors that threaten the dominant party at the polls. Greene uses this argument to show why Mexico transformed from a dominant party authoritarian regime under PRI rule to a fully competitive democracy.

In this collection of original essays, thirteen country specialists working within a common comparative frame of reference analyze major examples of long-term, single-party rule in industrialized democracies. They focus on four cases: Japan under the Liberal Democratic party since 1955; Italy under the Christian Democrats for thirty-five or more years starting in 1945; Sweden under the Social Democratic party from 1932 until 1976 (and again from 1982 until present); and Israel under the Labor party from pre-statehood until 1977.

Using country-specific case studies, top-rank analysts in the field focus on the lessons that dominant parties might learn from losing and the adaptations they consequently make in order to survive, to remain competitive or to ultimately re-gain power.

One of the more positive international trends as of late has been the transformation of several countries from authoritarian-based dictatorships and single party systems into multi-party democracies characterized by peaceful political transitions. In this volume, a group of experts are gathered to analyze this progression on a comparative level. The essays reveal how the dramatic collapse of the USSR functioned as a crucial catalyst in allowing pent-up domestic pressures for change to emerge in a less charged international environment. In addition, the chapters study the historical and current evolution of these countries, focusing on their success in developing long-term pluralistic structures, and gauging whether these recent trends are more overnight fads than long lasting advancements.

In the last two decades, there has been a widespread movement from authoritarian to democratic rule among developing countries, often occurring against a backdrop of severe economic crises and the adoption of market-oriented reforms. The coincidence of these events raises long-standing questions about the relationship between economic and political change. In this book, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore this relationship, addressing a variety of questions: What role have economic crises played in the current wave of political liberalization and democratization? Can new democracies manage the daunting political challenges posed by economic reform? Under what economic and institutional conditions is democracy most likely to be consolidated? Drawing on contemporary political economy and the experiences of twelve Latin American and Asian countries, they develop a new approach to understanding democratic transitions. Haggard and Kaufman first analyze the relationship between economic crisis and authoritarian withdrawal and then examine how the economic and institutional legacies of authoritarian rule affect the capacity of new democratic governments to initiate and sustain economic policy reform. Finally, the authors analyze the consolidation of political and economic reform over the long run. Throughout, they emphasize the relationship between economic conditions, the interests and power of contending social groups, and the mediating role of representative institutions, particularly political parties.

This volume brings together comparative studies and in-depth case studies that research the diversity of party system change in Europe. In so doing it presents a model for change which challenges orthodox views of political evolution.

Why have dominant parties persisted in power for decades in countries spread across the globe? Why did most eventually lose? Why Dominant Parties Lose develops a theory of single-party dominance, its durability, and its breakdown into fully competitive democracy. Greene shows that dominant parties turn public resources into patronage goods to bias electoral competition in their favor and virtually win elections before election day without resorting to electoral fraud or bone-crushing repression. Opposition parties fail not because of limited voter demand or institutional constraints but because their resource disadvantages force them to form as niche parties with appeals that are out of step with the average voter. When the political economy of dominance-- a large state and a politically quiescent public bureaucracy-erodes, the partisan playing field becomes fairer and opposition parties can expand into catchall competitors that threaten the dominant party at the polls. Greene uses this argument to show why Mexico transformed from a dominant party authoritarian regime under PRI rule to a fully competitive democracy. He also shows that this argument can account for single-party dominance in other countries where the surrounding regime is authoritarian (Malaysia and Taiwan) and where it is democratic (Japan and Italy). The findings have implications for Mexico's political future, the formation of new political parties, transitions to democracy, and the study of competitive authoritarianism. Kenneth F. Greene is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research on regimes, political parties, and voting behavior has been published in the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Política y Gobierno, Foreign Affairs en Español, and edited volumes. He has served as Co-Principal Investigator on two National Science Foundation grants for elite and voter survey research in Mexico, won a Fulbright-García Robles fellowship, and held visiting positions at the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley in 2002.