Politicians And Economic Reform In New Democracies

The emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe has raised anew the question of the relationship between economic reform and political liberalization. This work brings together a group of authorities to examine this question as it relates to Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships?

This book takes issue with existing theories of the relationship between democracy and economic liberalisation.

A 1993 assessment of differing experiences of the transition to democracy in the countries of Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe.

The joint report of twenty-one social scientists who collaborated over two years under the name of the Group on East-South Systems Transformations (ESST) identifies the principal political and economic choices confronting new democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe and South America.

In the last two decades, there has been a widespread movement from authoritarian to democratic rule among developing countries, often occurring against a backdrop of severe economic crises and the adoption of market-oriented reforms. The coincidence of these events raises long-standing questions about the relationship between economic and political change. In this book, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore this relationship, addressing a variety of questions: What role have economic crises played in the current wave of political liberalization and democratization? Can new democracies manage the daunting political challenges posed by economic reform? Under what economic and institutional conditions is democracy most likely to be consolidated? Drawing on contemporary political economy and the experiences of twelve Latin American and Asian countries, they develop a new approach to understanding democratic transitions. Haggard and Kaufman first analyze the relationship between economic crisis and authoritarian withdrawal and then examine how the economic and institutional legacies of authoritarian rule affect the capacity of new democratic governments to initiate and sustain economic policy reform. Finally, the authors analyze the consolidation of political and economic reform over the long run. Throughout, they emphasize the relationship between economic conditions, the interests and power of contending social groups, and the mediating role of representative institutions, particularly political parties.

As economic reform in developing countries has shifted from macroeconomic stabilization to liberalization, opportunities for legislators to influence the process and outcome of reform have increased and their role has become more important. This book focuses attention on differences in institutional structure, in political parties and electoral rules, to show how they create incentives that can explain the varying ways in which legislators respond to policy initiatives from the executive branch. In Argentina and the Philippines, presidents proposed similar fiscal reforms in the 1990s: expanding tax bases, strengthening tax administration, and redesigning tax revenue-sharing with subnational governments. Drawing on archival research and interviews with policy makers, Kent Eaton follows the path of legislation in these three areas from initial proposal to final law to reveal how it was shaped by the legislators participating in the process. Obstacles to the adoption of reform, he demonstrates, are greater in candidate-centered systems like the Philippines&’ (where the cultivation of personal reputations is paramount) than in party-centered systems like Argentina&’s (where loyalty to party leaders is emphasized). To test his argument further, Eaton looks finally at other kinds of reform ventured in these two countries and at tax reforms attempted in some other countries.

Argues that the interaction of formal institutions and the quality of democracy explain patterns of private sector development across Africa.