Possibility Of A Nuclear War In Asia

This book attempts to fuse two topical subjects and deal with them in a holistic manner. It is oft said and is also widely believed that the 21st century belongs to Asia and that the two giants of Asia, namely, China and India are going to dominate the world in the ensuing decades. It is also implicitly accepted that nuclear weapons are going to be there, at least for the foreseeable future. These are the two topics that have been analysed in this book; nuclear weapons and the emerging epicenter of global affairs, namely, Asia. The book deals with the fundamental nature of nuclear weapons itself. It purposely steers away from the Cold War mindset of viewing nuclear weapons in a western manner and attempts to unravel the manner in which the nations of Asia view these weapons in their own unique way. It is also about the nature of disputes in Asia and the security environment in Asia, both presently as well as in the foreseeable future. Since it is a fact that there are unresolved disputes in the region, the book also deals with the aspect of analysis of potential conflict scenarios. Will the countries succeed in settling their disputes diplomatically? Can deterrence succeed? What will happen if that fails? What will be the shape of future conflicts? This book makes a modest attempt to provide answers to some of these perplexing questions that plague policy makers and strategists in Asia today. Since the study is from an Indian perspective, the focus is naturally biased more towards South Asia vis-a-vis the other parts of Asia. Though the book attempts to answer all questions, some tough questions typically deny neat solutions. As the author admits, the aim of the book is to get both the policy and decision makers as well as the professional military to think about these issues, so that, in time, workable solutions can be evolved."

In May 1998 India tested a series of nuclear devices in Pokharan. Two weeks later Pakistan announced a matching series of its own tests. A year later, when the two countries had a bitter confrontation in Kargil, the worst fears of 'proliferation pessimists' appeared to be coming true. The alarm bells have never really stopped ringing since then. In Second Strike Rajesh Rajagopalan challenges much of the conventional wisdom on the perceived nuclear danger in the region and suggests that the nuclear situation in South Asia is far less dangerous, and much more stable, than it is generally given credit for. Presenting a threefold case, the author focuses on the impact of nuclear doctrines on stability, a hitherto neglected aspect of the nuclear debate, and argues that Indian and Pakistani doctrines reduce the pressures on the two nuclear forces. Next, he presents the view that the doctrines of the two countries lessen the likelihood of accidents and other dangers such as terrorists stealing nuclear weapons. - the crucial role played by political leaders - and contends that political leaders tighten control over nuclear weapons in critical situations.

The 2013-14 Strategic Asia volume examines the role of nuclear weapons in the grand strategies of key Asian states and assesses the impact of these capabilities—both established and latent—on regional and international stability. In each chapter, a leading expert explores the historical, strategic, and political factors that drive a country's calculations vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and draws implications for American interests.

Expert Road Map for Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia The advent of nuclear weapons has not made the Indian Subcontinent a safer or a more stable place. Pakistan, in fact, views its nuclear weapons as a great equalizer vis-Ã -vis India's superiority in conventional forces, something which facilitates its support to militancy in Kashmir. Crises over Kashmir have subsequently grown both more frequent and more intense. The two countries clashed in Kargil in 1999 under the nuclear shadow and again fully mobilized their forces during 2002. The sobering fact, however, is that there are no instances of a successful, limited war between nuclear states. The need for reducing the risks of nuclear conflagration in South Asia is therefore urgent and calls for cooperation, political will and wisdom on the parts of Indian and Pakistani leaders and people. Equally, it requires a clear understanding and implementation of measures that can reduce the risk of a nuclear war. In this book, a dozen experts from India, Pakistan and the US provide precisely such a road map

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.

Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.

This collection of seminal articles illustrates the reasons for the spiraling nuclear race in the Asian subcontinent and introduces the principal debates in the field. Authors discuss whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the South Asian powers has raised the likelihood of a nuclear war in the subcontinent or reduced the chance of a conventional war breaking out. They examine whether a small nuclear arsenal or a nuclear triad, as declared by India, is suitable for bringing stability to the region, as well as the risk of an accidental nuclear conflagration. The first section charts the evolution of nuclear programmes on the basis of realpolitik, and the second section analyses nuclear policies on the basis of religious and cultural ethos. A few essays turn the spotlight on the role of external powers in accelerating, decelerating and mediating the ongoing nuclear tension between India and Pakistan.

This thesis assesses the potential for a specific type of accidental nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Known as inadvertent war, such a conflict would be the result of a mistaken attempt at preemption, the launching of a nuclear attack by one nation in the mistaken belief that the other was doing likewise or was about to do so. While nuclear weapons can ordinarily be expected to exert a sobering influence on decision-makers, an escalating spiral of military activity during a crisis may generate different situational imperatives. Inadvertent war becomes possible when decision- makers perceive that conflict is inevitable and that there is a significant advantage in striking first. Evidence suggests that there is good reason for concern about the threat of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. The nuclear force structures adopted by India and Pakistan can be expected to exert a particularly strong influence on the potential for both of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war. The current arsenals of these countries, small and heavily dependant upon aircraft for weapons delivery, may invite preemption in the event that nuclear war appears imminent. If India and Pakistan increase their nuclear delivery capabilities by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the potential for inadvertent war will be even greater. In the context of a military confrontation in South Asia, ballistic missiles are likely to contribute both to perceptions of first-strike advantage and to reinforcing military alerts that can lead to the belief that nuclear war is inevitable.