Preparing The Army For Stability Operations

In 2004-2006, the U.S. government acted to revise the way that the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are conducted. The primary emphasis of the changes was on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. The proximate reason for the policy shift stems from the exposing of gaps in the U.S. ability to administer Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes. But the effort to create U.S. government capabilities to conduct SSTR operations in a more unified and coherent fashion rests on the deeper conviction that, as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, the United States must have the capabilities to increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts to conflict, and assist in peacebuilding at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation. According to the Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to SSTR operations, these operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. Although military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation.

A milestone in Army doctrine

The military invariably conducts conflict and post-conflict operations with other agencies. These agencies must be prepared and resourced for their participation, including transition from or to serving as lead-agency for the operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to define war or conflict more broadly, and incorporate other agencies, especially Department of State (DoS), into its planning and execution phases much earlier and more completely than is now the practice. The military's changing role requires it to better understand world cultures where it operates and the organizational cultures of agencies with whom it works. The DoS has begun the organizational change necessary to become an equal operational partner with the military, but remains inadequately funded. The United States clearly recognizes the need for international peacekeeping partners; its difficulty is to determine the appropriate role for those collaborators, to determine needs for assistance to become better partners, and to effectively manage that assistance.

The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation is increasingly limited resources for the military. The lack of resources includes limited time available to train due to a very demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations. No one can predict where, when, why, and how the next conflict will be fought. If the nation calls upon the Army to accomplish an objective, the Army must be prepared to achieve success. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states, "It is simply impossible to plan and train for every possible scenario our Soldiers and their leaders may encounter within the complex reality of the contemporary operating environment." The decisions made today regarding how the Army should train are the cornerstone for success during the next conflict or task. To determine what the future training concepts of the Army should be, this monograph reviews three areas which develop how the Army should train for future operations. The three areas which impact future training are the requirements given to Army from the Army's current operations, national strategy documents, and finally the future operational environment. Integrated into the analysis of those three areas is an analysis of the Army's current training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations to determine the current training doctrine prepares the Army for its future operations. The analysis addresses how the Army can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions, a lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and shrinking resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not fully prepare the Army for future operations and take into account the current operational environment. Finally the monograph presents recommendations for preparing the Army for future operations. Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills. The Army does not have enough time and resources to train for every mission and conflict, and focusing on a core task list which spans the spectrum of conflict, it can adapt those core skills to succeed in an ambiguous and complex future. Complimenting the core competency task list is an increased focus on leaders and leadership training. Future leaders must have the attributes necessary to succeed in a complex and constantly changing operating environment. The intangible attributes required by not only leaders, units and Soldiers are discipline, initiative, problem solving skills, and adaptability.

This volume provides materials for active learning about peacebuilding and conflict management in the context of complex stability operations. Today, America faces security challenges unlike any it has faced before, many of which requiring lengthy U.S. involvement in stability operations. These challenges are exceedingly dynamic and complex because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved, the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change, and the constraints placed on response options. This volume presents a series of case studies to inspire active learning about peacebuilding and conflict management in the context of complex stability operations. The case studies highlight dilemmas pertaining to the story of the case (case dilemma) and to its larger policy implications (policy dilemma). The cases stimulate readers to "get inside the heads" of case protagonists with widely differing cultural backgrounds, professional experiences, and individual and organisational interests. Overall, Understanding Complex Military Operations challenges the reader to recognize the importance of specific national security related issues and their inherent dilemmas, deduce policy implications, and discern lessons that might apply to other – perhaps even non-security related – areas of public policy, administration, and management. This volume will be of much interest to students of conflict prevention, transitional justice, peacebuilding, security studies and professionals conducting field-based operations in potentially hazardous environments.

Much activity is being aimed at revising the approach to planning and implementing Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The changes are meant to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on involving all available government assets in the effort. The authors find that some elements essential to the success of the process are not yet in place.

Jennifer Morrison Taw examines the military's sudden embrace of stability operations and their implications for American foreign policy and war.

The Army's stability operations manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, identifies five sectors as components of an integrated approach to stability and reconstruction (S & R): security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, participatory governance, and economic recovery and stabilization. FM 3-07 describes two categories of the range of activities in stability operations for achieving these end state conditions: reconstruction and stabilization. Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure to create the foundation for long-term development. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development. This guide examines the role of restoration of public services within the broader context of stability operations. The extent to which public service reconstruction takes place depends on the mission, the level of resources, and the host country context. This paper provides guidance helpful to U.S. peacekeeping personnel in planning and executing stability operations tasks related to restoration of public sector services and infrastructure. It is designed to supplement existing and emerging guidance, and is specifically relevant to addressing the needs of public sector rebuilding in a post-conflict situation by peacekeeping forces. The material presented here draws both from theory and analytic frameworks and from on-the-ground experience of practitioners.