Principles Of Maritime Power

Maritime powers dominate the planet, from the British empire of the 19th century, to the American post-World War II domination of global affairs. To a large degree their control of the globe is based on control of the seas. This book seeks to examine the strengths and weaknesses of maritime power, including specific chapters on mutiny, blockades, coalitions, piracy, expeditionary warfare, commerce raiding, and soft power operations, but with larger discussion of such sea power characteristics as sea control, sea denial, and the competition between land powers and sea powers. The conclusions will discuss how many other countries, including Russia during the Cold War and the PRC today, have or are seeking to use sea power to claim regional and then eventually global hegemony.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy is a book by Julian Stafford Corbett. It delves into maritime theory of war and naval strategy with actual examples throughout history.

This book adopts an innovative new approach to examine the role of maritime power and the utility of navies. It uses a number of case studies based upon key Royal Navy operations in the twentieth century to draw out enduring principles about maritime power and to examine the strengths and limitations of maritime forces as instruments of national policy. Individual chapters focus on campaigns and operations from both World Wars and a series of post-1945 crises and conflicts from the Palestine Patrol in the 1940s to Royal Navy operations in support of British policy in the 1990s. Each case study demonstrates critical features of maritime power including: operations during the transition to war; fleet operations in narrow seas; logistics; submarine operations; the impact of air power on maritime operations; blockade; maritime power projection; amphibious warfare; jurisdictional disputes and the law of the sea; and, peace support operations. The contributors to this book all have considerable experience lecturing on these issues at the United Kingdom Joint Services Command and Staff College, where maritime campaign analysis is used to teach the principles of maritime power to officers of the Royal Navy. The book combines an authoritative examination of critical Royal Navy operations during the twentieth century with a sophisticated analysis of the nature of maritime power. As such it is of both historical interest and contemporary relevance and will prove equally valuable to academic historians, military professionals and the general reader.

DIVThis brilliant exposition by a great strategist proposes that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. /div

In his excellent book explaining naval strategy, Julian S. Corbett examines sound maritime strategy. Crucially, he advances the view that navies could perform much better if their role in assisting land warfare and amphibious forces were increased. Writing in the early 20th century, Corbett draws upon centuries of naval battles and identifies several common strains to discuss. The development of sound war strategies at sea was often a process of trial and error - the author elects to explain how strategy evolved as much from calamity as from proven practice. How a naval force should be assembled, how it should assume formation upon the sea, and how concentrations and dispersal of ships should be organized each receive discussion. Although naval warfare has substantially changed since this book's original publication, it continues to be consulted for its timeless and sound advice. Corbett's era predated the extensive use of submarines and aeroplanes in naval combat, but his conclusions remain sound and sought after even in the tutoring of modern maritime strategy. His concepts of war, that build upon Clausewitz's ideas of offense and defense, and of naval power as an extension of a nation's objectives are important to strategists to this day. The final part of this book is concerned with sound command aboard a given vessel, and across a fleet. Corbett discusses what constitutes competent command of a ship, and how adept command has an immense bearing in any occasion. Good command could help preserve a crucial war asset in any scenario, heightening the efficiency of the naval force and contributing to eventual victory. Julian S. Corbett was a civilian historian, but had an immense interest and ability in the field of naval theory and combat. Although his views were often disregarded by many military leaders of his day, over the years his opinions have proven both valid and valuable.

An important book, presenting the latest insights by the leading world authorities on naval history.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett emerged as foundational thinkers on naval strategy and maritime power. Important in their lifetimes, their writings remain relevant in the contemporary environment. The significance of Corbett and Mahan to modern naval strategy seems beyond question, but too often their theories are simplified or used without a real understanding of their fundamental bases.Labeling a strategy, operation, or even a navy “Mahanian” or “Corbettian” tells very little. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought provides an in-depth introduction and a means to stimulate discussion about the theories of Mahan and Corbett. Although there is no substitute for opening the actual writings of Mahan and Corbett, this requires time, not just to read but most importantly to understand how states exploit the sea in the strategic sense. Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought takes the reader from their grand strategic foundations of sea power and maritime strategy, through their ideas about naval warfare and strategy, to how Mahan and Corbett thought a navy should integrate with other instruments of national power, and finally, to how they thought states with powerful navies win wars. This window into naval strategy provides twenty-first-century readers an understanding of what navies can and perhaps more importantly cannot do in the international environment.