Private Actors And Security Governance

The privatization of security understood as both the top-down decision to outsource military and security-related tasks to private firms and the bottom-up activities of armed non-state actors such as rebel opposition groups, insurgents, militias, and warlord factions has implications for the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Both top-down and bottom-up privatization have significant consequences for effective, democratically accountable security sector governance as well as on opportunities for security sector reform across a range of different reform contexts. This volume situates security privatization within a broader policy framework, considers several relevant national and regional contexts, and analyzes different modes of regulation and control relating to a phenomenon with deep historical roots but also strong links to more recent trends of globalization and transnationalization. Alan Bryden is deputy head of research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Marina Caparini is senior research fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

With the ever farther advancement of globalization, governance has become one of the most prominent theoretical concepts to describe today’s world. Governance theory is concerned with a system of rule through non-hierarchical governing modes, such as networks and market mechanisms. Initially the field of security was ignored, as it was seen as the last bastion of the nation state. When the concept of security governance emerged at the beginning of the millennium, it sought to take account of transnational threats, such as nuclear proliferation or cluster bombs. However, the traditional security domain of the state, i.e. the provision of security by military force, is still exempt from governance theory. Provoked by the increasing support of private actors to military operations, Gloria Westermeyer aims to investigate whether this exemption is still valid. Based on the conduct of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance services in the German ISAF Mission, the author examines the impact of private actors on the governance of today's military affairs. What is the relative power of private security actors vis-à-vis the state? Which factors determine if, to what extent and why private actors support the military? Under what circumstances and how may security functions be privatized without undermining the state's interest?

This book widens the current debate on security privatization by examining how and why an increasing number of private actors beyond private military and security companies (PMSCs) have come to perform various security related functions. While PMSCs provide security for profit, most other private sector stakeholders make a profit by selling goods and services that were not originally connected with security in the traditional sense. However, due to the continuous introduction of new legal and technical regulations by public authorities, many non-security-related private businesses now have to perform at least some security functions. This volume offers new insights into security practices of non-security-related private businesses and their impact on security governance. The contributions extend beyond the conceptual and theoretical arguments in the existing body of literature to offer a range of original case studies on the specific roles of non-security-related private companies of all sizes, from all areas of business and from different geographic regions.

This book explores the unintended consequences of security governance actions and explores how their effects can be limited. Security governance describes new modes of security policy that differ from traditional approaches to national and international security. While traditional security policy used to be the exclusive domain of states and aimed at military defense, security governance is performed by multiple actors and is intended to create a global environment of security for states, social groups, and individuals. By pooling the strength and expertise of states, international organizations, and private actors, security governance is seen to provide more effective and efficient means to cope with today’s security risks. Generally, security governance is assumed to be a good thing, and the most appropriate way of coping with contemporary security problems. This assumption has led scholars to neglect an important phenomenon: unintended consequences. While unintended consequences do not need to be negative, often they are. The CIA term "blowback," for example, refers to the phenomenon that a long nurtured group may turn against its sponsor. The rise of al Qaeda, which had benefited from US Cold War policies, is only one example. Raising awareness about unwanted and even paradoxical policy outcomes and suggesting ways of avoiding damage or limiting their scale, this book will be of much interest to students of security governance, risk management, international security and IR. Christopher Daase is Professor at the Goethe University Frankfurt and head of the research department International Organizations and International Law at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK). Cornelius Friesendorf is lecturer at the Goethe University Frankfurt and research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK).

Non-state threats and actors have become key topics in contemporary international security as since the end of the Cold War the notion that state is the primary unit of interest in international security has increasingly been challenged. Statistics show that today many more people are killed by ethnic conflicts, HIV/AIDS or the proliferation of small arms than by international war. Moreover, non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, private military companies and international regimes, are progressively complementing or even replacing states in the provision of security. Suggesting that such developments can be understood as part of a shift from government to governance in international security, this book examines both how private actors have become one of the main sources of insecurity in the contemporary world and how non-state actors play a growing role in combating these threats.

Recent debates in security policy have highlighted trends towards fragmentation, informalisation and privatisation in the diverse field of security policy, with its increasingly transnational security risks. In this context, the concept of security governance has risen to prominence and has inspired much valuable research. Yet, there are not only very different conceptual understandings of security governance; there is also a lack of clarity regarding its empirical manifestations and normative connotations. After a decade of research, this book therefore puts security governance to the test and scrutinises its analytical and political pitfalls and potentials. It reviews the concept of security governance and identifies central conceptual, empirical and normative challenges that need to be addressed. Moreover, this book scrutinises critical examples of security governance from EU security policy as well as in a comparative regional perspective. Case studies include EU efforts to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, combat terrorism inside European societies and protect critical infrastructures. This book was originally published as a special issue of European Security.

Building upon a range of case studies that range from civil war to maritime security and cyber crime, the contributors analyse how non-state actors can and should be involved in contributing to state and human security.

The use of private security companies (PSCs) to provide security services has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, with PSCs operating in a number of contexts, including armed conflict and areas where the rule of law has been compromised. The use of private actors to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state is not limited to PSCs, but is emblematic of a growing trend by governments to outsource functions with a view to improving efficiency and cutting budgets. Privatization of public functions can, however, present a number of challenges to existing national and international regulatory and oversight frameworks. In the private security sector these challenges were brought to international attention after high-profile incidents in which PSCs injured civilians revealed difficulties in effectively holding international PSCs accountable. This paper argues that crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in which key stakeholders work together to develop standards that are appropriately adapted for the private sector, as well as to create governance and oversight mechanisms to hold these private actors to effective account, helps to fill some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. It recounts the developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC) and its governance and oversight mechanism, the ICOC Association, offering an example of the development of an initiative which sets new international standards and elaborates a multistakeholder framework and approach to governance for the private security sector. A recent trend of state and non-state clients requiring compliance with the ICOC initiative in their contracts with PSCs offers a new take on binding international regulation of private actors.