Protecting The Force

On 5 November 2009, a tragic shooting allegedly carried out by a military member at Fort Hood, Texas, left 13 dead and 43 wounded or injured.1 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates subsequently established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood and appointed former Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., and former Chief of Naval Operations Adm Vern Clark to lead that effort. The review identified possible deficiencies and provided recommendations regarding Department of Defense (DoD) policies, programs, and procedures related to force protection, personnel policies, mass casualty response, and sufficiency of care for the health care providers involved in such events.

Combat drones are transforming attitudes about the use of military force. Military casualties and the costs of conflict sap public support for war and for political and military leaders. Combat drones offer an unprecedented ability to reduce these costs by increasing accuracy, reducing the risks to civilians, and protecting military personnel from harm. These advantages should make drone strikes more popular than operations involving ground troops. Yet many critics believe drone warfare will make political leaders too willing to authorize wars, weakening constraints on the use of force. Because combat drones are relatively new, these arguments have been based on anecdotes, a handful of public opinion polls, or theoretical speculation. Drones and Support for the Use of Force uses experimental research to analyze the effects of combat drones on Americans’ support for the use of force. The authors’ findings—that drones have had important but nuanced effects on support for the use of force—have implications for democratic control of military action and civil-military relations and provide insight into how the proliferation of military technologies influences foreign policy.

On 5 November 2009, a tragic shooting allegedly carried out by a military member at Fort Hood, Texas, left 13 dead and 43 wounded or injured. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates subsequently established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood and appointed former Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., and former Chief of Naval Operations Adm Vern Clark to lead that effort. That review identified possible deficiencies and provided recommendations regarding Department of Defense (DoD) policies, programs, and procedures related to force protection, personnel policies, mass casualty response, and sufficiency of care for the health care providers involved in such events. Key concerns included developing a credible process for identifying individuals who pose a potential threat to themselves or others, providing time-critical information to the right people, employing appropriate force protection measures, and planning for and responding to incidents. The report, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, was delivered to Secretary Gates on 15 January 2010. It concluded force protection measures focused solely on external threats are no longer sufficient. Force protection measures must now also consider internal threats— “disaffected individuals within the force motivated to violence against the force and the nation.”The DoD report recommended that each of the Services conduct in-depth follow-on reviews. In response, Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley issued Terms of Reference on 25 January 2010 and directed Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, Commander of Air Education and Training Command, to chair an in-depth Air Force Follow-on Review (Air Force FOR) to identify and resolve policy, program, and procedural gaps that could create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of Air Force personnel, other supported personnel, and their families. This report is the result of that review.Although the Air Force review emerged as a result of the shootings at Fort Hood in November 2009, this report expands its focus beyond traditional force protection measures by addressing a broader range of violent physical threats and the potential precursors or indicators of violence. This attention to indicators sets the conditions for moving toward preventing violence rather than relying on response in its aftermath. This more expansive approach, contained in this report, emphasizes integrating existing programs not normally identified within the force protection agenda. Our review team conducted simultaneous top-down and bottom-up assessments. Major commands (MAJCOM), direct reporting units (DRU), the Air National Guard (ANG), and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) provided inputs and reviews. Representatives from across the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) staff formed six cross-functional teams—Risk Assessment and Prevention, Sharing Information, Preparing the Force, Developing the Force, Leading the Force, and Responding and Recovering. The HAF also drew upon the DoD findings and recommendations as a baseline from which to assess relevant Air Force policies, programs, procedures, and practices. A full team roster is provided at appendix D.More than 2,000 Total Force commanders and civilian directors provided insight into practices related to information sharing, training, recognition of internal threats, force protection, and mass casualty response and recovery through a survey conducted by the Air Force Manpower Agency (AFMA). Selected survey results are integrated throughout the report and provided at appendix C.Our review developed 118 findings and 151 recommendations focused on preventing violence and enhancing response, which are contained in this report. A summary of our recommendations appears at appendix E. The terms of reference for both the DoD and the Air Force reviews requested notation of best practices to be shared across the DoD. Those identified during our review are provided in appendix B.

"On War" by Carl von Clausewitz (translated by J. J. Graham). Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone in a high-quality digital format.

In Defending Humanity, internationally acclaimed legal scholar George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, a leading expert on international criminal law, tackle one of the most important and controversial questions of our time: When is war justified? When a nation is attacked, few would deny that it has the right to respond with force. But what about preemptive and preventive wars, or crossing another state's border to stop genocide? Was Israel justified in initiating the Six Day War, and was NATO's intervention in Kosovo legal? What about the U.S. invasion of Iraq? In their provocative book, Fletcher and Ohlin offer a groundbreaking theory on the legality of war with clear guidelines for evaluating these interventions. The authors argue that much of the confusion on the subject stems from a persistent misunderstanding of the United Nations Charter. The Charter appears to be very clear on the use of military force: it is only allowed when authorized by the Security Council or in self-defense. Unfortunately, this has led to the problem of justifying force when the Security Council refuses to act or when self-defense is thought not to apply--and to the difficult dilemma of declaring such interventions illegal or ignoring the UN Charter altogether. Fletcher and Ohlin suggest that the answer lies in going back to the domestic criminal law concepts upon which the UN Charter was originally based, in particular, the concept of "legitimate defense," which encompasses not only self-defense but defense of others. Lost in the English-language version of the Charter but a vital part of the French and other non-English versions, the concept of legitimate defense will enable political leaders, courts, and scholars to see the solid basis under international law for states to intervene with force--not just to protect themselves against an imminent attack but also to defend other national groups.

From a highly decorated general, a brilliant new way of understanding war and its role in the twenty-first century. Drawing on his vast experience as a commander during the first Gulf War, and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, General Rupert Smith gives us a probing analysis of modern war. He demonstrates why today’s conflicts must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and makes clear why the current model of total war has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other recent campaigns. Smith offers a compelling contemporary vision for how to secure our world and the consequences of ignoring the new, shifting face of war.

On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured. The initial response to the incident was prompt and effective. Two minutes and forty seconds after the initial 911 call, installation first responders arrived on the scene. One-and-a-half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated. Two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on the scene two minutes and fifty seconds later. Leaders at Fort Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response plans and exercises. Base personnel were prepared and trained to take appropriate and decisive action to secure the situation. The prompt and courageous acts of Soldiers, first responders, local law enforcement personnel, DoD civilians, and healthcare providers prevented greater losses. As so often happens in our military, lessons already learned have led to a well-developed plan to care for the victims and families involved. The tragedy, however, raised questions about the degree to which the entire Department is prepared for similar incidents in the future-especially multiple, simultaneous incidents.