Prudential Regulation Of Banks And Securities Firms

This work contains the updated papers delivered at a conference on Prudential Regulation which was held in November 1994 in Siena. the work is divided into three parts: the capital of banks and securities firms risks in Banking and Securities Activities Mechanisms for the Protection of Depositors and Investors The contributions have been written by leading academics and practitioners, including some members of the Advisory Board on the European Financial Services Law.

The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.

For banks, insurance companies and securities firms preparing to capitalize on the rapidly accelerating trend towards financial services convergence, the possibilities are virtually endless. This book provides coverage of essential financial services regulation. It offers red flags pinpointing regulatory obstacles and pitfalls.

Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.

The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.

"The Fourth Edition of a leading resource in the field, this valuable practice tool brings you completely up-to-date on the evolving laws governing banks' securities activities - from regulatory changes in the financial markets and administrative reform to recent court decisions and legislative reform, including the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Here is everything you need to help build a bank's securities business while avoiding compliance pitfalls. Securities Activities of Banks, Fourth Edition provides: In-depth discussions of the securities activities now permissible for banks, bank holding companies, and financial holding companies, Clear explanations of how securities laws affect banks' securities activities, A complete review of how banks are regulated - including foreign banks and affiliates, Up-to-date analysis of the evolution of the banking laws through agency and court decisions. Detailed descriptions and analyses illuminate the full range of current bank securities activities, including investment and trading activities, brokerage activities, investment advice, underwriting, mutual funds, international securities activities, derivative instruments, deposits and loans, fiduciary activities, and more."--Publisher's website.

In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, many governments are seeking ways to improve their banking regulation systems in the interests of both economic health and consumer protection. Among the globally competitive countries that withstood the crisis with no significant disruption, Israel stands out, suggesting that other countries might benefit from an in-depth analysis of its banking system. This is the first book in English to provide such an analysis, emphasizing the crucial balance between prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation, which in Israel are both regulated by the same agency, unlike the ‘Twin Peaks’ model that prevails in other market-based economies. With recommendations that are highly applicable to many countries, the book examines a broad range of issues that are of current concern to the banking community worldwide. Among these issues are the following: – the architecture of financial regulation; – nationalization and privatization of banks; – conflicts of interest in the banking system resulting from universal banking; – problems of concentration and lack of competitiveness in the banking system; – the growing power of institutional investors and their entry into traditional banking activities; – mechanisms for recovery and resolution in the event of a bank failure; – new models of banking regulation, such as self-regulation and contractual regulation; and – bank consumer protection, complaint handling and redress. Even though the book focuses on Israeli banking regulation, its detailed attention to the development of a suitable supervisory model is of immeasurable international value for regulators, lawyers, bankers, academics, and business people who are in any way connected to the banking world; particularly following the 2008 crisis and its devastating effects. It is sure to be of service as many jurisdictions continue to search for optimal tools designed to prevent another such crisis.

Despite the intense debate on the advantages and disadvantages of adopting integrated supervision that has taken place in recent years, little is known about the experiences of countries that have adopted it and the obstacles and challenges they have faced to implement it. In an attempt to shed light on this area, the authors present the results of a survey conducted in a group of 15 countries that have adopted integrated supervision. After a brief review of the literature on integrated supervision, the authors examine four topics: 1) The reasons cited by this group of countries for establishing an integrated supervisory agency. 2) The scope of regulatory and supervisory powers of these agencies. 3) The progress of these agencies in harmonizing their regulatory and supervisory practices across the intermediaries they supervise. 4) The practical problems faced by policymakers in adopting integrated supervision. The survey revealed that the group of integrated supervisory agencies is not as homogeneous as it seems. Important differences arise with regard to the scope of regulatory and supervisory powers the agencies have been given. In fact, contrary to popular belief, less than 50 percent of the agencies can be categorized as mega-supervisors. Another finding is that in most countries progress toward the harmonization of prudential regulation and supervision across financial intermediaries remains limited. Interestingly, the survey revealed that practically all countries believe they have achieved a higher degree of harmonization in the regulation and supervision of banks and securities companies than between banks and insurance firms. The survey also identified some practical problems faced by this group of countries in establishing their unified supervisory agencies. The authors discuss these problems, along with the practical lessons and recommendations provided by the 15 agencies to other countries considering integrated supervision, in the final section of the paper.