Psychological Concepts And Biological Psychiatry

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicitng the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)

There has been an ongoing debate about the capabilities and limits of the bio-natural sciences as sources and the methodological measure in the philosophy of psychiatry for quite some time now. Still, many problems remain unsolved, at least partly for the following reasons: The opposing parties do not tend to speak with each other, exchange their arguments and try to increase mutual understanding. Rather, one gets the impression that they often remain in their “trenches”, busy with confirming each others' opinions and developing their positions in isolation. This leads to several shortcomings: (1) Good arguments and insights from both sides of the debate get less attention they deserve. (2) The further improvement of each position becomes harder without criticism, genuinely motivated by the opposing standpoint. (3) The debate is not going to stop, at least not in the way it would finish after a suggested solution finds broad support; (4) Related to this, insisting on the ultimate aptnessof one side is just plainly wrong in almost every case. Since undeniably, most philosophical positions usually have a grain of truth hidden in them. In sum, many controversies persist with regard to the appropriate methodological, epistemological, and even ontological level for psychiatric explanation and therapies. In a conference which took place in December last year, we tried to contribute to a better understanding about what really is at issue in the philosophy of psychiatry. We asked for a common basis for several sides, for points of divergence and for the practical impact of different solutions on everyday work in psychiatry. Since psychiatry as a whole is a subject that is to wide to be covered in a single meeting, we focused on the following four core topics: 1.Competing accounts of psychiatric biologism, reductionism, and physicalism. 2.Mental disease and brain disease in the light of current neuroscientific and epigenetic findings. 3.Normative suppositions for different accounts of mental disease. 4.Normative implications of different accounts of mental disease. These topics, which have been vigorously as well as fruitfully discussed at our conference, will (ideally) be, too, in the center of our contribution to Frontiers. More precisely, we think of arranging a “research topic” which assembles the issues of the conference. At this point, it seems promising to us to group three or four Target Articles (TA) and let them get criticized ...

Biological Psychiatry: A Review of Recent Advances describes the developments in biological psychiatry. This book discusses the theories in the complex field of human disease, particularly psychiatric disease. Organized into six chapters, this book begins with an overview of the etiology and genetic basis of schizophrenia. This text then examines the various physiological and biochemical variables in schizophrenics. Other chapters consider the two types of depression, namely, reactive and endogenous. This book discusses as well the criteria of what symptom complexes constitute a particular psychiatric disease. The role of the brain in the control of learning, memory, behavior, and emotion is also reviewed. The final chapter deals with the psychoanalytic theory, which consists of a complex of theories of three various types. This book is a valuable resource for psychiatrists and physicians. Research workers in the various disciplines of neurobiology that encroach upon psychiatry will also find this book useful.

An exploration of what it means to think about psychiatric disorders as “real,” “true,” and “objective” and the implications for classification and diagnosis. In psychiatry, few question the legitimacy of asking whether a given psychiatric disorder is real; similarly, in psychology, scholars debate the reality of such theoretical entities as general intelligence, superegos, and personality traits. And yet in both disciplines, little thought is given to what is meant by the rather abstract philosophical concept of “real.” Indeed, certain psychiatric disorders have passed from real to imaginary (as in the case of multiple personality disorder) and from imaginary to real (as in the case of post-traumatic stress disorder). In this book, Peter Zachar considers such terms as “real” and “reality”—invoked in psychiatry but often obscure and remote from their instances—as abstract philosophical concepts. He then examines the implications of his approach for psychiatric classification and psychopathology. Proposing what he calls a scientifically inspired pragmatism, Zachar considers such topics as the essentialist bias, diagnostic literalism, and the concepts of natural kind and social construct. Turning explicitly to psychiatric topics, he proposes a new model for the domain of psychiatric disorders, the imperfect community model, which avoids both relativism and essentialism. He uses this model to understand such recent controversies as the attempt to eliminate narcissistic personality disorder from the DSM-5. Returning to such concepts as real, true, and objective, Zachar argues that not only should we use these metaphysical concepts to think philosophically about other concepts, we should think philosophically about them.

This book is based on a symposium that was inspired by the late Donald O. Hebb who, in his latter years while an Honorary Professor in the Department of Psychology at Dalhousie University, became very interested in the phenomenon of multiple personality and other dissociative states. Hebb was troubled by the lack of understanding of dissociative behavior and, through his discussions with basic science and clinical colleagues in psychology and psychiatry, he became convinced that the subject would be a figurative gold mine for psychological theory and experimentation. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together clinical and research scientists with an interest and expertise in dissociative phenomena such as multiple personality disorder, hysteria and hypnosis. This group would exchange ideas and findings, discuss theory, and lay the groundwork for an interdisciplinary research program into dissociative phenomena generally, and more specifically into multiple personality disorder and its principal precipitating factor -- physical and sexual abuse in children.

It is now widely recognised that biological psychiatry is rapidly coming into its own. For over the last three decades dramatic advances in this young discipline have been made, all of which attest to the staying power of the experimental method. Those who made this revolution in knowledge happen are a breed of investigators availing themselves of the tools of molecular biology, pharmacology, genetics, and perhaps, above all, the technology of neuroimaging. The introduction of the interdisciplinary method of approach to the study of psychopathology had made it very clear that neuroimaging, as a set of techniques, is unique in that it is gradually providing us with evidence supporting Kraepelin's original view that mental illness is closely associated with abnormal changes in the brain. Broadly speaking, there are presently two structural techniques in neuroimaging - computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) - and three functional techniques - single photon emission tomography (SPECT), positron emission tomography and magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Through PET technology, for example, we have learned that, in early brain development, the primitive areas, mostly the brain stem and thalamus, are the first to show high activity in an infant. This is followed by the development of cortical areas by year one. Between the ages of four to 10, the cortex is almost twice as active in the child as in the adult. This information alerts us to what might happen in the way of trauma in abused children, especially those under the age of three. Child abuse increases the risk of physical changes, not only in the stress systems, but also in brain development (Glaser and Weissman). In addition to the difficult problem of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), we have to take into account the possibility of other types of mental illness as the consequences of child abuse. These include depression, eating disorders, and drug and alcohol problems. The combination of PET and fMRI represents a more remarkable example of the power of neuroimaging since the two have made it feasible to map accurately in vitro identifiable cortical fields, or networks. In a landmark NIH investigation of human cortical reorganization (plasticity), persuasive evidence was brought forward showing that the process of learning as a motor task involves a specific network of neurons. These neurons occur in the cortical field that is responsible for that particular task. Such findings are important partly because they provide evidence supporting the current notion that labor in the cortex is divided among ensembles of specialized neurons that cooperate in the performance of complex tasks. Cooperation, then, in this, sense implies crosstalk among ensembles and that signals are both processed and retransmitted to neighbouring ensembles. To understand the workings of these ensembles, much better spatial and temporal resolution in functional brain mapping is required. This can be achieved with an NMR instrument whose magnet is 4.1 Tesla or more.

A Textbook of Biological Psychiatry integrates the basic science concerning brain mechanisms of psychiatric disorders alongside surveys of present standard clinical treatment. Organized in a coherent and easy to follow structure, chapters expand across different levels of analysis, from basic mechanisms to clinical practice. This comprehensive reference provides an integrative treatment of the biochemistry of neurotransmission, behavioral pharmacology, and clinical aspects of psychiatric problems including depression, manic-depression, and mood disorders. Other chapters address the biological mechanisms and treatment of depression, anxiety, panic, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and addictions. The editor concludes with a perspective on the future of the field and prospects for understanding and effectively treating mood and anxiety disorders.