Psychological Explanation

Psychology has been captured by an assumption that is almost totally unrecognized. This assumption--the linearity of time--unduly restricts theory and therapy, yet this restriction is so common, so customary, that it is often completely ignored. This book traces the influence of this assumption and reveals the many overlooked "anomalies" to its dominance. Slife describes the many findings and explanations that are incompatible with linear time in several psychological specialties. He contends that these unnoticed anomalies point to alternative conceptions of time that offer innovative ideas for psychological explanation and treatment.

Psychology has been captured by an assumption that is almost totally unrecognized. This assumption—the linearity of time—unduly restricts theory and therapy, yet this restriction is so common, so customary, that it is often completely ignored. This book traces the influence of this assumption and reveals the many overlooked “anomalies” to its dominance. Slife describes the many findings and explanations that are incompatible with linear time in several psychological specialties. He contends that these unnoticed anomalies point to alternative conceptions of time that offer innovative ideas for psychological explanation and treatment.

This book is about explanation and experiment in a science of human action. It aims to provide a philosophy of social psychological science that both embodies sound principles of scientific reasoning and is sensitive to the social psychological dimensions of human action. The guiding principle of this book is the belief that the logical forms of causal explanation and experimental evaluation can be ef fectively employed in the scientific analysis of meaningful human action. According to most accounts, social psychological science has been in a more or less constant state of crisis for the past decades, having been subject to a host of criticisms on moral, political, methodological, and philosophical grounds. Many of these critiques have been directed against the still dominant conception of social psychological enquiry as a causal and objective scientific discipline that is closely analogous to (if not to be identified as a branch ot) the natural sciences. Thus, many of the most vigorous debates have concerned the nature of explanation and the utility of experimentation in a social psychological discipline.

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)

An argument that challenges the dominant "theory theory" and simulation theory approaches to folk psychology by claiming that our everyday understanding of intentional actions done for reasons is acquired by exposure to and engaging in specific kinds of narratives. Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans—our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons—are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In Folk Psychological Narratives, Daniel Hutto challenges this view (held in somewhat different forms by the two dominant approaches, "theory theory" and simulation theory) and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children acquire this practical skill only by being exposed to and engaging in a distinctive kind of narrative practice. Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal.

For a few decades, the puzzle of consciousness, which for centuries was analysed by philosophers, has been finding a wide interest in the scientific field, where previously it was not entitled to be a member. It has become one of the most-debated problems in the cognitive sciences. The anatomical bases, neurophysiological correlates and elementary mechanisms underlying complex processes arising with consciousness have been compared with the psychological (perceptive, cognitive, volitive, emotional) aspects of conscious expressions, in normal and pathological conditions. Various theories, which attempt to fit systematically and coherently neural and psychological data, have been debated, proving the emergence of the phenomenon of consciousness.

This edited volume presents selected papers capturing Herbert Kelman’s unique and seminal contributions to the social psychology of conflict analysis and resolution, with a special emphasis on the utility of concepts for understanding and constructively addressing violent and intractable conflicts. Central concepts covered include perceptual processes, basic human needs, group and normative processes, social identity, and intergroup trust, which form the basis for developing interactive methods of conflict resolution.