Putin S Syrian Gambit

Thanks in large part to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad'sfortunes have made a remarkable recovery since May/June 2015. Russia, together with the LebaneseHizballah, Iran, and Iranian-organized Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, andelsewhere, has succeeded in averting Asad's military defeat. What Russian president VladimirPutin has accomplished in Syria is important for American national security interests and policyin the region because it frames some of the hard choices Washington must now make.Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad insideSyria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated themove of Russian forces into the country. Russia also benefited from the disunity among thediverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey wereboth early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthirebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In returnfor help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia'sAleppo problem.As President Donald Trump considers and implements a way forward on working withRussia in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and toward peace in Syria,events of the past several years underscore several fundamental constraints under which Putinwill be operating and some challenges that have been overstated.First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement thatrequires him to step aside to bring the conflict to an end. Asad plays Russia off against Iran andthe Lebanese Hizballah, placing them all on the same level and extending no preference to Putinfor Russia's contribution to his survival.Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscowgrow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impactwhat Tehran sees as its existential interests in Syria as a vital link in Iran's land bridge to theLebanese Hizballah.Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia has successfully pursued engagementwith most major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as wellas with Israel. However unpopular on "the street," Putin and Gulf Sunni royals appear to haveno complexes about dealing with each other.Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue going into the next Russianpresidential elections, scheduled for March 2018. This may be the major reason he has wanted to "solve" Aleppo so quickly in 2016 and pivot again to peacemaking efforts more prominence.Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a"respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin.As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS andterrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations.First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectivesand preferred or acceptable outcomes.Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as theAmerican fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should bepart of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syriaat the end of the process.

Due largely to Russia's military intervention, Syrian president Asad's fortunes have recovered since June 2015. Russia, together with Hizballah and Iran, averted Asad's military defeat. What Russian president Putin accomplished in Syria is important for American security interests and policy in the region because it frames hard choices Washington must now make. Russia has profited from a hard core of Alawite and Christian support for Asad inside Syria. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to become militarily involved in Syria facilitated Russian military intervention. Russia also benefited from the disunity among the diverse opposition to Asad and their external patrons. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey were both early proponents of ousting Asad, Saudi Arabia is now more focused on defeating Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Turkey on fighting Kurdish separatist forces in northern Syria. In return for help from Putin in resolving its Kurdish problem, Turkey in 2016 helped Putin resolve Russia's Aleppo problem. As President Trump considers and implements a way forward on working with Russia in the fight against ISIS and toward peace in Syria, recent events underscore fundamental constraints under which Putin will be operating and some challenges that have been overstated. First, Russia will find it hard to deliver Asad's agreement to any political arrangement that requires him to step aside. Asad plays Russia off against Iran and Hizballah, extending no preference to Putin for Russia's contribution to his survival. Second, Tehran will not be keen to see its leverage in Damascus diminish and that of Moscow grow. Tehran will support Asad in his resistance to any Russian pressure that would impact Syria's role as Iran's land bridge to Lebanon. Third, while working with Iran militarily in Syria, Russia also engaged with major Sunni powers in the Middle East, most interestingly Saudi Arabia, as well as with Israel. Fourth, Putin does not want Syria to be a "negative" issue in Russian presidential elections in 2018. Cooperation with the Trump administration and renewed American treatment of Russia as a "respected equal" would make Syria a more manageable electoral issue for Putin. As Washington continues to formulate and fine-tune a new approach to fighting ISIS and terrorism under the Trump administration, this study makes the following policy recommendations. First, the United States must cast aside sentiment and strictly prioritize its objectives and preferred or acceptable outcomes. Second, the United States should work toward a Syria that remains unified even as the American fight against ISIS benefits from Syrian Kurdish military prowess. The Kurds should be part of the mix in political negotiations going forward but only in the context of a unified Syria at the end of the process. Third, the United States should explore the military pros and cons of more robust cooperation with Russia in Syria, without conceding anything in advance on Asad's future or Iran's place in the region. The U.S. needs to be prepared selectively and judiciously to strike Syrian regime forces from time to time to inhibit their attacks on nonterrorist opposition fighters and civilian populations. Fourth, Washington should work quietly with Moscow toward diminishing Iranian leverage in Syria and the region. That said, while Moscow probably hopes that its weight in Syria will increase over time at Iran's expense, Russia has little interest in sharing influence there with the U.S. Finally, with or without Russia, the United States should engage militarily in Syria more robustly. Besides being necessary to fight ISIS more effectively, this will also help reverse the view that began to take hold in the region during the Barack Obama administration that the United States is a declining power, and encourage regional capitals to rebalance their relations with Moscow.

"Skillfully lays out Mr. Putin's approach to the Middle East." Wall Street Journal "Detailed and fascinating." Diplomatic Courier Putin intervened in Syria in September 2015, with international critics predicting that Russia would overextend itself and Barack Obama suggesting the country would find itself in a “quagmire” in Syria. Contrary to this, Anna Borshchevskaya argues that in fact Putin achieved significant key domestic and foreign policy objectives without crippling costs, and is well-positioned to direct Syria's future and become a leading power in the Middle East. This outcome has serious implications for Western foreign policy interests both in the Middle East and beyond. This book places Russian intervention in Syria in this broader context, exploring Putin's overall approach to the Middle East – historically Moscow has a special relationship with Damascus – and traces the political, diplomatic, military and domestic aspects of this intervention. Borshchevskaya delves into the Russian military campaign, public opinion within Russia, as well as Russian diplomatic tactics at the United Nations. Crucially, this book illustrates the impact of Western absence in Syria, particularly US absence, and what the role of the West is, and could be, in the Middle East.

The eyes of the world are on the Middle East. Today, more than ever, this deeply-troubled region is the focus of power games between major global players vying for international influence. Absent from this scene for the past quarter century, Russia is now back with gusto. Yet its motivations, decision-making processes and strategic objectives remain hard to pin down. So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.

An unprecedented analysis of the crucial but underexplored roles the United States and other nations have played in shaping Syria’s ongoing civil war “One of the best informed and non-partisan accounts of the Syrian tragedy yet published.”—Patrick Cockburn, Independent Syria’s brutal, long-lasting civil war is widely viewed as a domestic contest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the fray. But in this book Christopher Phillips shows the crucial roles that were played by the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar in Syria’s war right from the start. Phillips untangles the international influences on the tragic conflict and illuminates the West’s strategy against ISIS, the decline of U.S. power in the region, and much more. Originally published in 2016, the book has been updated with two new chapters.

Even before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Region faced numerous obstacles to building a stable and prosperous future. The region, which encompasses the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia, has been plagued by economic and political uncertainty amidst dramatic shifts in the global power structure. With the pandemic now exacerbating the volatility in this already fragile region, the U.S.'s strategic objectives are rife for re-examination. A complicated stew of factors such as weakening of established governance systems, the emboldening of extremist individuals and groups through advances in digital technology, the humanitarian crises in Afghanistan and Syria, and the intensification of the great power competition with China and Russia are creating a fertile environment for the growth of violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Such organizations take advantage of vulnerable, aggrieved, and traumatized populations to fuel radicalization, recruitment, and unrest, which further undermine stability and the potential for peace and prosperity. While it is still early to fully understand how the ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic will impact U.S. policy, this book provides a timely analysis of relevant dynamics such as popular radicalization, digital information ecosystems, networks of influence, and new capabilities to recognize and prepare for other such black swan events in the region.