Rational Choice And Moral Agency

Is it rational to be moral? How do rationality and morality fit together with being human? These questions are at the heart of David Schmidtz's exploration of the connections between rationality and morality. This inquiry leads into both metaethics and rational choice theory, as Schmidtz develops conceptions of what it is to be moral and what it is to be rational. He defends a fairly expansive conception of rational choice, considering how ends as well as means can be rationally chosen and explaining the role of self-imposed constraints in a rational life plan. His moral theory is dualistic, ranging over social structure as well as personal conduct and building both individual and collective rationality into its rules of recognition for morals. To the "why be moral" question, Schmidtz responds that being moral is rational, but he does not assume we have reasons to be rational. Instead, Schmidtz argues that being moral is rational in a particular way and that beings like us in situations like ours have reasons to be rational in just that way. This approach allows him to identify decisive reasons to be moral; at the same time, it explains why immorality is as prevalent as it is. This book thus offers a set of interesting and realistic conclusions about how morality fits into the lives of humanly rational agents operating in an institutional context like our own.

Why be moral? Philosophers have wanted to answer this question for well over two thousand years, ever since Plato wrote on the subject. The question turned out to be as frustrating as it is compelling. A proper philosophical answer begins by saying what morality is, and what it means to be moral. A wise philosophical answer also steps back to ask what sort of being wants an answer. Why are we asking? Who wants to know? What do we want, and in what way might being moral serve our purposes? What difference does it make whether we have any reason to be moral? Do we have reason to care whether other people have any reason to be moral? Why? In this book, David Schmidtz presents elements of a theory of humanly rational choice: why we have reason to be rational, why being rational about the big picture seldom involves maximizing our payoff on a day to day basis, how rational agents choose ends, and why rational agents choose to respect and care about other people. Schmidtz also presents elements of a theory of morality: how being moral connects to what is good for oneself and to what is good for others, how it connects to following rules and understanding what the people around us expect from us, and how it connects to the heights of human aspiration and flourishing.

Public controversies - such as those about the distribution of goods between rich and poor, trade and population policies, allocation of medical resources, and the tradeoff between environment al protection and economic efficiency - often hinge on fundamental views about how we ought to make decisions tImt affect each other, that is, what principles we ought to follow. Efforts to find an acceptable public philosophy, a set of such principles on which people might agree, have foundered because of dis agreement among philosophers and others who are concerned with such issues. One view, which I shall develop and defend here, holds that decisions that affect others should be made according to an overall evaluation of the consequences of each option. This consequentialist view is opposed by a variety of alternatives, but many of the alternatives have in COlllmon a basis in moral intuition. To take a simple example, consequentialism holds that, other things equal, if we have decided that it is better to let a terminally ill patient die than to prolong her agony by keeping her alive, then we ought to kill her.

An ambitious new work by a well-respected economic sociologist, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique, offers a new perspective on the strategy and actions of organizations. In merging economic, psychological, and sociological literature as they focus on organizations, author Mary Zey contends that a historical political economy contingency theory provides the key to understanding how organizations function and the relationships between individuals and organizations in which they work. She brings to our attention that economic and other types of organizations differ in their behavior from rational individuals and rational markets. Zey integrates macro- and micro-levels of analysis while drawing together internal and external contingencies to explain how decisions are taken. Zey interprets, synthesizes, and critiques the important work of renowned scholars of rational choice, finance, and organizations including James March, Michael Jensen, and Oliver Williamson to analyze corporate decision making, differentiating it from individual decision making. The analysis is distinguished by inclusive thinking and new approaches to issues that have long confronted those who think about, theorize about, work with, and manage organizations. Mary ZeyÆs work expands the understanding of decision making by presenting evidence that points to the wide range and complexity of human decision making. The rational choice theorists, led most notably by Oliver Williamson and James Coleman, adhere to the tenets of transaction cost analysis and agency theory when looking at micro- and macro-level decisions made by people and organizations. Other models of decision making (habit, emotion, moral and ethical values, among others) have been labeled as deviations from formal rationality. Mary Zey calls these "deviations" alternative motives behind decision making, and her books are an attempt to present the leading work from this point of view. Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique is the first single-authored volume to analyze and present an alternative model to decision making theory and serves as a companion to Decision Making (Sage, 1992). Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory will be useful to professors and students of decision making theory, organizational theory, sociology of organizations, and social theory.

Publisher Description

There are a number of problems in philosophy that seem to share a similar possible solution: 'Why do promises and contracts bind?', 'Why ought citizens and judges obey the law?' and 'Can we realize the gains to be made from cooperation?'. All three problems (as well as some others) share a possible solution in the form of rational internal commitment. Reasons and Intentions is a 'state-of-the-art' overview of the relevant positions on the possibility of such commitment, including critical ones. The introduction provides a survey of the central problem of the volume, 'how the will can bind itself and still be instrumental in nature', and the various positions which are further examined in the contributions. Addressing the question of the relation between intentions and action, the considerations which make an intention rational and how this translates into our conception of (moral) agency, this book brings together specially commissioned essays by the leading scholars in the field.

In this book, Binder shows that at the heart of the most prominent arguments in favour of value-neutral approaches to overall freedom lies the value freedom has for human agency and development. Far from leading to the adoption of a value-neutral approach, however, ascribing importance to freedom’s agency value requires one to adopt a refined value-based approach. Binder employs an axiomatic framework in order to develop such an approach. She shows that a focus on freedom’s agency value has far reaching consequences for existing results in the freedom ranking literature: it requires one to move beyond a person’s given all-things-considered preferences to the values underlying a person’s preference formation. Furthermore, it requires, as Binder argues, one to account (only) for those differences between choice options which really matter to people. Binder illustrates the implications of her analysis for the evaluation of public policy and human development with the capability approach: only if sufficient importance is ascribed to freedom’s agency value can the capability approach keep its promises. ​

Philosophy, economics, and decision theory have long been dominated by the idea that rational choice consists of seeking or achieving one's own greatest good. Beyond Optimizing argues that our ordinary understanding of practical reason is more complex than this, and also that optimizing/maximizing views are inadequately supported by the considerations typically offered in their favor. Michael Slote challenges the long-dominant conception of individual rationality, which has to a large extent shaped the very way we think about the essential problems and nature of rationality, morality, and the relations between them. He contests the accepted view by appealing to a set of real-life examples, claiming that our intuitive reaction to these examples illustrates a significant and prevalent, if not always dominant, way of thinking. Slote argues that common sense recognizes that one can reach a point where "enough is enough," be satisfied with what one has, and, hence, rationally decline an optimizing alternative. He suggests that, in the light of common sense, optimizing behavior is often irrational. Thus, Slote is not merely describing an alternative mode of rationality; he is offering a rival theory. And the numerous parallels he points out between this common-sense theory of rationality and common-sense morality are then shown to have important implications for the long-standing disagreement between commonsense morality and utilitarian consequentialism. Beyond Optimizing is notable for its use of a much richer vocabulary of criticism than optimizing/maximizing models ever call upon. And it further argues that recent empirical investigations of the development of altruism and moral motivation need to be followed up by psychological studies of how moderation, and individual rationality more generally, take shape within developing individuals.