Rational Conflict

This book analyses conflict theory through one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation.

"This book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go—and, in fact, must go—hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary—the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University)

This book covers the problems of rational decision-making in conflict situations.

This book examines the use of third-party mediation in conflict resolution, and uses a rational method to analyse two case studies of long-term international conflicts.

Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.

Featuring a substantial new introduction and two new chapters in the Postscript, this new edition makes one of the most significant works on power available in paperback and online for the first time. The author extensively engages with a body of new literature to elucidate and expand upon the original work, using rational choice theory to provide: • An examination of how, due to the collective action problem, groups can be powerless despite not facing any resistance • Timely engagement with feminist accounts of power • An explanation of the relationship of structure and agency and how to measure power comparatively across societies This book’s unique interaction with both classical and contemporary debates makes it an essential resource for anyone teaching or studying power in the disciplines of sociology, philosophy, politics or international relations.